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With growing liberalisation, the functions of state to be reviewed. 
Deregulation should not be only for the sake of form's, instead enough measures 
should be taken to reflect easing.out controls and regulations, thereby making 
market forces to perform without restraints. Whene%r the government has to 
intervene, it must do this only when absolutely ne.ce s^s^ iy, and not as a matter of 
course. 
Under liberalisation, there is some, stopejbi* confusion because is such a 
system, unlike in a regulated economy, changes will be taking place that might be 
conflicting. While integration should be the co're ifdeia(^  spm,e times it is not possible 
for policy-makers to ensure total integration and it might so happen that some of 
the changes made may turn out to be working at cross puiposes. This is the price 
we have to pay for a liberalized economy. Once, we have opted for such a system, 
the government must pursue policies feailessly to achieve the purpose at hand. 
Since it is not possible to protect multiplicity of interests, it is best to let the 
market forces to decide the quantum and areas of protection. By and large, the 
government can only create opportunities for free enterprise and leave the fittest to 
survive. We have to recognize the strains of liberalisation in the face of the 
political and sectoral resistance to aspects that often hurt and the fact that the 
government cannot remain numb to the evident pains of change. The change that 
is taking place is not only shocking for same, but is certainly catastrophic at times. 
There are problems for different sectors in adjusting to the demands for change 
and the reformists have to gear themselves up in order to attend to these. They 
cannot simply leave them at the mercy of the agents of change, especially, in the 
beginning of such policies. 
In developing countries there is a wide spread concern about poor public 
enterprise performance, and it is generally agreed that reform of this sector is 
required urgently. The earlier hopes that public enteiprises would assist in the 
development of key industrial sectors in order to fill the entiepreneurial and skill 
gaps left by the private sector and to generate financial sutplus for investment 
under government programmes and projects have not been fulfilled. Typically, the 
sector's performance has fallen short of expectations and therefore, governments 
had to shoulder heavy fiscal and managerial burdens, absorbing an increasing 
share of scarce public resources. Poorly performing public entei-prises, sheltered 
from market competition and enjoying preferential access to scarce inputs, have 
limited the growth of public sector enteiprises, increasing the costs of their 
businesses and blocking their access to markets. Though the reasons for poor 
public enterprise performance are varied, however, for many observers the 
fundamental cause is the lack of market discipline, necessitating public enteiprises 
to be protected from the pressures of market competition in order to ensure better 
economic and financial performance. 
Developing countries like India have created a public sector, to balance or 
to replace the weak private sector, to produce higher investment ratios and in order 
to extract a capital surplus for investment in the economy. Among its objectives, it 
was also to transfer technology to strategic sectors, to generate employment, and 
to make goods available at lower prices, but success could not be achieved in 
many cases as many PSUs have been economically inefficient, incurred heavy 
financial losses, and absorbed disproportionate shares of domestic credit. Of 
particular concern to governments is the burden that loss-making PSUs place on 
hard-pressed public budget. 
Since 1990s, Indian government has undertaken comprehensive reforms 
under the auspices of stabilization and structural adjustment programmes of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which includes fiscal and 
monetary austerity, devaluation, trade liberalisation, financial liberalisation and 
banking system restructuring, price liberalisation, privatisation, labour market 
deregulation, tax reforms, and subsidy cuts. The World Bank group supports 
privatisation of public sector undertakings in the context of its broader goals of 
economic development and the reduction of poverty. An efficient private sector 
makes essential contributions to the attainment of these goals. Privatisation when 
correctly conceived and implemented, fosters efficiency, encourages investment, 
and free public resources for investment in infrastructure and social programmes. 
Privatisation is a compliment to. not a replacement for, the other aspects of the 
development of private sector in World Bank's member countries. 
The basic objective of reforms is to reduce the scope of public sector 
undertakings to create an environment for private participation and government 
private sector paitnerships to enhance efficiency and the international 
competitiveness of domestic industries and to impart dynamism to the overall 
growth process. A comprehensive reform programme includes almost all facets of 
economy such as the factor market, industry, infrastructure, trade, financial and 
public sectors. Countries are now continuing to pursue more outward-looking 
strategies through trade liberalisation, exchange rate reforms and further reduction 
of tariff and non-tariff barriers. The world is now transforming into a global 
village and liberalisation and economic reforms guided by IMF and World Bank 
have become essential devices to achieve the same. Liberalisation in its broader 
sense implies a process of freeing the economy from various governmental 
regulations such as industrial licensing, control on pricing and distribution of 
products and services, import licensing, foreign exchange regulations, control of 
capital issues by companies, credit controls, restiictions on investments etc., so 
that the development and operation of economy may expand the market. Thus, 
liberalisation is essentially a process of withdrawal of all direct controls on the 
economy. 
In such an environment of liberalisation and economic reforms intioduced 
in India since 1991, under the 'Washington Consensus' an important question 
arises as to what will be the impact of liberalisation and economic reforms on 
public sector undertakings. 
This research work on "Impact of Liberalisation and Economic Reforms on 
Administration: With Special Reference to Public Sector Undertakings" is an 
attempt to examine the consequences of liberalisation and economic reforms 
commenced since 1991, on public sector undertakings. 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. 
The First Chapter titled, 'Stiaicture and Working of Administration' 
endeavours to present an overview of the evolution of Indian Administration, its 
structure and working in the Mauryan period, during Sultanate of Delhi, Mughal, 
British and post-independence periods. Through this chapter we come to know 
that India has a nearly four thousand years long administrative histoiy. Imperial 
and unitary form of administrative systems; i.e. the Mauryan, the Mughal and the 
British systems have significantly conttibuted to the evolution of political 
institutions and subsequent administrative system based on parliamentai-y 
democracy in India. However, many other regimes such as Guptas, Cholas and the 
Sultanate of Delhi have also influenced Indian administrative system through the 
ages, which should not be undermined. The administrative systems-Mauryan, 
Mughal and British are said to be the 'land marks' in the evolution of India's 
administrative system. This is mainly because they were being designed for 
common application over a major part of India. This commonality also infused a 
unitary character in all these three administrative systems. Another similarity 
among these systems was in terms of their objectives that were, to preserve and 
promote the imperial interest of the respective regimes. Notwithstanding its 
colonial character, the British administrative system marked the beginning of a 
scientific and universal pattern of administration. As a whole, all these three 
administtative systems alongwith many other regimes and empires have left their 
lasting impressions on the present day administrative system in India, based on 
parliamentary democracy. This chapter ends with a discussion on public sector 
undertakings in a socialistic pattern of society. Public sector undertaking is a 
modem innovation inducted into the economic activities of a state by which a 
socialistic state like India ensures equitable distribution of goods and services 
under its own care and control. Maximum socio-economic benefits to the 
maximum number of consumers at the minimum cost of production form the 
cardinal objectives of the government of the socialistic state to induct into 
commercial, industrial or commercial life. We also come to know that personnel 
of any public enterprises generally do not form part of the civil services of the 
state. Thus, the executive, legislature and the civil services do not have control 
over the public enterprise personnel. In India, however, these principles have not 
been adhered to. Almost invariably the top-notches of the public enteiprises have 
been live wire personnel from the Indian Civil Services deputed on secondments 
from the ministries. Even the staff manning the lower levels of managements has 
been taken over from the government departments or the ministries. Thus, the 
deputationists have caused many problems. These civil servants who, sometimes, 
lack the required technical expertise, commercial skill and experience, were 
incapable of adjusting themselves to the changed socialistic environment after 
independence. They remained aloof from the employees and didn't join the main 
stream of the social changes. This naturally deprived the right position in the 
enterprise. Wrong people were thus imposed on the right positions. The result has 
been that the public sector has been pestered with evils like favouritism, nepotism, 
corruption, and inefficiency. The Nehru Government is supposed to be responsible 
for the present un-easing and devastating brain drainage in India. Evidently these 
public enterprises have become automatic machines, producing conoiption and 
inefficiency. The Public Sector, therefore, came to be mismanaged by the 
unprincipled politicians and opportunistic civil seivants. The needed freedom from 
the control of the government or from the clutches of the bureaucrats of the 
administrative ministries has been the C17 of the day. 
The Second Chapter entitled, 'Public Sector Undertakings in India' 
discusses the genesis of public sector undertakings and it's beginning in India. It 
also highlights the pattern of PS Us in India and their working in the changed 
environment of liberalisation and privatisation. Moreover, this chapter examines 
the process of contiol over PSUs under the auspices of liberalisation and economic 
reforms introduced since 1990s. The implications for public accountability arise 
from the fact that the central government's financial stake in the company will 
come down as a consequence of disinvestments. The calculations show that the 
stake would fall from as high as 89.5% to 58% per cent. One must acknowledge 
that even with this holding the centre would be able to exercise considerable 
control over the company's management. One obvious solution to ensure 
autonomy and relevant accountability for PSUs is to disinvest their equity to 49% 
or less to remove their handicap of being considered as a part of the state. The 
government could still retain a majority stake, say, through equity owned by a 
publicly held trust so that it is not perceived as holding a majority of the shares. 
Through this Chapter we come to know that in India, the model of establishing 
and managing public sector enterprises has differed vastly from that of similar 
ventures in socialistic states in other parts of the world. There are. however, 
different forms of exercising governmental control over public sector enterprises. 
In socialistic or communist states like the erstwhile USSR and other countries 
where the innovation of public enterprise has firstly been inducted in the economic 
field, it is the political party in power which directs the government as to how it 
should plan and promote public enterprises and manage them to realize given 
socio-economic targets. Public sector undertakings were being promoted for 
establishing social justice and economic equality in the nation; to raise the 
standards of living of the poor, and to add to the gross national product. But in 
practice, political bureaucrats and administrative bureaucrats occupying the top 
managerial positions of the public sector succeeded only in raising the standard of 
living of their own selves and that of their dear and near ones. To conclude, it can 
be safely said that unprincipled politicians and opportunistic civil servants in India 
have summarily mismanaged the public sector since the very beginning. Although, 
the public sector undertakings constitute one of the most important forms of 
development efforts made by governments. This brings us to the veiy basic issue 
whether with privatisation undertakings in which the government still has a 
substantial stake should be treated as any of the other private sector undertaking. 
While in the private corporate sector the governing stake does not have to be 
considerable to ensure that the governing interests appoint their own chaiiman and 
managing directors and pick the directors at will, what to speak of appointing 
auditors they favour. With privatisation of PSUs, a situation could easily emerge 
where despite a substantial holding by the government in financial terms and not 
in percentage terms the government will be unable to assert itself in the matter of 
appointment of the managing director, members of the board of directors and the 
auditors. 
In India, public sector undertakings were foimed in accordance with the 
decision to use industrialisation as a means of affecting economic growth. In order 
to accelerate the rate of economic development and in order to free the economy 
from colonial dependence, it was necessary to build up heavy industiy. Hence, the 
formation of a public sector in the economy of developing country like India is a 
historically inevitable process. India followed British pattern to establish public 
sector undertakings in the economy. Public sector had been playing a vital role in 
building up the basic infrastructure for growth and setting up core and basic heavy 
industries in the initial stages of the country's development by making large 
investments with long gestation periods, which the private sector would not have 
been able to do at that stage. Such investments created the infrastiucture and the 
investment climate required for the growth of private investment. Public sector 
was protected from competition by state benefaction in various forms like 
budgetary support, price preference and capital restructuring. This, combined with 
bureaucratic control, political greed, lack of autonomy in taking commercial 
decisions and consequent lack of accountability adversely affected the efficiency 
and profitability of the public sector, and made many public enterprises sick, their 
net worth being totally eroded by their accumulated losses. They continued to 
survive due to government meeting their working capital requirements and 
reimbursing their losses from the budgetary resources, thereby increasing their 
revenue deficits. 
The Third Chapter titled, 'Liberalisation and Economic Reforms' 
examines the foundations of the concept of liberalisation, laissez-faire, economic 
reforms, disinvestments and divestment and their indispensability in the present 
global economic system. Furthermore, this chapter tries to examine the Industrial 
Policy Resolutions of India regarding public sector policy of the government since 
1948. Besides, this chapter also surveys the Multinational Corporations and their 
administration in India. In this chapter we examine that the key strategy espoused 
for growth and progress in most of the developing countries during the 1950's and 
60's was a deep dependence on planned economy with a clear stress on public 
sector participation in economic development. Many developing countiies in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America pursued this model of development energetically, 
but, within a period of two-three decades, became disenchanted with the results. 
Against the background of a series of global recessions in 70s and 80s, the 
economies of most developing countries began to collapse, above all under the 
strains of severe external debt, which began accumulating in the late 70s. Public 
Sector investments produced less output, lower yield and consequently very little 
surplus, if any, for growth. Consequently pressure began to mount globally for a 
change in the strategies of growth. With the end of the cold war and the break up 
of the Soviet Union and the global trend towards rolling back the frontiers of state, 
with increased reliance on market economy and renewed faith in the capacity of 
private capital and resources due to the phenomenal success of such policies in the 
case of the East Asian, Latin American and African countries, a process of 
structural adjustment spurred by the studies and influence of the World Bank and 
other international organizations have started in many of the developing countries. 
The process of globalisation and liberalisation in developing societies and the 
accompanying forces of market economy have given rise to questions of far-
reaching considerable and procedural significance. 
The Fourth Chapter titled, impact of Liberalisation and Economic 
Reforms on Administration' scrutinizes the economic reforms during the Congress 
party rule and post Congress party reforms. This Chapter also studies the structure 
and working of the Ministry of Disinvestment. It also analyzes the Lok Sabha 
discussions concerning public sector undertakings, and the role of bureaucracy in 
PSUs. In the end it evaluates the administration in the era of globalisation. The 
economic reforms introduced by P.V Narsimha Rao in the shape of New 
Economic Policy gave us some hope. But we should not imitate the wholesale 
western model, as it would be dangerous to our own existence. We should 
privatise, liberalise and globalise our economy but at the same time should come 
up with a clear-cut economic alternative to the pro-western pronouncements of 
Rao and later Devegowda, Gujral and Vajpayee governments. Attempts should be 
made to Indianize the system of our economy. A healthy interaction with the 
western economic forces is welcome but the Indian identity should not be lost 
sight of. Unnecessary bureaucratic control should be done away with, but the 
supremacy of the people and the sovereignty of the nation should be emphasized 
in unambiguous terms. The wholesale transplantation of western technology and 
consumeristic culture based on the principle of profiteering is certainly not the 
solution to our problems. The impact of uncritical acceptance of the western 
model of modernisation and liberalisation of the economy has been much more 
varied and far-reaching than is visualized. Because of the wholesale commitment 
to the neo-liberal market-friendly ideology and policies, the role, relevance and 
even the very existence of public sector undertakings (PSUs) are under constant 
questioning and threat. The government is committed to disinvest its 
shareholdings in PSUs in order to privatize them. The advocates of the school of 
impairing greater autonomy to PSUs, on the other hand, have been strongly 
advocating to withhold these enterprises. In their view, a few strategic measures 
such as strengthening the Navaratana/Miniratana institutions, operating PSUs a 
board-managed organizations, and investing more monies into them, would 
facilitate them to function better and augment their competitiveness, and 
contribute to consistent and sustainable development. A board-led enteiprise is an 
essential prerequisite for the success of working of an enterprise. The institution of 
Board of Directors in PSUs frequently reveals the need for making PSUs as board 
led organizations. The composition and strengths of such boards should be such 
that may turnout to be a viitue of PSUs and contribute to the their improved 
performance. The government should restrict the number of government directors 
on the enterprises and appoint independent directors and also to enhance their 
number. In the changed economic environment of liberalisation, it is desirable to 
reduce the nominees from government and induct more internal and external 
professionals and expert members in the board to make it function in a 
commercial-like manner, of course without compromising the public puipose. 
Under liberalisation, we should have a policy that would work for PSUs. 
While the MoU and exit policy, no doubt, have a role in preparing the public 
sector for the challenges of tomorrow, these by themselves will not do. The PSUs 
should be competent to fight things out and this demands a tough format. The 
PSUs fundamentally should be corporatized, not only in structure but also in its 
approach. The policy makers should first stop thinking about all the commanding 
heights of the past and settle down to the business of putting the various PSUs in a 
position where they can perform competently. However, with the liberalisation of 
the economy, restructuring of PSUs has to take a different dimension, simply 
cleaning the slate will not do and the public sector companies should be given an 
agenda that will help them function at a competitive level of feasibility. 
Under pressure of liberalisation, the third world countries are being 
obsessed by ill conceived deregulation exercises as well as misperceived 
promotional attempts towards wasteful and environmentally hazardous processes. 
The liberalisation process which is directed at speeding up economic investments 
and removal of various existing rules on grounds of environmental safety or other 
reasons has practically made a hazardous impact on the economy. The 
10 
liberalisation programme to be successful should ensure that the benefits accrue to 
all sections of society and that it commands the acceptance of a wide constituency. 
Developments in the Indian economy cannot be de-linked from the international 
context. The process of integration of economies into a global economy is 
proceeding apace, and we ought to be part of the process. Liberalisation at home 
must be a necessary precondition for expanding our involvement in the 
international economy to obtain competitive benefits through reforms in areas 
such as agriculture and labour intensive industry. 
In our point of view, numerous problems inherited in liberalisation, as 
apparent today and as evident through histoiy are posed by a close scrutiny of 
market operations, such as: 
1. The fabulous claim that extension of private power implies maximization of 
individual liberty has to be studied empirically. It will be deceptive to 
ignore the coercive abilities of the market operation. 
2. Markets fail to narrate to the requirements of people if not interceded by 
individual purchasing power or public intei^vention. 
3. There are several areas where market mechanism is simply unable of 
operating. Public goods that are characterized by indivisibilities in 
production or by jointness of supply pretense a difficulty for market. 
4. Market mechanism in lots of cases, is incompetent of toning up to 
efficiency. Lacks of any regulation will only makes things unmanageable 
and increases the risks often unalterable of these processes. 
Thus, government intervention in relation to, formulation and 
implementation of monopoly legislation, investment in human resource 
development, elimination of baniers to the equalization of oppoitunities for higher 
earnings, information and marketing, physical and social infrastmcture, research 
and development, and other measures conducive to the efficient functioning of the 
market will not only be justifiable but it will also promote efficiency and enhance 
productivity of the market-oriented economy. Market liberalisation refers to 
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change in policy framework within which the public enterprises operate, which 
will create a more competitive, market-oriented environment whereas enterprise 
reform refers to internal change in the management, organization and operational 
practices of public enterprises. Privatisation refers to the tiansfer of ownership 
and/or control of productive assets from public to private sector. Market 
liberalisation can be implemented without changing the ownership or control of 
public enterprises, and ownership or control can be shifted to the private sector 
while leaving the overall policy framework unaltered. Here, a question, which 
arises, is ownership an important determinant of economic performance? 
Economic theory suggests that improvements in efficiency and performance 
depend not only on ownership, but also on market competition. Economic 
reasoning also implies that performance may be better under private ownership 
and control than under public ownership, and will be better in competitive rather 
than monopoly market conditions. 
The trouble with our economic planners and politicians is that they base 
their conclusions and actions on economic parameters alone, leaving out such 
important issues as population growth, ecological degradation, and unsustainable 
development all of which interact with each other and affect the economy. We 
should, therefore, try to find an Indian solution to the Indian problem. The Indian 
economy is dangerously taking an elitist pro-western trend. It shall not serve the 
interests of the nation in the long run. It may be a relief for the time being but not 
the remedy we are searching for. Therefore, we should globalise with caution with 
effective benign role of the state ensured. In our opinion the root cause of present 
day economic ills of our nation is corruption-corruption of all kinds, which is 
mainly due to the blind race for modernisation on the western model. Hence, we 
should devote our energies to the elimination of wholesale and retail corruption at 
all levels. Various scandals involving people from bottom to top and from top to 
bottom compel us to think again. India's economic reform programme since 1990s 
has involved two basic sets of policy measures. The first set aims to accomplish 
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macroeconomic stabilisation by reducing both fiscal and balance of payment 
deficits. Reducing fiscal deficits involves a cut in public expenditure, and also an 
attempt to raise public revenue to bring about a balanced budget over a period of 
time. To reduce the BOP deficits, the economic reform program in India has 
heavily relied on currency devaluation to boost up exports and lessen imports. So 
far, measures taken to attain macroeconomic stabilization in India have been 
generally half-hearted and stumbling in nature. 
The second basic set of economic policy initiatives taken in India since July 
1991 have been to modify the production structure by increasing the role of the 
markets in the economy, directly through privatisation, or by way of reduction in 
state investments and interventions, and indirectly through domestic deregulation 
and by trade liberalisation. The overall effect of these measures has been to bring 
to an end India's relative economic isolation from the rest of the world economy. 
There is no misgiving that there has been an increased degree of integration of the 
Indian economy with the global economy in the 1990s. This has led to a 
fimdamental shift in Indian developmental policy, away from Nehruvian socialism 
based on import-substitution industrialisation to an export-oriented 
industrialisation strategy. The industrial policy announced in July 1991 intended to 
fi-ee the industrial sector from barriers to entry, and from other limitations to 
expansion, diversification and modernization. Much of the industrial licensing 
system was dismantled, and areas once closed to the private sector were opened 
up: electricity generation, some of the oil industry, heavy industry, air transport, 
road and areas telecommunications. 
Some broad conclusions relating to privatisation or disinvestment policy, 
which emerge from the present study may be stated as follows: 
1. Privatisation, which is being pursued since July 1991, has not been 
precisely defined anywhere. It has so far consisted of-
(a) Broad-basing the ownership and management of PS Us by selling 
government equity to the general public or the workers, or making 
"strategic sales" of PSUs on a selective basis and thereby mobilizing 
resources that could be used to reduce budgetary deficit of the government; 
(b) Revival of sick PSUs by referring them to the BIFR and closure of such 
sick PSUs that caimot be revived; 
(c) Taking measures to improve the performance of PSUs by giving them 
greater autonomy and making them accountable; and 
(d) Permitting private investments (including the inflow of foreign capital) in 
several areas hitherto reserved for the public sector, and facilitating and 
encouraging private investment and competition in such areas, particularly 
in building up of infrastructure like power, telecommunications, air 
transport, road construction, information technology etc. 
2. Privatisation efforts so far have not resulted in any significant reduction in 
the number of PSUs or mobilization of sizeable resources by 
disinvestments. 
3. Privatisation would be meaningful if besides (a), (b), (c) and (d) of (1) 
above, the PSUs are fully exposed to competition by withdrawal of all 
government protection and patronage and making them sink or swim on 
their own strength and ultimately freeing them from all forms of State 
control (bureaucratic and political) and insulating them from political 
greed, or disbursing of patronage by politicians. 
4. Besides the implementation of the Competition Act, it is also necessary to 
have independent regulators to ensure a level playing field for all, and 
preventing and punishing unfair practices. 
Mere privatisation of PSUs is not sufficient. PSUs are only one of the 
several ingredients of the public sector. It is essential to make thorough analytical 
studies of each ingredient, particularly government administration, to make a 
decision what package of measures need to be adopted to set the entire public 
sector on the right track. With growing liberalisation of the economy, policy 
makers should concentrate sincerely to protect the PSUs and the domestic private 
sector even while encouraging the flow of foreign investment because neither can 
be sacrificed. This is the most important aspect since we need both foreign 
investment and the domestic enteiprise. Refonn should not be directed towards 
displacement of Indian skills and capital, and at the same time, the firm signal 
should be sent to the international community that the Indian economy was 
opening up and should cease to be viewed as a closed shop. This is a difficult 
preposition, but the reformists in the government should be flexible enough to 
assure both sides that neither is neglected. In regard to foreign investment, westem 
governments and industrialists need convincing that the doors are being opened to 
multilateral business. 
The Fifth Chapter under the heading of 'India and the World Economic 
Environment' highlights the international economic relations in the twentieth 
century which witnessed developments that led to the evolution of concepts, 
percepts and doctrines completely unique not only to achieve order in international 
economic and trading relations but also in the establishment of international 
economic institutions like GATT, WTO, IMF and World Bank. This Chapter 
scans the significance of SAARC and Regional Cooperation in the changed world 
scenario. Finally, this Chapter discusses the opposition campaigns against 
disinvestment policies of the government of India. The period of 1913-1950 which 
witnessed two world wars and trade wars, the severest economic depression in 
history, the collapse of liberalism and of the global market, very slow growth of 
output and international trade was one of the worst periods indeed. It has been 
very aptly observed that "economic liberalism, waxing from 1820 to around 1870, 
waning between 1870 and 1913, was practically moribund from 1913 to 1950". 
With the ravages of the second world war, the economic problems became too 
dampening. So in 1944, even while the second world war was going on, 
representatives of 44 nations met in Bretton Woods, USA, to discuss the major 
international problems and to evolve practical solutions for them. The Bretton 
Woods Conference proposed the setting up of 
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(i) The International Monetary Fund (IMF) to alleviate the problems of 
international liquidity (i.e., to help the member countries to meet their 
balance of payments deficits) and international monetaiy instability; 
(ii) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to 
help the reconstruction and development of various national economies 
by providing long-term capital assistance; and 
(iii) The International Trade Organisation to work towards the liberalisation 
of international trade. 
Through this study we also come to know that International financial 
institutions like IMF, World Bank consider 'Privatisation' to be an instiument of 
economic policy which when combined with other measures improves economy. 
In the global context, it is seen as an instrument to create market economy, 
generate local and international competition and improve national productivity so 
that a country gets a competitive advantage among nations. International 
experience leads one to conclude that divestiture of PSUs by itself is no panacea 
for ensuring their global competitiveness, which depends on management styles, 
policies and ethics irrespective of whether entrepreneurs are in the public or 
private sector. Objectives, country characteristics, compulsions and ideologies 
determine the best course that needs to be adopted. To make PSUs globally 
competitive, however, most PSUs need to be reengineered. One aspect that finds 
universal acceptance is that disinvestments proceeds should not be used to finance 
welfare schemes. 
The methods of the study have been historical, descriptive and analytical. 
Efforts have been made to collect all the relevant data and inteipret it in historical 
perspective and from the point of current relevance. Most of the research material 
has been collected from different libraries in India especially Indian Institute of 
Public Administration, Sapru Academy, Lok Sabha Secretariat Library, Jawaharlal 
Nehru University, all located in Delhi and Maulana Azad Library, A.M.U. Aligarh 
and from the Internet. 
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PREFACE 
With growing liberalisation, the functions of state are needed to be 
reviewed. Deregulation should not be for form's sake and a variet>' of measures 
taken should be reflected in fewer controls and regulations and in the market 
forces performing without restraint. While the government has to intervene, it 
must do this only when necessary, and not as a matter of course. 
Under liberalisation, there is always scope for confusion because unlike in a 
regulated economy changes will be taking place that might be conflicting. While 
integration should be the idea, still it is not possible for policy-makers to ensure 
total integration and some of the changes being made may turn out to be working 
purposes at cross purposes. This is the price we have to pay for a liberalized 
economy. Once, we have opted for such a system, fear should not be at the root of 
whatever policies that the government has to pursue to achieve the purpose at 
hand. It is not possible to protect several interests and the government must let the 
market forces decide who requires protection and who does not. Overall, it can 
only create opportunities for free enterprises and leave the fittest to survive. We 
have to recognize the strains of liberalisation in the face of the political and 
sectoral resistance to aspects that often hurt and the fact that the government 
cannot remain numb to the evident pains of change. The change that is taking 
place is not only shocking, but it is certainly catastrophic. There are problems for 
different sectors in adjusting to the demands for change and the reformists have to 
gear themselves up in order to attend to these. They cannot simply leave them at 
the mercy of the agents of change, especially, in the beginning of such policies. 
In developing countries there is wide spread concern about poor public 
enterprise performance, and it is generally agreed that reform of this sector is 
required urgently. The earlier hopes that public enterprises would assist in the 
development of key industrial sectors in order to fill the entrepreneurial and skill 
gaps left by the private sector and to generate financial surplus for investment 
under government programmes and projects have not been fulfilled. Typically, the 
sector's performance has fallen short of expectations and therefore, governments 
had to shoulder heavy fiscal and managerial burdens, absorbing an increasing 
share of scarce public resources. Poorly performing public enterprises, sheltered 
from market competition and enjoying preferential access to scarce inputs, have 
limited the growth of public sector enterprises, increasing their costs of business 
and blocking their access to markets. Though the reasons for poor public 
enterprise performance are varied, however, for many observers the fundamental 
cause is the lack of market discipline, necessitating public enterprises to be 
protected from the pressures of market competition in order to ensure better 
economic and financial performance. 
Developing countries like India have created a public sector, to balance or 
replace weak private sector, to produce higher investment ratios and in order to 
extract a capital surplus for investment in the economy, to transfer technology to 
strategic sectors, to generate employment, and to make goods available at lower 
prices, although many PSUs have been economically inefficient, incurred heavy 
financial losses, and absorbed disproportionate shares of domestic credit. Of 
particular concern to governments is the burden that loss-making PSUs place on 
hard-pressed public budget. 
Since 1990s, Indian government has undertaken comprehensive reforms 
under the auspices of stabilization and structural adjustment programmes of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which includes fiscal and 
monetary austerity, devaluation, trade liberalisation, financial liberalisation and 
banking system restructuring, price liberalisation, privatisation, labour market 
deregulation, tax reforms, and subsidy cuts. The World Bank group supports 
privatisation of public sector undertakings in the context of its broader goals of 
economic development and the reduction of poverty. An efficient private sector 
makes essential contributions to the attainment of these goals. Privatisation when 
correctly conceived and implemented, fosters efficiency, encourages investment. 
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and free public resources for investment in infrastructure and social programmes. 
Privatisation is a compliment to, not a replacement for, the other aspects of the 
development of private sector in World Bank's member countries. 
The basic objective of reforms is to reduce the scope of public sector 
undertakings to create an environment for private participation and government 
private sector partnerships to enhance efficiency and the international 
competitiveness of domestic industries and to impart dynamism to the overall 
growth process. A comprehensive reform programme includes almost all facets of 
economy such as the factor market, industry, infrastructure, trade, financial and 
public sectors. Countries are now continuing to pursue more outward-looking 
strategies through trade liberalisation, exchange rate reforms and further reduction 
of tariff and non-tariff barriers. The world is now transforming into a global 
village and liberalisation and economic reforms guided by IMF and World Bank 
have become essential devices to achieve the same. Liberalisation in its broader 
sense implies a process of freeing the economy from various governmental 
regulations such as industrial licensing, control on pricing and distribution of 
products and services, import licensing, foreign exchange regulations, control of 
capital issues by companies, credit controls, restrictions on investments etc., so 
that the development and operation of economy may expand the market. Thus, 
liberalisation is essentially a process of withdrawal of all direct controls on the 
economy. 
In such an environment of liberalisation and economic reforms introduced 
in India since 1991, under the 'Washington Consensus' an important question 
arises as to what will be the impact of liberalisation and economic reforms on 
public sector undertakings. 
This research work on "Impact of Liberalisation and Economic Reforms on 
Administration: With Special Reference to Public Sector Undertakings" is an 
attempt to examine the consequences of liberalisation and economic reforms 
commenced since 1991, on public sector undertakings. 
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The thesis is divided into five chapters. 
The First Chapter titled, 'Structure and Working of Administration' 
endeavours to present an overview of the evolution of Indian Administration, its 
structure and working in the Mauryan period, during Sultanate of Delhi, Mughal, 
British and post-independence periods. This chapter ends with a discussion on 
public sector undertakings in a socialistic pattern of society. 
The Second Chapter entitled, 'Public Sector Undertakings in India' 
discusses the genesis of public sector undertakings and it's beginning in India. It 
also highlights the pattern of PSUs in India and their working in the changed 
environment of liberalisation and privatisation. Moreover, this chapter examines 
the process of control over PSUs under the auspices of liberalisation and economic 
reforms introduced since 1990s. This brings us to the very basic issue whether 
with privatisation undertakings in which the Government still has a substantial 
stake should be treated as any of the other private sector undertakings. While in 
the private corporate sector the governing stake does not have to be considerable 
to ensure that the governing interests appoint their own Chairman and Managing 
Directors and pick the directors at will, what to speak of appointing auditors they 
favour. With privatisation of PSUs, a situation could easily emerge where despite 
a substantial holding by the government in financial terms and not in percentage 
terms the government will be unable to assert itself in the matter of appointment of 
the managing director, members of the board of directors and the auditors. 
The Third Chapter titled, 'Liberalisation and Economic Reforms' examines 
the foundation of the concept of liberalisation, laissez-faire^ economic reforms, 
disinvestments and divestment and their indispensability in the present global 
economic system. Furthermore, this chapter tries to examine the Industrial Policy 
Resolutions of India regarding public sector policy of the government since 1948. 
Besides, this chapter also surveys the Multinational Corporations and their 
administration in India. 
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The Fourth Chapter titled, 'Impact of Liberalisation and Economic Reforms 
on Administration' scrutinizes the economic reforms during the Congress party 
rule and post Congress party reforms. This Chapter also studies the structure and 
working of the Ministry of Disinvestment. It also analyzes the Lok Sabha 
discussions concerning public sector undertakings, and the role of bureaucracy in 
PSUs. In the end it evaluates the administration in the era of globalisation. 
The Fifth Chapter under the heading of 'India and the World Economic 
Environment' highlights the international economic relations in the twentieth 
century which witnessed developments that led to the evolution of concepts, 
percepts and doctrines completely unique not only to achieve order in international 
economic and trading relations but also in the establishment of international 
economic institutions like GATT, WTO, IMF and World Bank. This Chapter 
scans the significance of SAARC and Regional Cooperations in the changed world 
scenario. Finally, this Chapter discusses the opposition campaigns against 
disinvestment policies of the government of India. 
The concluding section brings together various issues with reference to the 
policies of the government regarding PSUs in a globalised economy. 
The methods of the study have been historical, descriptive and analytical. 
Efforts have been made to collect all the relevant data and interpret it in historical 
perspective and from the point of current relevance. Most of the research material 
has been collected from different libraries in India especially Indian Institute of 
Public Administration, Sapru Academy, Lok Sabha Secretariat Library, Jawaharlal 
Nehru University, Maulana Azad Library, A.M.U. Aligarh and from the Internet. 
CKA(FI^^I 
STRUCTURE AND WORKING OF INDIAN 
ADMINISTRATION 
(A) Origin of Indian Administration 
(1) Pre-Mughal Period 
i) Mauryan Administration: The structure and shape of Indian administration as 
it exists today is not just the result of administrative rules framed by the British or 
by British parliament during their rule or by the parliament of the free India after 
mdependence. Its roots go deep m the adminisfrative history of the country from 
the ancient times. The real foundations of India's administrative system were laid 
during the Mauryan period of Indian history. Chandragupta Maurya, the founder 
of the Mauryan Empire was a great warrior and an able administrator. He set up a 
sound and efficient system of administration in his vast empire. The great 
diplomat and politician Kautilya, also called Chanakya, in the task of building-up 
a sound administrative system assisted him. His system of government was 
virtually based on the principles laid down in the Arthashastra written by 
kautilya. Chandragupta, the founder of Mauryan dynasty, succeeded the Nanda 
IJhrone in 321 B.C at the age of twenty five. The Arthashastra is our main literary 
Source of information regarding Chandragupta's administration. The account of 
the Greek ambassador Megasthenes is another source of information in the field. 
Kautilya was the chief advisor and Prime Minister of Chandragupta Maurya. His 
i]eal name was Vishnu Gupta and he was a Brahmin by caste. 
The Arthashastra is divided into 15 books but the books relevant to the 
sjtudy of the pattern of the public adminisfration as such are four; the first, the 
slecond, the fifth and the sixth. The second book entitled "The Duties of 
Crovemment Superintendents" depicts almost all the departments, but 
cpnsideration of the machinery of the government would be mcomplete if the 
portion in the first book regarding relations of the king with ministers, spies, 
ehvoys and princes are not taken into account. 
The Arthashastra is more a manual for an admmistrator than a theoretical 
work It IS mainly concerned with practical problems of government and describes 
Its machmery and functions, both m peace and war The instructions on 
administration cover all areas and functions m some detail and clarity They 
mclude central, provincial, regional, field and village administration, municipal 
administration, fmancial and resource admmistration, justice and military 
administration In fact, the titles of chapters in the second book alone illustrate the 
tentacular nature of modem bureaucracy Formation of villages, division of land, 
construction efforts, building withm the forts, duties of the Chamberlam, busmess 
of collection of revenue by the Collector General, busmess of keepmg up accounts 
m the office of accountants, detection of what is embezzled by the government 
servants out of the state revenue, exammation of the conduct of government 
servants etc, are the chapters of second book of Kautilya's Arthashastra ' Such an 
elaborate tentacular bureaucracy sustamed m loyalty and efficiency m those days 
of difficult communication through three factors an elaborate system of internal 
spymg and mspection, the hard work and vigilance of the emperor and his cohorts, 
and, thirdly, through a skeletal monetary economy with cash payments 
Accordmg to Arthashastra, Chandragupta was the lawmaker and the 
supreme judge He was also the supreme commander of the army He governed 
the empire with the help of mantris or mmisters and the Amatyas or secretanes 
There was also a Parishad or Assembly which consisted of mantris, amatyas and 
other mfluential people of the state It was a sort of parliament, which advised the 
emperor on important matters of war and peace However, Chandragupta was not 
bound to accept the advise of his Parishad. The whole empire was divided mto 
four provinces The emperor directly govemed the provmce of Magadha while 
Patliputra was the capital of the Mauryan Empire The north-western provmce had 
Its capital at Taxila, the western provmce at Ujjam and the southern provmce at 
Suvamagiri The governor of each provmce was called 'Kiimara' or 'Aryaputra' 
and was generally a prince of the royal family ^ The provmces were divided mto 
Vishyas or Aharas. The Vishyas consisted of a number of villages. Besides these 
territories under direct rule, there existed some territories as vassal states. 
Minister and the high priest were the most important ministers; with one or 
two additions they might have formed the irmer cabinet. It were they who assisted 
the king to examme the character of mmisters appointed in government 
departments of ordmary nature. Those whose character was already tested under 
all kinds of allurements were to be employed as prime mmisters. Among the 
important ministers m Arthashastra might be counted the Sacrificial Priest, the 
teacher, the Prime Minister, the High Priest, The Commander of the Army, 
Chamberlain or Treasurer General and the Collector General. Below ministers, 
there were officers called Superintendents, lower in importance than the 
ministerial officer and much below them, belonging to the Sixth order, accordmg 
to remuneration. They might be regarded as Chiefs of sections dealing with 
various economic and other activities of the government. A dual control was 
exercised over the superintendents as far as control of the services of the personnel 
and collection of the revenue was concerned, they were under the Collector 
General.^ The finance department consisted of three officers. The Collector 
General of ministerial level in charge of revenue collection; the Treasurer General 
of ministerial level in charge of treasury in the broad sense of the term consisting 
of treasurer house, trading house, store house of grains, store house of forest 
produce, armory and jail; and the Superintendent of Accounts much below 
ministerial level according to remuneration.'* The Prime Minister, Door Keeper, 
the superintendent of Harem, all of ministerial level. The Supermtendent of 
country parts and that of boundaries, both belonging to the next order below the 
ministers and the superintendent of passport and that of pastuer lands both of 7"" 
order accordmg to remuneration are included in the home department in 
Arthashastra. The duty of a minister as specifically handling the Home portfolio is 
not mentioned m the Arthashastra. The head of the defence department seems to 
be the Senapati. The Senapati is not the commander; under him there are two 
branches one in charge of actual defence forces controlling strategy and tactics on 
the field, and the other in charge of supplies. ^ 
The structure of central administration is given in great detail both in 
Kautilya's Arthashastra and in Asokan inscriptions. They agree about two or three 
top levels in central administration; a Minister or Ministers called Mantrin 
(Kautilya) or Mahamantra (Asoka); a council of ministers at the next level 
{Manthparashid) and many top officers and public servants variously called 
Amatayas or Sachh'as in a clear hierarchy. These three levels were retained with 
slightly changed names in the later Gupta Empire m the 5 Century A.D. and 
under Harsha in the 7* Century. The General of the Army was also a Mantri of 
equal status as were the Viceroy of Kumara of the four large regions or Provmces 
of the Mauryan Empire. Their high and equal status is borne out by the high 
annual salary of 48,000 Panas assigned to them. The members of the council were 
either part time or consultative and drew 12,000 Panas, but the Public Servants-
amatyas-<istv^ 24,000 Panas or half of the top MantHns.^ 
The army administration was separately organized as was accounting and 
financial administration through separate hierarchies. The office of the Collector 
General (samaharti) and the Accountant General {Akshapataladhyaksha) were 
separate and each had its own hierarchy. Kautilya goes into minute details about 
everything but even more so in regard to finance. The chapter xxi of book II on 
tolls, details various punishments for various offences relating to toll evasion and 
chapter xvi on commerce discusses government monopolies of local produce and 
imports in detail and suitable ways of increasing profit. Two detailed chapters are 
again assigned to gold and currency.^ 
The Mauryan government was a centralized bureaucracy of which the 
nucleus was the king. The king was assisted by the Mantriparishad whose 
members were a few mantris, the Yuvraj, the Purohita and Senapati. Legislation 
was largely a confirmation of social usage. The final decision was the kmg's 
though the opinion of the ministers was considered. The Mantriparishad was 
subordinate to the king and was generally an advisory body. Its members were 
selected by the king. Megasthenes says advisors m the Maninpahshad were 
selected from the 7"' caste- the councilors {Brahmins and Kshatriyas)^ 
Arthashastra says that Purohita (high priest) of the palace and Mahamantri were 
present when the king examined his ministers. In fact they played a vital role in 
the administration of the Mauryan state. The central administration was largely 
confined to revenue control. Sannidhata (chief revenue officer) performed an 
important role as a treasurer of state income that was received m cash or kind 
(grain, gems, etc). Samaharta was the revenue collector from cities, lands, mines, 
forests, roads, tolls, fines, licences, taxes on manufactured goods, merchandise and 
precious stones. He was in charge of income, expenditure and supervision of 
accounts provided by the Accountant General. Accountant General kept the 
accounts of the royal household who were assisted by Karmikas (clerks). Accounts 
were jointly submitted by ministers, and those who committed fraud were heavily 
fmed for embezzlement. The fiscal year commenced from Asadha (July) with 354 
working days.^ 
The governance of the vast territory with the help of an expanding 
bureaucracy and a huge standing army involved heavy expenditure. This seems to 
have been the guiding principle of the Mauryan state in undertaking and regulating 
numerous economic activities which brought it profits. Mauryans seem to have 
owned numerous big farms, which worked under the supervision of the 
Superintendent of Agriculture {Sitadhyaksha) with the help of numerous slaves 
and hired labourers. Land revenue was the chief source of income of the empire 
and was one fourth of the gross produce. According to Arthashastra, the Mauryan 
state exercised a rigid control through a number of superintendents over all trade 
and industry, such as the superintendent of commerce (Panyadhyaksha) not only 
fixed prices of commodities but also intervened whenever there was a glut of any 
commodity. Similarly, the office of superintendent of markets (Samsthadhyaksha) 
was designed to be a safeguard against fraudulent trade practices. All state boards 
were placed under the charge of a superintendent of ships {Navadhyaksha), who 
regulated river traffic and collected ferry charges. The superintendent of tolls 
{Sulkadhyakshd) collected custom dues from the traders ranging from 1/5* to 1/25 
of the value.'' There were other taxes such as tithes and tolls, taxes on forests, 
mines and fisheries, fines and profession taxes, major share of which was spent on 
the army, other official charity works and public works such as the buildmg of 
hospitals, rest houses, roads and parks. 
The central administrative structure was generally replicated in the regions 
or provinces governed by viceroys. Provincial administration ftmctioned under 
kumara or Aryaputra. Governors that were locally recruited administered smaller 
units. The provincial mantriprishad assisted Kumars, it had more powers, smce it 
had direct contact with the king and acted to check the prince. Mahamattas were a 
highly responsible cadre of officials, holding senior positions. Justice was 
conducted by Mahamattas in cities. One Mahamattas inspected the judiciary in 
cities every five years to check in justice and by a provincial locally appointed 
Mahamattas after every three years. They also dealt with civil cases (i.e. marriages 
etc.).'^ These were subdivided into divisions and districts. The districts have 
continued to be the nerve centre of field administration even today. The district 
officer then called Pradeshtri or Sthanika seems to have been much the same as 
his present day counterpart. He combined revenue collecting and magisterial 
duties and supervised the work of other technical or clerical officials (yukta) as 
well as village government under the Gopa. As a great Buddhist emperor, Asoka 
appointed Dharma Mahamatras or ethical superintendents to elevate the moral 
tone of the society. Rajukas acted as judges in rural areas. They were also 
assessment officers, solving problems related to land disputes and agriculture. 
Pradesika the equivalent of pradester of Arthashastra was in charge of overall 
administration of a district, supervised collection of revenue, maintained law and 
order, check the work of superintendents. Rajukas were subordmates to pradesika 
and administered hundreds of thousand people. Their work was restncted to the 
rural areas and worked for their welfare. They also supervised irrigation and road 
construction. They were the backbone of rural administration. Yiiktas were the 
subordinate revenue officers of the districts level who did secretarial and 
accounting work. They are mentioned in the order Yukta, Rajuka, Pradesika by 
edicts. There were other officials who were an integral part of this wide 
administrative network such as Dauravika-gate keeper of the palace, Durgapala-
forts governor, Pulsani-kmg'^ agent. Prativedikas were the spies who had direct 
access to the king. Nagarka was the city superintendent who looked after 
maintenance of law and order in the city; he was assisted by Gopa and Sthanika. 
Nagarkas had the power to release prisoners on certain auspicious occasions. 
Nagalaviyohalaka Mahamattas were the judicial official under the general 
administration of the Nagarka. ^ ^ The remarkable fact was that every official had 
propagation of Dhamma as the common denominator to his official role. This 
uniform factor helped to strength the centralized Mauryan State at every level of 
administrative machinery. 
The Guptas in the North and the Cholas in the South made a sophisticated 
system of village self-government an integral part of the administrative system. 
But the overall structure of central and provincial administration was essentially 
modifications of the Arthashastra-Asoka model. The successor empires of the 
Guptas and of Harsha adopted this bureaucratic system founded by Kautilya, 
Chandragupta, and Asoka with minor changes in name and substances. Thus, we 
find an officer for war and peace, Sandhivigaraha, another officer Uparika 
associated with provincial administration, kumaramatyas or experienced officials, 
and Dandanayaka standing for police or an army officer. 
ii) Administration of Sultanate of Delhi: Towards the end of the twelfth century, 
the Muslims established a powerful and highly centralized state in northern India, 
which for some time controlled almost the entire country extending as for south as 
Madurai. To run such a state they developed an efficient administrative system. 
The head of the Muslims was the Caliph. His functions as laid down by jurists 
indicate his place in the Islamic polity. He was the defender and maintainer of the 
Faith, the protector of the territory of Islam, the supreme judge of the state, and the 
chief organizer and administrator of the commonwealth. He was the successor to 
the Prophet, as head of the community, commander of the Faithful, leader and 
ruler of all Muslims. Just as the Prophet was the vicegerent of God and the Caliph 
the vicegerent of the Prophet, the monarch was the vicegerent of the Caliph 
Khalil-bin-Shahin a'z-Zahiri says about the Caliph that no kmg of the east or the 
west can hold the title of Sultan unless there is a covenant between him and the 
Khalifah^^ Most of the Sultans considered themselves to be the deputies of the 
Khalifah of Baghdad and received investitures from them. They also 
acknowledged the nominal sovereignty of the Caliph. The Sultan was the supreme 
executive, all legislative and judicial authority were vested in him. 
The Delhi Sultanate was basically a theocracy in which the Sultan was 
endowed with both the powers, religious and temporal. Their avowed object was 
to rule the country as per the tenets of the Quran and Hadith to propagate Islam. 
The Sultan's office was the most important in the sultanate, all political legal and 
military authority was vested in him. He was the commander in chief of the 
military forces and was responsible for the safety and security of the state. He was 
also responsible for the maintenance of law and justice. The judges were 
appointed by him to maintain the law and justice in the state. He acted as a court 
of appeal from the judges. The Sultan was assisted by a council of six ministers in 
the day-to-day administration of the country. The ministers were appointed by the 
sultan and remained in office at his pleasure. The number, power and ftinctions of 
the ministers varied from time to time. Some Sultans used to appoint Naib-ul-mulk 
who acted as the deputy of the Sultan for all purposes. He was m charge of the 
military organization. The counsel of ministers was known as Majlis-i-khahvat 
that advised the sultan, which was not binding. 
There were four main departments i.e. Diwan-i-Wizarat, Diwan-i-Risalat; 
Diwan-i-Arz; Diwan-i-Insha m the Delhi Sultanate 
Wazir was the Prime Minister heading the Diwan-i-Wizarat. He was the key figure 
in the administration. In the early periods the Wazir was primarily a military 
leader. In the 14* century the Wazir began to be considered more an expert in 
revenue affairs and presided over a large department dealing with both mcome and 
expenditure.'^ He was assisted by the Mushrif-i-Mamalik (collection of revenue) 
and Mustawf-i- Mamalik (in charge of state expenditure).'^'Mq/wwi/ar recorded the 
loans and Kazin was the treasurer. Naib-i-Wazir-i-Mamalik was deputy Wazir. 
Wazir acted as the head of the entire governmental machinery. He received a 
handsome allowance and maintained his camp with great splendour. All the 
departments of the government functioned under the control and supervision of the 
Wazir. Legally, jurists say, Wizarat was the lieutenancy of the monarch or the 
Caliph. A Wazir therefore enjoyed delegated authority, which by its very nature 
was of two kinds. According to Mawardi, a Wazir could either be a Wazir-ut-
Tajwid or a Wazir-ut-Tanfidh. The first enjoyed unlimited authority and could 
exercise the power and prerogatives of the sovereign with only a few restrictions 
while the Wazir-ut-Tanfidh was merely an assistant of the sovereign whose orders 
it was his duty to carry out. In actual practice he also had a great deal of power for 
he was the head of the administration and exercised official control over the 
bureaucracy and the people.'^ In the Sultanate of Delhi both these types of Wazir 
are found; most Wazirs possessed special and limited powers, a few enjoyed 
unlimited authority and ruled the empire. 
The most important department of the state, next to the Wazir's was the 
Dewan-i -Arz or the military department. The head of this department was called 
the Arz-i -Mumalik. The Arz was not the commander in chief of the army, since 
the sultan himself commanded all the armed forces. The special responsibility of 
the Arz department was to recruit, equip and pay the army. It was Bulban who first 
set up a separate Arz's department in India. Arz-i-Mumalik was empowered to 
recruit equip and maintain necessary army all matters connected with military 
campaigns were looked after by Arx-i-Mumalik^^ So important were the functions 
of this department that the Sultan himself might perform some duties oftheArz-i -
Mumalik. 
The Department of Diwan-i-Risalat dealt with religious matters, pious 
foundations and stipends to deserving scholars and men of piety. It was presided 
over by the chief Sadr, who was generally a leading Oazi. He was also generally 
the chief Oaz/. The chief Oaz/ was the head of the department of justice. Oazl's 
were appointed in various parts of the empire particularly in those places where 
there was a sizeable Muslim population. The Oazis dispensed civil law based on 
the Muslim law (sharia). The Hindus were govemed by their own personal laws, 
which were dispensed by panchayats in the villages, and by the leaders of the 
various castes in the cities. Criminal law was based on regulations framed for the 
purpose by the rulers.'^ The Minister in charge of the department Diwan-I-Risalat 
was in charge of foreign affairs and he maintained diplomatic relations with other 
cauntiiQs..Diwan-i-Risalat and the Diwan-I-Qada were mostly looked upon as the 
branches of a common department.^^ 
The Department of Diwan-i-Insha was in charge of royal correspondence 
wherein all the orders of the Sultan were drafted and dispatched by them.^ '* This 
department dealt with all the correspondence formal or confidential between the 
rulers and the sovereigns of other states, and with his subordinate officials. It has 
rightly been called 'the treasury of secrets'. Dabir-i-Khas presided over this 
department; he was also the confidential clerk of the state.^ ^ 
In addition to these departments there were also other departments. The 
rulers posted intelligence agents called Barid in different parts of the empire to 
keep them informed of what was going on. A minister of great importance was the 
Barid-i-Mumalik who was the head of the state news agency. It was his duty to 
keep himself informed of all that was happening in the empire; ubiquitous agents 
reported all news, which had any significance or importance. The headquarters of 
every administrative subdivision had a local Barid who sent regular newsletters to 
the central office. Men of known probity and honesty were appointed to this post. 
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sometimes learned men with an outstandmg reputation for piety and impartiality 
were forced to accept it agamst their will as a matter of public duty. So great was 
the responsibility that if a Barid failed to report a misdeed or some gross mjustice 
committed by a well placed official, he sometimes paid for his short-coming with 
his life.^ "^  Nothing was outside the cognizance of the Barid, he was the confidential 
agent of the central government to report on every aspect of public administration. 
The government officials, the conditions and finances of the area under his 
jurisdiction, the agriculture, the welfare of the peasants and the purity of the 
coinage alike came under his secret investigation. 
The ruler's household was another important department of the state. It 
looked after the personal comforts of the Sultan and the requirements of the large 
number numbers of women m the royal household. It also looked after a large 
number of karkhanas or departments in which goods and articles needed by the 
king and the royal household were stored. The officer in charge of all these 
activities was Wakeel-i-daar. He was also responsible for the maintenance of 
proper decorum at the court, and placing nobles in their proper order of 
precedence at formal receptions. Other important officers were as follows: Amir-i-
Behr was controller of boats. Bakshi-i -Fauj was the paymaster. Dewan-i-
Bandagan (slaves), Dewan-i-Amir-i -Kohi (agriculture)- created by Mohammad 
bin tughlaq, Diwan-i-Mustakharaj (to realize arrear by Allauddin Khalji), Diwan-
i-Khaira (charity,by Feroze Shah Tughlaq), Diwan-i-Ishtiyaq {pensions).Sahana-i-
Mandi (market,by Allaudin Khalji), Qaziul Qazat (chief justice) aided by muftis to 
expound the law and A!^ o/wa/-custodian of law and order, aided by the Muhtasib 
were the important officers.^' 
When Muslims conquered the country, they divided it into a number of 
tracts called Iqtas, which were parceled out among the leading Muslim nobles. 
The holders of these offices were called MM^/M or Walis. It was these tracts, which 
became provinces or Subas. At first the Muqtis were almost independent; they 
were expected to maintain law and order in their tracts, and collect the land 
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revenue due to the government. Out of the money they collected they were 
expected to meet the salaries due to the soldiers and keep the balance. As the 
central government became stronger and gained experience, it began to control the 
Muqtis more closely. It began to try to ascertain the actual income, and to fix the 
salaries of the soldiers and the Muqtis in cash. The Muqti was now required to 
remit to the centre the balance of the income after meeting the expenditure. Wali 
was higher than Muqti in status: for whereas the Muqti was used for any governor, 
the Wali applied to a minor provincial chief In all probability the term "Wali" 
was reserved for governors with extra ordinary powers. The number of such 
governors was small; the major part of the Sultanate was administered by 
govemors with limited authority .^ ^ The empire was divided into three varieties of 
provinces. The first category consisted of the Iqtar, which were under the 
command of Muqti. The second category was composed of newly conquered 
provinces under military Govemors known as Walis. The last variety comprised of 
the suppressed and subdued Hindu kingdoms. The Delhi Sultanate had 23 
provinces during the apex of its glory under Muhamad Bin Tughlaq. The 
provincial administration was same as that of the central government. ^ ° Sultan 
appointed a principal revenue administrator (Sahib-i-Diwan called Khwaja) to 
maintain revenue accounts in provinces.'" 
Below the provinces were shiqs and below them the Paragna. We do not 
know much about the administration of these units. Each Shiq was placed under 
the control of Shiqdar^^ We are told that the villages were groped into units of 
100 to 84 (traditionally called chaurasi). This must have been the basis of the 
paragnas. The paragnas were headed by the Amils. The most important people in 
the village were Khut (land owners) and Muqaddam or headman. We also hear 
about the village accountant or Patwari. We don't know how exactly the village 
was administered. Kotwal was the principal police officer in the city; he 
corresponded roughly to the Sahib-i-Shurtha of the Caliphs." 
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functions predominated though he performed certain borderline functions as 
well/*^ The internal organization of a variety of departments was very much 
similar to what it is today. 
The upper administrative agency in the provinces of the Mughal empire 
was an exact miniature of that of the central government. There were governors 
(officially styled the Nazim and popularly the Subedar), the Diwan, the Bakshi, the 
Oazi, the Sadr, the Buyutat, and the Censor, but no Khan-i-Saman.'*^ The Subedar 
was concerned with the maintenance of order and smooth realization of land 
revenue. The provincial Diwan was selected by the imperial Diwan and directly 
under his orders. He was to see that nobody got any unauthorized money from the 
imperial treasury. Being solely responsible for the fmancial administration, 
involving details of income as well as expenditure, his powers were those of a 
Comptroller-General of Civil as well as military administration. His function was 
to assist, no less than to check, all the departments of the provincial government of 
the provincial government. But for this dyarchical arrangement, the provincial 
government was an exact replica of the central organization.''^ Similarly, there 
were provincial Bakshis, Sadrs and Qazis subject to their respective departmental 
heads at the center. In addition to these, the most important among the local 
subordinate officers were the Faujdar, Muqaddam, and Thanadar, who were 
charged with the maintenance of order; and the qanungo, patwan,and bitikchi, 
who looked after local accounts and other records of use to the government. But 
by far the most onerous duties were concentrated in the KotM'al whose character 
and functions were, therefore, of key importance. Another important official was 
the news reporter. In fact there were many in this department, scattered all over the 
empire. They constituted the detectives and newspapermen rolled into one. They 
were under the supervision and orders of the Darogha-i-Dakchwki. The emperor 
kept in touch with what was happening from day-to-day in various parts of the 
empire through these informed as well as by their personal tours, which were not 
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To run such a vast empire the Sultan had five main sources of revenue i.e. 
Zaakat—a tax collected only from Muslims, IMO"' of their property was collected 
as zakat from them; they should possess such property at least for a period of one 
year; Jizya -a poll tax imposed on non-Muslims; KharaJ-A tax collected from 
non-Muslims, it varied from 1/10 to 1/12 of the total produce of the lands; Ushr-'a. 
land tax collected from the Muslims, it was 1 /10 of the total produce of the lands 
irrigated by natural means; Khams-it was 1/5 of the spoils of war confiscated from 
infidels. The remaining 4/5 of the booty went to the soldiers. Besides, these taxes 
sanctioned by the Quran, there were also other taxes such as custom duties, tax on 
income from mines, tax on heirless propertiers, house tax, grazmg tax and Water 
tax.^^ 
(2) Mughal Administration 
The Mughal empire founded by Babar in the 16* century provided a steady 
pattern of administration. The emperor was the pivot of the Mughal 
administration. He was the fountain of all honours, the source of all administrative 
power, and the supreme dispenser of justice. There were four royal methods of 
transacting business. The emperor sat in Diwan-i-Khas-o-Am attended by the high 
administrators at the capital and transacted state business in public. In the Ghusl 
Khanna-his private audience chamber, so called because Akbar came straight to it 
after bathing- he held confidential consultations with his ministers and such high 
officers as he cared to summon. When matters of pressing interest emerged 
suddenly, he summoned a few of his highest officers inside his private apartments 
to discuss and dispose of necessary business with them. The Mughal emperor 
formed the pivot on which the entire administration turned. In camp or in the 
palace, well or ill, he never neglected business and thus always played an 
important part in the administration of the country. He presided over it; he 
inspired its activities; very largely he determined its character. The Mughal 
government was a one man. The Mughal emperor had no cabinet in the modem 
sense of the term. The Mughal emperor, like other Islamic sovereigns had to play 
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a two-fold part, viz., to govern all the people in their dominions as their king, and 
also to be the missionary, defender and agent of the creed of a section of their 
subjects. 
The Mughal ministry consisted of the foUowmg Departments: 
1. The Exchequer and Revenue (under the High Diwan) 
2. The hnperial Household (under the Khan-i-Saman) 
3. The military pay and accounts office (under the emperial Bakshi) 
4. Canon law, both civil and crimmal (under the chief Oaz/) 
5. Religious endowments and charity (under the chief Sadar) 
6. Censorship of Public Morals (under the Muhtasib) 
7. The Artillery (under the Mir atish or Darogha-i-Top-Khanah) 
8. Intelligence and Posts (under the Darogha of Dak Chouki.f^ 
The Exchequer was presided over by the High Chancellor (Diwan-i-Ala), 
who bore the courtesy title of Wazir, and had two assistants called the Dhvan-I-
Tan {Diwan of salaries) and Diwan-I-Khalsa (or Diwan of crown lands)." The 
work of every minister came under his supervision. As a keeper of king's purse he 
had a say in all matters where any expenditure was to be incurred. All the imperial 
orders were first recorded in his office before being sent. The entire revenue 
administration was under him. As revenue and fmance minister, he scrutinized the 
account of every dam or pie that came into or went out of the treasury. His office 
being thus of key importance, only men of the highest and most tested merit were 
appointed to it. Muzafar Khan, Raja Todar Mall, Quliz Khan and Muqim, Rai 
Patar Das, Ghiyas Beg, Itimad-ud-Daula and Sadaulla Khan were some impotant 
Diwan of Mughal Period.^ ^ The Diwan had his seal of office. It was placed on 
certain types of papers, which had reached him only for record. The letters written 
by him in accordance with the instructions of the king also bore his seal. It was put 
on the treasuries in the capital as well. Putting the seal didn't involve exemption 
from signing the papers. That was a royal privilege. 
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The Military Pay and the Account Office under the imperial Bakshi in the 
Mughal hierarchy was next to the Dewan. The Mir Bakshi of the Mughals 
corresponds to the Diwan-i-Arz of the sultanate. He was the head of the military 
department, and his duties were; "The recruitment of the army, the mamtenance of 
the troops in good order, holding of military tests, the inspection of horses and the 
muster of troops at regular intervals, and equipping them for expeditions.""''^  
Although some writers describe him as the Imperial Pay Master, as most of the 
officers were Mansabdars with military assignments of salaries and other 
expenditures only then the army was actually on the field. Ordinarily these matters 
were dealt with the office of the Diwan. He was the nerve centre of the Mughal 
administration. All the news writers outside the capital were his agents. The 
provincial Bakshi was the news writer-in-chief for his province. His reports passed 
through the hands of the Mir Bakshi at the capital who thus had his fingers on the 
pulse of the whole empire. The Mir Bakshi was in a position to pass judgments on 
the work of all public servants outside the capital. The superintendents of artillery, 
elephants and war-boats were placed immediately under Him. The Mir Bakshi had 
his own separate office where he did his departmental work. He was supplied the 
usual number of assistants, a reader, a personal assistant and a Munshi helped him 
in the discharge of his duties. 
The imperial household under the Khan-i-Saman or High steward was the 
third secular ministry. The high steward was a very important officer of the 
Mughal times, as he was the head of the emperor's household department and 
accompanied him during his joumeys and campaigns. All the personal servants of 
the emperor were under this officer's control, and he also supervised the 
emperor's daily expenditures, food, tents, stores etc. The Mir Samanar Khan 
Saman worked in association with the Dewan-i-Buyiitat and several daroghas, 
each in charge of a Karkhana, and a Mustaufi or Auditor. They together looked 
after the purchase and maintenance of stores, civil and military, includmg the 
private purchases of the emperor's household. The last named duty was in course 
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of time assigned to another officer called the Darogha of the Ghusalkhana who 
was the emperor's personal secretary. ' 
The emperor as the ^Khalifa of the age' was theoretically the highest judge 
and used to hold courts of justice and select cases himself on Wednesdays. But the 
court held by him was a tribunal of the highest appeal rather than a court of first 
instance. The Qazi was the judge in religious suits only and tried them according 
to Muslim law. A Mufti assisted him. The supreme Qazi of the empire was called 
the Qazi-ul-Ouzat and also 'Qazi of the Imperial Camp' and he always 
accompanied the emperor. Every city and even large village had its local Qazi, 
who was appointed by the chief Qazi.'^^ The Sadar was judge and supervisor of the 
endowments of land made by the emperor or by the princes for the support of 
pious men, scholars and monks. It was his duty to see that such grants were 
applied to the right puipose and also to scrutinize application for fresh grants. 
Assistance was often given in cash also. The chief Sadar of the empire was called 
the Sadar-us-Sadiir, the Sadar-i-Jahan, or popularly the Sadar-i-Kul. In addition 
every province had its local Sadar.'^^ The Sadar-us-Sadoor was the head of the 
Dewan-i-Risalat that looked after spiritual matters, religious endowments, stipends 
to scholars, pious men and administration of justice. 
According to Muslim law, it is the king's duty to appoint an Inspector or 
Censor of Public Morals (Muhtasib), for regulating the levels of the people in 
strict accordance with the scriptural rules. The Censor's fiinction was to enforce 
the Prophet's commands and put down the practices forbidden by Him (Amr Wa 
Nahi)- such as drinking, distilled spirits and fermented bear, bhang (i.e., hemp or 
cannabis sativa) and other liquid intoxicants, gambling and certain kinds of sexual 
immoralities."^ He was both an ecclesiastical and a secular officer. As a secular 
officer he examined weights and measures and saw to it that fair prices prevailed 
in the market. He recovered debts and traced and handed over to their owner's 
fiigitive shares. He also secured cleanliness in the cities and preserved public 
streets or markets from being built upon. Under Aurangzeb his ecclesiastical 
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in frequent. But the over all officers on whom they had to depend in the province 
was the Nazim or Subedar. 
The central government had to maintain a regular channel of 
communication for the transmission and receipt of information with regard to what 
was happening m the territory and for this information-feedback there were four 
classes of officers and subordmate staff: (1) Waqa-i-Na\ns—he was the regular 
public reporter. He was present when the provincial viceroys held public courts 
and recorded the occurrences at that place. He sent dispatches to the emperors, (2) 
Sawanih-Nagar- he was a special commissioner and reporter of important cases, 
(3) Khufia Navis-he was the secret writer and a most confidential agent, and (4) 
Harkarah-he was a spy who brought oral news and served as feedback-link.''^ 
The bureaucracy of the Mughal empire was graded on a system bonrowed 
by Akbar directly from Persia and essentially military in character. Each official 
was the holder of a Mansab or official appointment of rank and profit, and such, 
was theoretically obliged to supply a certain contingent of troops and auxiliaries 
for the service of the state, in 1573-74 these Mansabdars were classified in thirty 
three grades, ranging from "Commander of 10' to "Commander of 10,000," those 
in command of '10' to '400' being commonly styled Mansabdars, those in 
command of '500' to 2,500' being called Amir, and of '3,000' and upwards Amir-
i-Azam or Umra. In addition the mansab or class rank, which was regarded as a 
personal {Zat) distinction, an official was also granted Sawar rank, as a previlege, 
in return for maintaining a supplementary contingent of Sawar or cavalry.^ *' Irvin 
was of the opinion that Zat was the actual number of horsemen maintained by 
Mansabdar and Sawar was the additional honour showing the additional number 
of horsemen maintained by him.^' Mansab is an Arabic word, which meant office, 
rank or dignity. It specified rank in the services, pay and position in the court. 
According to Irvin, ''Mansabdar was that measure of status under the Mughal 
Government which determined a Mansabdar's (a) rank (b) salary & (c) his office 
in the Mughal court." There was, however, no distinction between a civil and a 
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military officer in the Mughal period and so every Mughal officer was 
Mansabdar^^ A Mamabdar had to perform both civil and military functions. 
Every Mansabdar was fixed the number of troops to be maintained and in addition 
to the prescribed troops; he had to maintain horsemen, elephants, carts, camels, 
etc. For the proper maintenance of these a lump sum grant was paid to the 
Mansabdars along with their salaries. There was no fixed duty assigned to 
Mansabdars. Sometimes they were assigned duty by the emperor and Mansabdars 
must successfully complete the duty given to them there was no prescribed rules 
and regulations for the appointment oi Mansabdars. The emperor could appomt 
anyone as Mansabdar or any Mansabdar could dismiss by him. He could promote 
any Mansabdar to higher rank without consulting any body. All the officers 
recruited for discharging both civU and military duties, were the members of the 
Mansabdari system. They were transferred from civil to military department and 
vice versa. They were given very fat salaries. A Mansabdari of 5000 was paid 
from rupees 28,000 to 30,000 per month and out of this salary, he had to spend 
rupees 10600 for the maintenance of the troops and other obligations. A 
Mansabdari of 50 was given rupees 250 and had to spend rupees 185 for the 
maintenance of the soldiers etc. according to some scholars that the Mansabdars 
were not paid for the whole year, but this statement was strongly protested by 
Dr.Srivastava.^ "* 
Generalizing from the details of public administration in Mughal India we 
arrive at some significant conclusions: 
1. It was a law and order administration. Maxims and precepts for welfare 
and poor relief were there but no organized attempt was made at the 
institutionalization of optimum utility, common felicity, socialism and 
development. 
2. Finance and revenue were under the charge of Diwan. There was a system 
of accounting and partial audit but there was no budget, no appropriation 
bill, and no estimates committee. 
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3. There were judicial officers like the Qazi-ul-Qazat and the Amil and the 
Mufti. But there was no organized judicial hierarchy and no secular system 
of positive laws. 
4. The police Kotwal was the police officer. The Darogha was there as the 
superintendent or a High executive functionary but not a police officer. 
5. Villages were not organically linked up with the central administration. 
The villagers themselves appointed the Chaukidars. 
6. The legacy of Provincial Divisions is still continumg. There were 15 subas 
during the time of Akbar. In later times the number mcreased to 22. More 
or less, the number of the component units in the Indian federal system 
today is the same. 
(3) British Administrative System 
Parliamentary government and legislative and other democratic institutions 
in their modem form also had an organic growth on the hidian soil. The British 
government, as we know them, gradually introduced the institutions through 
halting doses by constitutional reforms grudgingly granted under various Acts of 
British Parliament. Although in appearance and in their outer trappings, they 
resembled the British model, to begin with they could hardly be called 
representative or democratic. Nevertheless, howsoever unintentionally, they were 
responsible for laying the foundation of parliamentary democracy m India. The 
British administration can be studied into two periods viz, the administration of 
the East India Company - 1773-1834 and the administration of the British India -
1834-1947. 
The administration of the East India Company 1773-1854 
The Supreme or Central Government of the East India Company was first 
constituted at Fort William in Bengal under regulating act of 1773. This form of 
government had m fact been designed primarily to endow the company, whose 
main purpose was commerce, with powers to maintain law and order within the 
bounds of Its trading stations. The Regulatmg Act of 1773 constituted a supreme 
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government with a Governors General and four councillors having controlling 
authority over the presidencies of Fort St.George and Bombay, who were 
prohibited from declaring war or making peace with country powers without the 
consent or approbation of the said Governor General and Council, except in such 
cases of imminent necessity as would render it dangerous to postpone such 
hostilities or treaties until the orders of the Governor General and Council might 
arrive and also excepting cases in which they might have received special orders 
jfrom the Court of Directors.^^ This was the first Act of parliament which 
prescribed a definite system of government for the affairs of India. It raised the 
status of the Govemor of Bengal to Govemor General and expanded his Council 
to comprise four members and provided for the establishment of a Supreme Court 
of Judicature at Calcutta, independent of the Govemor General and his council, 
assisting of chief justice and four other judges.^^ Under the Act the whole civil and 
military government of the Bengal presidency, and also the ordering, management 
and government of all the territorial acquisitions and revenues in the kingdoms of 
Bengal, Bihar and Orissa were vested in the Govemor General and Council of the 
presidency of Fort William in Bengal. The Regulating Act of 1773 authorized the 
Govemor General and Council to make and issue such mles, ordinances and 
regulations for the good order and civil govemment of the company's settlement 
of Fort William and other factories and places subordinate, or to be subordmate 
thereto." This Act gave the statutory recognition of parliament's right to regulate 
the civil and military affairs and revenues of the company's territories in India. 
This Act brought company's political functions under parliamentary supervision 
The Govemor General and Council was directed to keep the Court of Directors 
regularly informed of all matters of interest by sending dispatches to England. The 
Court of Directors on the other hand, were required to place it before the treasury 
within 14 days offer receipt copies of all advices relating to revenues, and submit 
to a secretary of state all such other advices as related to the civil and military 
affairs of India. The presidencies of Bombay and Bengal kept under the control of 
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the presidency of Bengal. The administration was to be carried on in accordance 
with the majority vote of the Council and the Governor General was given only a 
casting vote in case of a tie, on occasions he was over ruled by the Council and 
was made to do things, which he did not approve at all. The Supreme Court had 
the powers to veto the Council's legislation. Thus, this Act laid the foundation of a 
central administration and instituted a system of parliamentary control. It marked 
the beginning of the company's transformation from a trading corporation to a 
corporation of a new kind, entirely administrative in its object and subordinate to 
parliament. 
The Pitt's hidia Act of 1784 established a Board of Control m England to 
enable the British parliament to control the Indian administration. Real powers of 
the Board were in the hands of its President, a member of the British Cabinet. This 
Act also extended effective control of the Governor General of Bengal over the 
two other presidencies and reduced his Council to comprise three members. Thus, 
Pitt's India Act established an effective instrument of control, direction and 
supervision, which operated with slight alterations till 1858. According to the 
government of India Act, 1833, the company surrendered all its real and personal 
property in India and held it now in trust for the crown in the service of India with 
effect from 22 April, 1834. By the Charter Act of 1833 the Governor General of 
Bengal became the Governor General of India and his government came to be 
known as the Government of India. It thus centralized the administration of the 
company in India. It was the centralization of the government of East India 
Company in India. Under this Act, a new presidency was also created, named. 
Presidency of Agra, which was constituted in a modified form as the North-
western Provinces under a Lieutenant Governor. A law member was added to the 
Governor General's Council, who was not in company's service and was given the 
power to vote only when the Council was engaged in work relating to legislation 
under this Act.^ ^ Thus, the Charter Act of 1833 converted the Company into a 
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purely political and administrative body, winding up altogether its commercial 
activities. 
Under the Charter Act of 1853 the government of the British Indian 
territories continued in the hands of the Company under the direct control of the 
parliament and the number of the Court of Directors was reduced from 24 to 18, 
and one third of their number was to be nominated by the crown. The law member 
became full member of the Executive Council with powers to sit and vote. For the 
better performance of legislative business the Executive Council was to have on it 
a representative from each of the four governments of Madras, Bombay, Bengal, 
and the North-Western provinces, besides the Chief Justice and one of the other 
judges of the Supreme Court at Calcutta to make a Central Legislative Council of 
12 members.^ ^ Thus, the Central Legislative Council consisted the Governor 
General, the commander in chief, four members of the Council and six legislative 
members of whom four were representatives from the provinces and the other two 
were the chief justice and one of the other judges of the Supreme Court. Though 
the 1853 Act thus introduced some definite improvements in the machinery of 
legislation, no hidian element was associated with the council. 
Transfer of Government to the British Crown 
The Revolt of 1857 gave a death-blow to the system of East India 
Company's rule in India. The government of India came under the direct control 
of the crown after the enactment of the Government of India Act, 1858. The office 
of the Secretary of State for India was created and all the powers formerly 
exercised by the Court of Directors and the Board of Control were vested in the 
Secretary of State, a minister of cabinet rank. He was authorized to superintend, 
direct and control all acts, operations and concerns relating to the government on 
revenues of India. He was to be assisted by an under secretary of state and council 
of fifteen members styled as the council of India.^ The Council was composed of 
exclusively people from England, some of whom were nominees of the Crown 
while others were the representatives of the Directors of the East India Company, 
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The Secretary of State was responsible to the British ParHament, governed India 
through the Governor General, and assisted by an Executive Council, which 
consisted of high officials of the government.^' The expenses incurred on the 
establishment of the Secretary of State, including his own salary, were charged to 
the revenues of India. 
Thus, the essential features of the system introduced by the Act of 1858 
were: 
1. The administration of the country was not only unitary but rigidly 
centralized. Though the territory was divided into provinces with a 
Governor or Lieutenant-Govemor aided by his Executive Council at the 
head of each of them, the provincial govemments were mere agents of the 
government of India and had to function under the superintendence, 
direction and control of the Governor General in all matters relating to the 
government of the province. 
2. There was no separation of fiinctions, and all the authority for the 
governance of India, civil and military, executive and legislative, was 
vested in the Governor General in Council who was responsible to the 
Secretary of State. 
3. The control of the Secretary of State over the Indian administration was 
absolute. The Act vested in him the 'superintendence, direction and control 
of all acts, operations and concerns which in any way were related to the 
Government or Revenues of India'. Subject to his ultimate responsibility to 
the British Parliament, he wielded the Indian administration through the 
Governor General as his agent and his was the last word, whether in matters 
of policy or of details. 
4. The entire machinery of administration was bureaucratic, totally 
unconcerned about public opinion in India." 
This Act fmally became "The Act for the Good Government of India" of 
1858. Under this Act all the Indian territories, then in possession of the company. 
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became vested in the crown and were to be governed directly by and in the name 
of the crown, acting through principally Secretary of the State. The Act of 1858 
was, however, largely confined to the improvement of the administrative 
machinery by which India government was to be superintended and controlled in 
England. It did not alter in any substantial way the system of government that 
prevailed in India. 
Indian Councils Act of 1861: The Act of 1861 mtroduced some changes in 
Indian administration. It provided for the addition of a fifth member m the 
Executive Council of the Governor General and also empowered the Governor 
General to legislate by ordinances which had the same authority as acts of the 
legislative council and to lay down rules for transactmg business which enabled 
him to assign responsibility for specific subjects to individuals members of the 
executive council. This Act also authorized the Governor General to associate 
non-official Indians with the work of legislation and vested legislative powers m 
the governments of Bombay and Madras. '^' Thus, the powers of the Govemor 
General however increased more in the legislative field than in the executive. This 
Act also authorized the Govemor General in Council to create new lieutenant 
governorships, to readjust the territorial boundaries of administrative divisions, or 
to effect any change in their boundaries, subject to the previous sanction of the 
secretary of state. The Indian Council Act of 1861 tried to render the executive 
government so strong that it could not be handicapped by any expansion of the 
legislature. It also restored the legislative powers of the local government without 
affecting the central control. The establishment of an overland cable in 1868, the 
Suez Canal in 1869, and the completion of a British submarine cable m 1870 
brought India under the effective control of the Secretary of State. 
The Act of 1892 enlarged the size and ftmctions of the legislatures. The 
number of additional member sat the center was mcreased to sixteen, out of which 
four of the additional members were elected by the non official members of the 
provincial legislatures. In the three presidencies, the maximum number of 
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additional members was increased to twenty and in the North-Westem provinces 
to fifteen. Some of the additional members of the provmcial legislatures were 
elected by the district boards, chambers of commerce and universities. The 
members of the legislatures were allowed to discuss the budget and to put 
questions to the executive councilors.^^ This Act is notable for its object, which 
was explained by the Under Secretary of State for India thus: "to widen the basis 
and expand the functions of the Government of India, and to give further 
opportunities to the non-official and native elements in Indian society to take part 
in the work of the govemment."^^ 
The Indian Council Act of 1909; also known as Morley Minto Reforms 
increased the size and functions of the Legislative Councils. The members of the 
legislative councils were empowered to move any resolution relating to the 
budget, with the exception of budgetary allotment concerning subjects like 
Foreign Affairs, Ecclesiastical Affairs, Armed Forces etc.^ ^ The executive 
government of India was authorized to reject the appointment of any elected 
member to the council. 
Indian Councils Act Of 1919: The Government of India Act 1919 formed a 
landmark in the history of Indian constitutional development. The Government of 
India Act 1919 was based on the Montague-Chelmsford Report. There were three 
main concepts on which the India Council Act of 1919 was based. They are: 
1. The central and provincial sphere were demarcated and distinguished from 
each other with greater clarity and precision. 
2. The provinces were considered to be the most suitable unit for beginnmg 
the experiment of self-government. 
3. An attempt was made to give a more effective voice to the public m the 
conduct of the central government though no element of responsibility was 
introduced in this sphere.^ ^ 
This Act introduced many significant changes in the admmistration on 
India. A post of High Commissioner for India in U.K was created by this Act, and 
26 
the occupant of this post was given some powers previously discharged by the 
Secretary of State for India. This Act also provided for a bicameral legislature, viz. 
the Central Legislative Assembly and the Council of State at the centre. Direct 
election was introduced for both the houses of the legislature. Several restrictions 
were imposed regarding the introduction of bills concerning specified subjects, 
such as, public debt, armed forces, foreign affairs, etc, and the Governor General 
was authorized to prevent the consideration of any bill or even any part of a bill at 
any stage. Further, this Act introduced two lists of subjects, viz. The Central List 
and the Provincial List for clearly demarcating the provincial and central spheres 
and introduced diarchy in the provinces and the subjects to be dealt with by the 
provincial governments were separated into two categories, viz., (a) reserved 
subjects such as irrigation, police, european education, prisons etc., which were 
administered by the Governor with the help of the Executive Council, and (b) the 
transferred subjects such as local self government, agriculture, forests, excise, etc., 
which were administered by the Governor with the help of his ministers. Each 
province had a triennial single chamber legislature.^^ The Act of 1919 set up a 
unicameral and triennial legislature called the Legislative Council having 
Presidents who were to be elected by the council itself The Executive 
Government of the Central Government of India under the Council Act of 1919 
consisted of the Governor General in Council who continued to be responsible to 
parliament through the Secretary of State in matters of all central subjects. The 
size of the Executive council was left undefined by law. In practice it continued to 
have six ordinary members of whom three were now Indians. 
The political and administrative work of the India office remained vested in 
the Secretary of State in Council, the maximum and the minimum number of its 
members being fixed at 12 and 8 respectively, instead of 14 and 10 as before. 
Their appointment was to be for a period of five years. The salary of the Secretary 
of State and his establishment was transferred from the Indian revenue to the 
money provided by Parliament.''' Thus, the Act of 1919 set in motion two mam 
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tendencies, namely, an increasing decentralization of authority from the Indian 
office downwards to local government and a progressive democratization of 
legislative bodies as an instrument of executive control. Both the trends dictated 
the expediency of securing the stability of government by making its chief 
executive still stronger. 
The Government of India Act, 1935: By the Act of 1935, India was made a 
federation and provmcial autonomy was granted. The Act also provided for the 
distribution of legislative powers between the center and the provinces as per two 
lists, i.e. the Federal List, the Provincial List and introduced bicameral legislatures 
in Madras, Bombay, Bengal, Bihar, and Assam, the other provinces having a 
single chamber each. In addition, dyarchy was introduced at the centre under 
which certain subjects falling in the federal list, viz., defence, external affairs, 
ecclesiastical affairs and the administration of tribal areas were kept with the 
Governor General, who administered them with the assistance of three Executive 
Councilors appointed by him personally. In respect of other federal subjects, the 
Governor General dealt with them with the assistance of a council of ministers. 
The introduction of this Act curtailed several important powers of the Indian 
legislature and there were certain subjects on which neither the federal nor the 
provincial legislature could pass laws. With regard to non-votable items, which 
constituted about 80 percent of the federal budget, the legislature had no control.^ ^ 
The Indian Council Act of 1935 reflected continuity of policy, a step forward 
towards the achievement of the purpose already declared in the preamble of the 
Government of India Act 1919. 
The federal legislature was to consist of the King represented by the 
Governor General, and two Chambers, to be known respectively as the Council of 
State and the Federal Assembly. The Council of State was to consist of 156 
representatives of British India and not more than 104 representatives of the Indian 
States. The Federal Assembly was to consist of 250 representatives of British 
India and not more than 125 representatives of the Indian States. The Council of 
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State was to be a permanent body, one third of its members retiring every three-
years. The Assembly, on the other hand, was to have a maximum hfe of five years. 
The annual fmancial statements were to be presented to both Chambers. The 
estimates of expenditure embodied in the annual financial statement were to show 
(i) the expenditure charged upon the revenues of the federation and (ii) the sums 
required to meet other expenditure proposed to be made from the revenues of the 
federation.'''' 
Under the Act of 1935, the executive authority of the province was 
exercised on behalf of His Majesty by the Governor who was given a council of 
ministers to aid and advise him in the exercise of his functions, excepting in so far 
as he was required to act "in his discretion" or "in the exercise of his individual 
judgmenf. There was no obligation to consult the ministers in the former sphere, 
while in the latter sphere the Governor was not bound to follow the minister's 
advise even though it may be sought and given. Undoubtedly, these provisions put 
severe constraints on an effective responsible government, but it remains true that 
during the years of the working of Congress ministries (1937-1939) and (1946-
1947) the Governors chose to act by and large as Constitutional heads.^ "* 
The Indian Independence Act of 1947: The Indian Independence Act of 1947, 
provided for the creation of the two dominions of India and Pakistan by partioning 
India. In addition, it gave legislative supremacy to each dominion with powers to 
adopt its own constitution, abolished the office of the Secretary of State for India 
and the supremacy of the Crown over Indian affairs including the Indian states.^ ^ 
Until the inauguration of the Republic, India remained a dominion and was 
govemedby the 1935 Act, with modifications. 
THE CENTRAL SECRETARIAT 
The Central Secretariat at Fort William in Bengal was designed to fiimish 
the requisite information for the formulation of policy and to carry out the orders 
of the Company's Government. It consisted in 1784 of three main branches: 
General, Revenue and Commercial. The General branch was subdivided into three 
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sections, namely civil, military and marine. A judicial branch was later established 
with the separation of justice from revenue administration in 1793. Between 1793 
and 1834, the central secretariat conducted its business in these four branches.^^ 
In 1835, a legislative department was created under the charge of the 
Judicial Secretary. On 29"' April 1843 the Governor General in Council decided to 
separate completely the Secretariat of the Government of India from that of 
Bengal. The former government had already (in January 1843) appointed a 
separate secretary for its financial department, and on 1^ ' May 1843 the other 
departments were also separated. The political, foreign, and secret branches were 
placed under another secretary and the department was called the foreign 
department of the government of India. The remaining branches, revenue, general, 
marine, judicial, legislative and ecclesiastical, were placed under a third secretary, 
the department being called Home department of Government of India and all 
proceedings pertaining to the railways were dealt with by the Home department 
until the inception of the public works department as a separate organization 
which virtually took over all civil functions, including railways, on 9* February 
1855.^ ^ 
The Indian Act of 1853 placed Bengal in charge of a Lieutenant Govemor 
on May 1, 1854 and certain changes were made in the pattern of administration. A 
legislative member was added to the Council. One consequence of this change was 
that the Home department was abolished and all legislative functions were vested 
in the Council of India, as constituted by Section 22 of the Act. On May 1^ ', 1855, 
the Military board was dissolved and on January 18"' 1858 the medical boards in 
three presidencies were also abolished and their functions were allocated to an 
officer in each presidency who was designated as Director General of Medical 
Department.''^ The number of departments steadily increased between 1843 and 
1919. Public Works was separated from the Home department, and the Public 
Works Department was formed in 1855, the Legislative Department came into 
being in 1869, and in 1871 matters relating to Revenue, Agriculture and 
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Commerce were taken away from the Home Department of Revenue, Agriculture 
and Commerce. This last department was to concern itself exclusively with the 
matters relating to the source and development of revenue in the several branches 
and ascertaining how it may be increased. Considerations of economy, however 
led to the abolition of this department in 1879. Commerce was incorporated in 
finance, while agriculture and revenue were again entrusted to the Home 
department, which was renamed as the Department of Home, Revenue, and 
Agriculture. But it was reconstituted two years later, largely as a consequence of 
the recommendations of the Finance Commission of 1880, the Department of 
Home, Revenue and Agriculture was bifiorcated into the Home Department on the 
one hand, and Revenue and Agriculture on the other. The later took over charge of 
land revenue, surveys, agriculture, horticulture, minerals, meteorology, famme and 
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emigration from the Home department. 
The next major change was attempted in 1905 in Lord Cruzon's time. On 
18* February of the year the railway branch of the Public Works Department was 
abolished and the control of the expended railway system was entrusted to the 
newly created Railway Board as on 1^ March. Commerce was merged mto the 
newly created Department of Commerce and Industry. In August 1921, Medical 
Administration was transferred from Home to the Education Department, which 
was renamed as the Department of Education and Health. On 25"' February 1921, 
a reorganized Department of Industries was created and the activities of the 
Commerce Department were curtailed. In 1923 the Public Works Department was 
merged with the Department of Indusfries and the newly constituted Department 
was renamed as Department of Industries and Labour.^ *' The Foreign and Political 
Department was split in 1937 into two distinct departments: 
(a) The External Affairs Department, and 
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(b) The Political Department. 
Certain major changes were made after the end of the second world war in 
1946. Thus, the Department of Education Health and Lands was split into three 
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separate departments of Education, Health and Agriculture. In April 1946, the 
Labour Department was split up into two distinct departments, the first consisting 
of Works, Mines and Power, and the second handling labour. The Works, Mines 
and Power Department handled business relating to public works, mines, 
geological survey, stationery, printing, boilers and explosives. The Labour 
Department dealt with labour, rehabilitation of civil and military demobilized 
personnel, employment exchanges, technical trainmg center and labour tribunals.'"*' 
With the Independence and transfer of administration from the crown to the 
popular government of India, all departments were renamed as ministries on 29* 
August 1947.^ ^ 
The establishment of British rule in India brought into existence basically a 
new political, admmistrative and legal structure. Such a state structure was a 
logical outcome of the new system of economy introduced in India. The new land 
system based upon private property, commercialization of agriculture, introduction 
of capitalist enterprises and money based national economy needed a uniform 
system of law and administration to maintain and regulate the new property 
relations and contractual transactions. The British, therefore, laid the foundations 
of modem state in India for achieving their social and economic goals. Yet it was, 
in course of time, responsible for a kind of administrative and political unification 
of the country that was completely lacking in the pre-British period. 
The hierarchical gradation of public services brought about the 
administrative unification of the country. Although conquest constituted the 
ultimate source of legitimization for the authority of British bureaucracy, yet the 
rationality of its organization, the specific conditions of service, the organization 
of rule bound functions, a defined sphere of jurisdictional competence, respect 
shown to law, impersonal character of public officers, the standards of educational 
tests and the fairness of the competitive system were more important source of 
legitimization. This made compliance to the rule deeper and more effective. 
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A new system of judicature was also established and the bulk of laws were 
codified. But at the same time, the powers of the executive were considerably 
amplified. The entire emphasis of codification was on limiting the scope of 
judicial discretion. Within the framework of autocracy, a free judiciary emerged m 
India whose aim was to provide a judicial system that could satisfy the needs of 
the rising mercantile/capitalist economy and society apart from admmistration. As 
the economic organization of the country became more complex, there was a mass 
of legislation to provide a legal framework both for administration and for a 
rapidly developing commercial and capitalist economy. In spite of various 
constitutional reforms either under pressure of nationalist movement or for its own 
needs, the highly centralized and authoritarian state apparatus was not shattered, 
and was handed over to new rulers of the country. Unfortunately, the leading 
classes in independent India not only inherited a respective state apparatus but 
they strengthened it further for repression. 
Thus, the pre-British Mughal's system of administration had a highly 
bureaucratized hierarchy of officials. The British made full use of this apparatus of 
administration, and gradually moulded to it to its own requirements. An immediate 
cause of deviation from the Mughals constitution was the commercial character of 
the East India Company with its emphasis on the civil authority being invested 
with control over the military. But that of a great many functions previously 
exercised by them under the Mughals or the Marathas. What the British did was to 
transfer the exercise of these functions to an official apparatus either reconstituted 
or newly created. 
(B) POST INDEPENDENCE ADMINISTRATION 
(1) STRUCTURE, PROCEDURE AND WORKING OF 
ADMINISTRATION 
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION: The union government, as hidia's central 
government is known, is divided into three distinct but interrelated branches: 
legislative, executive, and judicial. As in the British parliamentary model, the 
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leadership of the executive is drawn from and responsible to the legislative body. 
Indian administration operates within the framework of the Constitution, which 
has been in operation since 26 January 1950. According to its constitution, India 
is a "Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, and Democratic Republic." The Constitution of 
India is federal in structure. It provides for the establishment of a federation 
consisting of a Central Government and a number of State Governments. Although 
the term 'federation' fmds no mention in the Constitution, Indian Constitution has 
all the features of a federation, thus, entitling India to call itself a federally 
governed nation and its central government is patterned after the British 
Parliamentary system. 
The Constitution provides for a parliamentary system of government both 
at the center and in the states, based on universal adult suffrage. It creates a strong 
centre and vests the constituent powers and the residual powers of legislation in 
the central legislature, called Parliament. The legislative power is divided between 
the union and the states or local governments in accordance with three lists, viz., 
(i) Union List-containing 97 subjects, (ii) State List-containing 66 subjects, and 
(iii) Concurrent List-containing 47 subjects.^'' 
THE CENTRAL SECRETARIAT 
The central secretariat is at the apex of the administrative pyramid, of 
course, fimctioning under the over all control of the ministry. The term 
'secretariat' has its origin in the time when what we had in India was really the 
secretary's government. After independence the power of governance came into 
the hands of popularly elected ministers and, thus, the ministry, not the secretary, 
became the real fountain of authority. Thus, in the altered political and 
constitutional situation, the term secretariat has come to be a synonym for the 
minister's office. The label is of ancient lineage, but its complexion has undergone 
a basic change since independence. 
The ministers obviously cannot work all alone and need assistance. For 
purposes of administration, the government of India is divided into ministries and 
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departments that together constitute the "Central Secretariat." To implement the 
policies enunciated by the mmisters in consultation with the secretariat there are 
attached offices subordinate offices and other field agencies. The three essential 
components of the government at the center are: (i) The mmister (ii) The 
secretary, and (iii) The executive head. 
The most important flmction of the mmister is to decide upon policy, of the 
secretary to provide the material by which to reach such decisions and to oversee 
the implementation of such decisions; and of the executive head to carry the 
decisions into effect. The first two functionaries, namely, the minister and the 
secretary are served by the secretariat organization called a ministry or 
department. Orders and instructions issued by the secretariat are considered as 
orders of the government of India. The central secretariat, thus, occupies a key 
position in the administrative hierarchy, literally speaking; the secretariat is 
nothing but a conglomeration of various ministries departments of the central 
government. The secretariat works as a single unit with collective responsibility as 
in the case of the council of ministers. Under rules, each secretariat department is 
required to consult any other department that may be interested or concerned 
before disposing of a case. Secretaries, thus, are secretaries to the union 
government as a whole and not to a particular minister. 
Functions and Roles: The secretariat's primary responsibility is to assist and 
advice the ministers in respect of the following matters: 
1. Making and modifying the policies from time to time. 
2. Framing legislation, rules and regulations. 
3. Sectoral planning and program formulation. 
4. (i) Budgeting and control of expenditure, (ii) According administrative and 
financial approval to operational plans and programmes and their 
subsequent modifications. 
5. Supervision and control over the execution of policies and programmes by 
field agencies, and evaluation of results. 
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6. Coordination and interpretation of policies, assisting other branches of 
government and maintaining contact with state administration. 
7. Initiating measures to develop greater organizational competence. 
8. Discharging their responsibilities to the parliament.*^ 
According to Ashok Chanda, "The central secretariat is the principal 
executive instrument of the Union government and is responsible for 
administering the central subjects, coordinating the activities of national 
importance and assisting in the formulation of foreign, economic and financial 
policies". On the one hand, the Secretariat is a policy-formulating, coordinating 
and^upervisory agency, and, on the other, is the prmcipal executive agency of the 
government. For example, the Railway Board, which constitutes the railway 
ministry, is also the higher operating agency. In fact, when any new activity starts 
in the secretariat and it gets beyond certain proportions, it is handed over to a field 
agency created for the purpose. Owing to a number of factors the secretariat in 
India has to concern itself even with details of administration. For one thing, India, 
being a parliamentary democracy the Secretariat has to collect a lot of information 
from various sources and agencies to be made available to the parliament, 
particularly by way of replies to questions. Secondly, "people approach ministers 
directly for redress of individual or group grievances. The ministers also want to 
do their best to redress such grievances, thus, adding to the work of the 
secretariat". Thirdly, our polity being a federal one, the task of coordinating the 
functioning of state governments has to be done by the Union Government 
Secretariat. Fourthly, and perhaps most importantly, the responsibility for carrying 
out the proclaimed national goals and faithful implementation of the constitution 
rests particularly on the Union government. 
Structure: The Central Secretariat is a conglomeration of various ministries and 
departments. But Cabinet Secretariat, which is in reality a ministry comprising 
more than one department, is still known as the Secretariat. The term "Ministry" 
came into vogue only after independence in 1947. The constitution requires that 
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the President shall make rules for the allocation of business amongst mmisters. 
This is the root of the portfolio system, and the concept of a ministry springs from 
this system. A ministry is the charge allotted to the mmisters. This charge may 
include one or more departments depending upon admmistrative convenience, 
each under the charge of secretary. Many large mmistries like agriculture, defence, 
education, external affairs, finance and home have more than one department 
included in their charge. A department is an organizational unit consisting of 
secretary to government together with a part to Central Secretariat under his 
administrative control on which the responsibility of performing specific functions 
has been conferred. In other words, a department should be identified with a 
secretary's charge and a minister with a minister's charge but this distinction is not 
always maintained. Thus, if a ministry has more than one department withm itself, 
it may have more than one secretary in which case there will arise the need for 
making one secretary superior to other secretaries who will represent the mmistry. 
A ministry is responsible for the formation of the policy of the government withm 
its sphere of responsibility as well as for the execution and review of that policy. 
A ministry, for the purpose of internal organization, is divided mto the 
following segments with an officer in charge of each of them to expedite matters:*^ 
Department: Secretary / Additional/ Special Secretary 
Wing: Joint /Additional Secretary 
Division: Under Secretary 
Section: Section Officer 
The lowest of such unit is the Section-in-Charge or a Section Officer and 
consists a number of assistants, clerks; daftaries, typists and peons. It deals with 
the work relating to the subject allotted to it. It is also referred to as the office. 
Two sections constitute a branch which is under the charge of an under secretary, 
also known as the branch officer. Two branches ordmarily form a division that is 
normally headed by a deputy secretary. When the volume of work m a ministry 
exceeds the manageable charge of a secretary, one or more wings are established 
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with a joint secretary in charge of each wing. At the top of the hierarchy comes the 
department, which is headed by the secretary himself or m some cases by an 
additional/ special secretary. In some cases, a department may be as autonomous 
as a ministry and equivalent it in rank. To satisfy the ego of certain officers the 
post of director was created in 1960. It is not much different in terms of 
responsibilities from that of a deputy secretary. Officer on Special Duty (O.S.D): 
This is an old device to accommodate certain persons or to meet unexpected 
emergency but has been found useful to practicing administrators.^^ 
A permanent office is needed to assist the officers in preserving continuity 
of administration. Functions of the office can be divided into two broad categories, 
(a) functions to be earned out automatically on any case sent to office without 
specific directions and (b) functions to be performed only by direction of an 
officer. All the secretariat officers' work under the "Tenure System" which is an 
institutionalization of the need for change at higher levels. 
The Cabinet Secretariat: Before the adoption of the portfolio system in the 
government of India, all governmental business was disposed of by the Governor 
General in Council, the Council functioning as a joint consultative body hoard's 
the amount and complexity of business increased, the work of the various 
departments was distributed amongst the members of the Council, only the more 
important cases being dealt with by the Governor General or the Council 
collectively. This procedure was legalized by the Council Act of 1861 during the 
time of Lord Canning, leading to the introduction of the portfolio system and the 
organization of the Executive Council of the Governor General. Until 1935, the 
Secretariat of the Executive Council was headed by the private secretary to the 
Viceroy, but he did not attend the Council meetings. Lord Willingdon first started 
the practice of having his private secretary by his side at these meetmgs. Later, this 
practice continued and in November 1935, the Viceroy's pnvate secretary was 
given the additional designation of Secretary to the Executive Council. On the 
attainment of the mdependence in August 1947, the Executive Council of the 
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Viceroy was replaced by a popular cabinet, headed by the prime minister. 
Consequently, the secretary of the Executive Council of the viceroy was renamed 
as the cabinet secretary. The cabinet secretariat is responsible for all secretariat 
work connected with the meetings of the cabinet, making and maintaining records 
of the discussions and decisions of the cabinet and its committees, viz the Joint 
Plaiming Committee of the Cabinet, the Appointment sub Committee of the 
Cabinet, etc. The O and M Division created in March 1954 was also attached to 
the cabinet secretarial. The O and M Division is primarily responsible for 
initiating and sustaining a concentrated effort to improve administrative efficiency 
in all branches of the government of India. In addition, the cabinet secretariat deals 
with the work relating to the central statistical organization. The cabinet secretariat 
is headed by the Prime Minister and consists of a secretariat and an attached 
office, namely the central statistical organization. The cabinet secretary does not 
deal with any item of work of executive or an advisory nature which can be 
regarded as appropriate for transfer to a subordinate office. The cabinet secretariat 
consists of 1 secretary (also secretary to the Planning Commission), 1 joint 
secretary, 1 deputy secretary, 4 under secretaries and 6 sections officers. The 
secretariat organization comprises, (i) Main Secretariat, (ii) O and M Division (iii) 
Military Wing, and (iv) Economic Wing.^ ^ 
The work relating to the cabinet and its committees is governed by the 
Rules of Procedure in regard to the proceedings of the Cabinet, which were 
approved by the Cabinet in 1947. There are three methods of disposal of cases by 
the Cabinet, namely 
(a) by discussion in Cabinet; 
(b) by circulation for expression of opinion; and 
(c) by discussion in a Committee of the Cabinet for two or more ministers 
nominated by the Prime Minister.*^ 
No invitation for the Cabinet meeting is sent to any cabinet minister, the 
notice of the meeting serves the purpose. Invitations are, however, sent to the 
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Ministers of State who have independent charge of the ministries/ departments 
when the matter relating to their ministries / departments is to be considered by the 
Cabmet. A minister of this category is also invited when his ministry/department 
has expressed specific views on the proposals of another ministry placed before 
the Cabinet. The Cabinet Secretary and other senior officials of the Cabmet 
Secretariat make ail the arrangements of the meetings. Secretaries and senior 
officials of other mmistries remain in attendance at the meeting when an item 
relating to their ministry is on the agenda. They are called inside the meeting room 
when so desired by their minister or the prime minister. 
The officials of the Cabinet Secretariat present at the cabinet meeting draft 
the minutes of the meetings. They are submitted to the Prime Minister for approval 
within twenty-four hours of the meetings. After the prime minister has approved 
the minutes, they are circulated to the cabinet ministers, ministers of state in 
independent charge of miniseries and the secretaries concerned. If a minister 
present at the meeting suggests any amendment in the minutes it is submitted to 
the prime minister for consideration and orders. If the prime minister accepts the 
amendment, revised minutes are circulated. At the conclusion of each cabinet 
meeting, the Cabinet Secretary briefs the press on those important decisions taken 
that can be disclosed to the press. Similar briefing is given whenever necessary in 
case of important decision taken in a cabinet Committee. 
Cabinet Secretary: The Cabinet Secretariat fiinctions under the over all 
supervision of a Cabinet Secretary. He is a very senior civil servant, and the pivot 
of the Cabinet Secretariate. All the Ministries in all those matters in which the 
cabinet as a whole is concerned entrust him with the positive ftinctions of securing 
coordination as well as timely and effective action. He convenes meetings of the 
secretaries and senior officers whenever necessary. He guides and advises 
secretaries to the government whenever they come to him for advice regardmg 
their departmental difficulties. In short, acts as their friend, philosopher and guide. 
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Prime Minister's Office (P.M.O): The Prime Minister's Office (P.M.O), known 
as the Prime Mmister's Secretariat until 1977, was estabhshed in September 1946. 
According to the Descnptive Memoirs of Prime Minister's Secretanat (1954), "the 
Prime Minister's Secretanat is responsible for assisting the Prime Minister m 
maintainmg, on the official side, liaison with the ministries of the Government of 
India, the President, the Governors of States, Chief Ministers, Representatives of 
Foreign governments m this country etc., and on the other side, in handling 
various complaints from members of the general public addressed to the Prime 
Minister in his capacity as the head of cabinet."'^ The Prime Minister's Secretariat 
was not designed to be the residuary legatee of the Government of India. But for 
the purpose of answermg questions in the Parliament, it has been found convenient 
to handle m the Prime Mmister's Secretariat certain very general subjects, which 
could not, on a stnct classification concerned a particular ministry. During January 
1966 to March 1977, under the late Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the 
Secretariat in terms of power and authority attained enormous prestige during the 
internal emergency it emerged as the real decision making organization, virtually 
functioning as the government of India. In 1977, the Janta Government under 
Morarji Desai as Prime Minister came into power, and one of the earliest measures 
of Moraiji Desai was to curb the powers and functions of this formidable body. Its 
staff was curtailed, and its name was changed too: it was renamed as the Prime 
Mmister's Office, which stays till today. 
In 1980, Indira Gandhi Came into power again, the Prime Minister Office 
became a very powerful institution of policy and decision makmg in the 
Government. Later on prime minister Rajiv Gandhi strengthened this office. At 
one point of time it mcluded three full-fledged secretaries, three additional 
secretanes, five joint secretaries and a battery of OSDs and director level officers. 
There were a large number of advisors too. The Prime Minister's Office had thus a 
galaxy of bureaucratic stars. The Prime Minister's Office, as the name suggests, 
assists the Prime Minister in the performance of his political, parliamentary and 
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public responsibilities. The Prime Minister's Office, today, is thus, the 
Government of the Government of India. Being closest to the Prime Mmister, this 
office is more powerful than tlie Cabinet Secretariat. The P.M.O in a way basks in 
the reflected glory of the political chief 
Ministries and Departments: Ministries and Department are very essential in the 
organizational set up of the government of India. The administrative organization 
that assists the Minister to deal with the subject allotted to him is known as the 
Ministry. Each Mmistry/ Department is responsible for dealing with the subjects 
allotted to it under the Busmess Rules made by the President m 1966 and amended 
from time to time. This allotment is done by the President on the advice of the 
Prime Mmister. These rules also specify cases or classes of cases to be submitted 
to the President, the Prime Minister, the Cabmet or its committees for prior 
approval and the circumstances in which the Department primarily concerned with 
the business under disposal will have to consult other departments concerned and 
secure their concurrence before takmg formal decision. 
Functions of Ministries/ Departments: They are responsible for the formulation 
of policies as well as their execution within the spheres. Their functions are as 
follows: 
(a) Assisting the minister in policy making and its periodical review, 
(b) Framing legislation and rules and regulations, 
(c) Sectoral planning and programme formulation, 
(d) Budgeting and control of expenditure in respect of their activities and 
accordingly securing administrative and fmancial approval to operational 
programmes and plans and their subsequent modifications, 
(e) Supervision and control over the execution of policies and programme by 
the executive departments or semi autonomous field agencies and 
evaluation of the results, 
(f) Coordination and interpretation of policies assistmg other branches of 
government and maintaining contact with state administrations. 
42 
(g) Initiating measures to develop greater personnel and organizational 
competence both in the secretariat and its executive agencies, and 
(h) Assisting the minister in the discharge of his parliamentary responsibilities 
The machinery of the central government has increased in size smce 
independence. At the time of the transfer of power to India in 1947, the work of 
the government was carried out in 18 ministries. Two decade later, this number 
had gone up to 40 Ministries/Department. In 1985 the Union government 
consisted of 75 Ministries/Departments. In 1994 this number stood at 74. '^ 
(2) ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC SECTOR: SOCIALISTIC 
PATTERN OF SOCIETY 
Increasing intervention by the state in the economic field has been a characteristic 
feature of the 20* century, particularly after the end of the first world war in 1918. 
This trend got accelerated after the termmation of the world war second m 1945, 
Today, state intervention of a positive kind in the ownership, operation or 
regulation of industries and services has gained a vast momentum. 
In India also this trend has been in operation for quite some time. It was at 
its Karachi session, in 1931, that the Indian National Congress, for the first time, 
attempted to define the economic and social content of the swaraj it was striving 
for, and in its resolution on economic and social programmes, among other things 
resolved: "The state shall own or control key industries and services, mmeral 
resources, railways, waterways, shipping and other means of public interest." ^ ^ 
This resolution was passed at the instance of Jawahar Lai Nehru, who along with a 
band of progressive young men, belonged to what may be termed as the 'leftist' or 
'socialist' wing of the congress. In 1934, Sir M. Visvesvaraya published a book 
called Planned Economy for India, suggesting a systematic plan for the economic 
development of the country. In 1927, the congress set up a National Planning 
Committee with Jawahar Lai Nehru as its Chairman and K.T Shah as the General 
Secretary. This committee appointed two subcommittees in 1940 to report on 
principles of national planning and administrative machinery for India's national 
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plan. However, due to the outbreak of the second world war and the congress 
involvement in the struggle for freedom, the reports of these subcommittees could 
become available only in 1948. The National Planning Committee supported state 
intervention in the country's economy and recommended increasing state control 
over it including nationalization of industries. Eight leading industrialist of 
Bombay had published in 1943 the Bombay Plan. All this had set people thinking 
about planning and development. These ideas were later embodied m the New 
Indian Constitution in Part IV of the Directive Principles of State Policy. Article 
38 of the Indian Constitution states: "The state shall strive to promote the welfare 
of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in 
which justice-social, economic, and political-shall inform all the institutions of 
national life". Similarly, Article 39(b) committed government "to direct its policy 
towards securing that the ownership and control of material resources of the 
country are so distributed as best to sub serve the common good; and that the 
operation of economic system does not result in concentration of wealth and 
means of production to the common detriment. 
On 21^ April 1945, the Planning Committee under the chairmanship of 
Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru issued a policy statement, which stated: "Certam 
industries must be taken under central control in the interest of coordinated 
development. Government should play an active part in the industrial 
developments of the country."^^ The statement confirmed the contmuation of 
ordnance factories, railways, post office and public utilities already under state 
ownership and operation. It also declared that basic industries of national 
importance must be nationalized as provided adequate capital is not forthcommg, 
and it is regarded as essential in the national interest to promote such industnes. 
The national government headed by Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru announced 
two epoch-making industrial Resolutions, the first m 1948 and the second m 1956. 
Through these resolutions the national government sought to dispense social 
justice and economic equality in the heterogeneous society that comprised of the 
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affluent maharajas, nawabs on the one hand and the poor peasants and the proper 
proletarians on the other. This ambitious objective was to be reaUzed through the 
planned development of the public sector undertakings. Therefore, the public 
sector envisaged to be the infrastructure of the socialistic society. 
The types and the functions of a public enterprise, as they are m existence 
in the various modem socialistic states of the world may be classified mto three 
broad categories: 
1. Totally monopolistic with governmental protection. 
2. Competitive in character but regulated by the government 
3. Semi-monopolistic and partially-competitive with or without 
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government protection. 
Public sector undertaking is a modem innovation inducted mto the 
economic activities of a state by which a government ensures equitable 
distribution of goods and services under its own care and control. Maximum 
socio-economic benefits to the maximum number of consumers at minimum cost 
of production form the cardinal objectives of the government of the state to enter 
into commercial, industrial or economic life. General objectives of a modem state 
in estabhshing or managing a public undertaking are viz., dispensing of socio-
economic justice, optimum exploitation of resources in men and materials of a 
country; attainment of self-dependence of the citizens as well as of the state and 
freedom from exploitation of consumers by private entrepreneur. The Acts that 
bring forth public enterprises clearly lay down the public purpose and aims which 
each of these enterprise has to pursue and strive to achieve. For example, the 1953 
Air Corporation Act envisaged transportation of men and materials by the Air 
India and the Indian Airlines within and outside India. Similarly Life Insurance 
Corporation and Warehousing Corporation were devised to realize particular 
objectives which each one has pursued and achieved for public good. 
It needs, nevertheless, be mentioned here that the enterprises under the 
National Government's control and being managed by political bureaucracy have 
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hardly achieved success in reaUsing their objectives. The poUticians with no idea 
of practical experience and the administrative bureaucrats without any faith or 
active involvement in the working of this socialistic innovation have created an 
ominous situation in which the public sector lingers without delivermg the 
anticipated goods to the nation. Personnel of any public enterprise generally do not 
form part of the civil service of the country. Thus, the executive, legislature and 
the civil service do not have enough control over the public enterprise persormel. 
Each enterprise frames its own rules and regulations for its employees. This is a 
statutory necessity. In India, however these principles have not been adhered to. 
Almost invariably the top-notches of the public enterprises have been live-wire 
personnel from the Indian civil service deputed on secondments from the 
ministries. Even the staff manning the lower levels of management has been taken 
over from the government departments or the ministries. Thus, the deputationists 
have caused many problems. The needed freedom from the control of the 
government or from the clutches of the bureaucrats of the administrative ministry 
has been the cry of the day. 
Just on the eve of Independence, Nehru spelt out his own opinion in the 
following unequivocal terms: "Far too much attention is often paid in acquiring 
existing industries than to the building of new industries by the state or under state 
control. Existing industries of tfie basic type may have to be acquired by the state 
and run by the state. But it seems to me far better approach to the problem for the 
state would be to concentrate more and more on new industries." ^^  Nehru was a 
bom socialist of incomparable core, and a dedicated patriot of rock-bottom strata. 
As a socialized dictator of the national govemment he reigned over the country 
and had the complete sway over the ruling party more than over 17 years without 
allowing any interference or imposition from any quarters. The mdustrial 
resolutions was his brain-children, given birth to in order to hasten the 
achievement of radical and post-haste revolutionary transformation of a subject 
country into an affluent socialistic republic. The people accepted socialization as 
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only a means to obtain their socio-economic needs, necessities and wants. The 
ultimate economic motivation of the national government in entering into econo-
industrial activities has been to introduce a system of socialization covermg all 
embracing economic activities of the nation. Such enterprises were to be owned by 
the people, held in the form of a trust by the people's representatives. They were 
meant for producing goods or services in adequate quantum and at reasonable 
prices. The Nehru government in India preferred appointing members of the 
Indian Civil Service even if they were not qualified for such posts or lacked the 
requisite commercial or business experience to run the enterprise of the public 
sector.^ These ICS personnel who lacked the required technical expertise, 
commercial skills and experience, were incapable of adjusting themselves to the 
changed socialistic environment. They remained aloof from the employees and 
didn't join the main stream of the social changes. This naturally deprived them of 
their rightful positions in the enterprises. Wrong people were thus imposed on the 
right positions. The result has been that the public sector has been pestered with 
evils like favoritism and nepotism, corruption, and inefficiency. The Nehru 
government was solely responsible for the unending and devastating brain drain 
firom India. Evidently these public enterprises have become automatic machines 
producing corruption and inefficiency. The public sector, therefore, was an easy 
prey for the unprincipled politicians and opportunistic civil servants, to 
mismanage and abuse commercial ventures. 
As a matter of fact public enterprises should be self-financing and self-
supporting. Once they are flooded with the public aid granted by the legislature-
the Parliament at the center and legislatures at the states in the forms of equity, 
loans from the Consolidated Funds, the enterprises are expected to stand on their 
own feet. The public aid granted to any enterprise in the form of equity or loans or 
purchase of assets or working capital must be repaid to the state with reasonable 
interest, otherwise the exchequer and the tax payers are crushed under its 
continually increasing burden of the annual expenditure. By and large, the Indian 
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public sector belongs to this category, indeed. No enterprise under a socialistic 
government can hope to escape the pressure that is brought to bear upon it by the 
minister, the press, the legislature and the people, each one of whom keeps a 
critical vigilance on the activities of such enterpnses. Public enterprise being an 
offspring of the socialistic philosophy is considered to be a medium through which 
social equality and economic equity are sought to be inducted in the society which 
has been a communion of people diversified in the standard of affluence, of wealth 
and of living. 
In India, the model of establishing and managing public sector enterprises 
has differed vastly from that of the similar ventures obtaining m socialistic 
governments in other parts of the world. Since the birth of the slogan, 'socialistic 
pattern of society', the ruling party in India has clearly expressed its rigid 
opposition to large aggregations of private property either in agriculture, industry 
or trade and commerce. There are, however, different forms of exercismg 
governmental control over public sector enterprises. In socialistic or communist 
states like the USSR and other countries, where the innovation of public enterprise 
has firstly been inducted in the economic field, it is the political party in power 
which directs the government as to how it should plan and promote public 
enterprises and manage them to realise given socio-economic production targets. 
In Yugoslavia it is the management of these enterprises themselves who formulate 
their own planning and targets under the direction of the ruling party while the 
government keeps a close watch on their working since the government acts as a 
financier-entrepreneur. 
The public sector enterprises were being promoted for establishing social 
justice and economic equality in the nation; to raise the standard of living of the 
poor, and to add to the gross national product. But in practice, political 
bureaucrats and administrative bureaucrats occupying the top managerial positions 
of the public sector succeeded only in raising the standard of living of their 
ownselves and that of their dear and near ones. To conclude it can be safely said 
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that summanly mismanaged by unprincipled politicians and opportunistic civil 
servants in India smce the very beginnmg. 
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PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS IN INDIA 
(A) ORIGIN OF PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS 
While tracing the origin of the concept of pubUc enterprise and its present 
day popularity we come upon the fact that the term, "Public Corporation" was 
coined by the Crawford Committee in 1926, when it was examinmg the workmg 
of the British Broadcasting Service.' Since then this term has assumed increasmg 
popularity in almost all the modem states of the world. 
Although a by-product of socialistic philosophy, the concept of public 
enterprise has taken deep roots in all types and forms of governments in vogue in 
the world. Every government, whether totalitarian, communist, monarchic or 
democratic knows that it can not but take increasing interest in the economic 
activities of the state so as to provide means to satisfy the socio-economic needs 
and necessities of the citizens equally, equitably and adequately. Public Sector 
Undertaking is a modem mnovation inducted into the economic activities of a 
state by which a government ensures equitable distribution of goods and services 
under its own care and control. Economic inequalities and social differences 
among various groups and classes of a society or of a nation have given birth to 
the concept as well as the creation and development of this innovation. This 
innovation has been inducted into the commercial, industrial or economic life and 
has rigorously been practiced in the advanced countries like the USSR, Germany, 
France, UK, and USA and other European countries much earlier than in India. 
Each of the enterpnses in the public sector is bom of a necessity-economic, social, 
or both. The entrepreneur of a public enterprise is the govemment and its 
shareholders are the public that comprise, tax payers and citizens of the country. 
Public sector is an omnibus term. In France, public enterprises mean 
mdustrial and commercial undertakings of the govemment. In USA, public sector 
means all govemment agencies which are engaged in providing specific goods and 
services. In UK, public corporations are the public enterprises. In Italy, public 
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enteq^rises are those which are run either by local v^Ei '^s-^r^^-t l^^s^e 
government.^ According to A. H. Hanson, "public enterpnses=«Jg^ state 
ownership and operation of industrial, agncultural, financial and commercial 
undertakings."^ H. N. Roy is correct when he observes-"Nations all over the 
world, regardless of size or ideology, have increasingly avail of public enterprises 
as instrument for social and economic development." 
United Kingdom is the birthplace of public corporation- an oldest form of 
public sector enterprises. In 1908, the Port of London Authority was established a 
proto type of 20'^  century public corporation. The modem system of public 
corporation come mto existence with the establishment of the Port of London 
Authority which was established by an Act of Parliament and was entrusted to act, 
(i) "as a public authority over the Thames estuary...in the capacity of river 
conservancy and grantor of licenses to river crafts and users, and (li) as a 
commercial enterprise in providing and administering dock and warehousmg 
facilities in the Port of London".^ In 1909, Electricity Commission and Forestry 
Commission were constituted. In between 1926 and 1949 the important 
corporations estabhshed or nationalized were B.B.C. (1926), London Passenger 
Transport Board (1933), National Coal Board (1946), Iron and Steel Corporation 
(1949) and the Bntish Steel Corporation.^ 
In USSR where no private sector was seen, the management of mdustry, 
transport and trade was not conducted directly by ministries or by departments of 
local Soviets, but by independent public corporation. The tempo of nationalization 
in USSR began in 1918 when entire economy came under the state ownership. In 
1927, five years plans started. Peoples Commissariats were established inl932 and 
after that the totalitarian type of corporations grew in USSR. China and 
Yugoslavia have the same type of mdustrial management influenced by Russian 
experiences. The USSR as a nation collapsed in 1991 into several small countries. 
The genesis of public sector m the form of public corporations m USA goes 
as back as 1930 when postal system was directly owned by state governments. 
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During the period of economic depression of 1930-33 the Roosevelt government 
of USA adopted the public corporation system. The Inland Waterways 
Corporation, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Federal Home Loan Banks and 
Tennessee Valley Authority were established in quick succession in U.S.A. The 
establishment of TVA may be said to mark the maturity pomt of this system and 
its organization has become a symbol of public corporations in most of the 
countries of the world.^  In 1933, the TVA was established which started as prince 
among the government corporation m USA. The scope of public sector in USA is 
very limited and till today the people of USA debate the role of public sector in the 
economy. Virtually, they do not like public sector except a few where it is 
permitted by law. In USA the first and the oldest corporation is the Panama 
Railroad Company established in 1904.^  The Port of New York Authority was 
established in 1921 as a result of an agreement between the state of New York and 
New Jersey. The authority is, thus an agency of the two state governments and is 
charged witli the management of ports, airfields, bridges, tunnels and bus and 
trunk terminals. It enjoys a high degree of autonomy and self-sufficiency and 
revenues and does not have to depend upon any external assistance or subsidy. 
Although the agreement provides for various vetoes m favor of the governors of 
the two states, yet they have never been used.'° 
The system soon spread over the commonwealth countries and also over 
France, Belgium and many other continental countries. After the second world 
war, there has been tremendous growth of public enterprises of one type or another 
in most of the countries. These are being set up and operated by the governments 
with explicit intention of accelerating economic and social development. There is 
hardly any country at present where the government is not engaged actively and 
directly in setting up and managing public enterprises. According to A. H. Hanson, 
"whatever the ultimate perspective may be, the country anxious to develop 
economically has no alternative but to use public enterprise on a considerable 
scale, at the very least in order to get things gomg."" 
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In India, it came into vogue with the estabhshment of the national self-
government in 1946. Mr. 'Nehru had declared in December 1947 in the general 
body meeting of Associated Chambers of Commerce of India, "I have little doubt 
that the approach will involve a large measure of socialization in regard to certain 
basic and key industries. I have little doubt the tendency will be for them to be 
state owned or at any rate, to be state controlled, whether the central government 
or state government or a municipal corporation. Normally, the control will be m 
the shape of public corporation."'^ The Damoder Valley Corporation was 
established in 1948 under an Act of Parliament. It was followed by Industrial 
Finance Corporation, Indian Airlines Corporation, Eastern Shipping Coiporation, 
Life Insurance Corporation and more than two dozen other corporations and 
companies. All developed nations have chosen "public corporation" as a device of 
economic development and have modified according to their need and believes. 
This form of public enterprises is very popular and other developmg nations take 
advantage of their experience. A question arises here that what are the factors that 
brought about the public sector and are responsible for its rapid growth? All the 
causes underlying its creation can be divided into two groups. The first group 
includes the factors connected with the restricted capabilities of private capitalist 
enterprise in developing countries in the second are those which explain the desire 
to use tiie public sector as an instrument for effecting economic development and 
defending national interests. 
(B) BEGINNING OF PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS IN INDIA 
In the real sense, public enterprises in India are of recent origin. However, 
their importance in the industrial sector increased after the attainment of 
Independence. But the scholars have traced the history of public enterprises as far 
as back as 300 B.C. Kautilya, the founder prime minister of Mauryan empire in 
India, in his 'Arthashasira' spoke of public enterprises. There was a 
'Lavanadyaksha' in charge of manufacture of salt and fixation of its price. 
Likewise, the 'Akaradhyaksha' the 'Rupadarsaka' and the 'Suvarnadhyaksha' 
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seem to have been in charge of mining, coinage, and gold, all in the control of the 
state,'^ S. D. Sharma in an article-'Public Enterprises in Medieval India' has stated 
"in the later part of the medieval period, mining also came in the ambit of state 
activity and a number of state monopolies such as manufacture of all kinds of 
ammunition, particularly lead and salt pestle were created". He further observed 
that there was a large number of Karkhanas-royal workshop, which were attached 
to the Imperial household. About the importance of these Karkhanas S.D. Sharma 
wrote-'The royal workshops occupied an important place in the economy. No 
single unit in the private enterprise was big enough in size that could be compared 
to the royal workshop, in equipment and organization also; the private enterprise 
units were a poor match to the Karkhanas".'"* The whole medieval India was 
somehow or other engaged in the production of consumer goods as well as arms 
and ammunition. 
In modem India we find two sorts of efforts-one by the alien government 
and other by Swadeshi Movement headed by Indian National Congress, which 
paved the base for public enterprises in the country. It was the first world war, 
which interrupted, and blockaded supplies and naval warfare that shook British 
complacency about industrialization of India. They then thought of ammunition 
and ordnance factories. During the colonial rule, the Indian Industrial Commission 
(1916) recommended- "It is vital therefore for the government to establish those 
industries whose absence exposes us to grave danger in times of war."'^ Thus, the 
alien government started ordnance factories and took over the management of 
Indian railways in 1922. Later, the second world war provided great impetus to the 
development and expansion of the war industnes (1939-45). The existing 
industries worked to full capacity. Some new industries were also started but only 
to supply war needs. Industries for the manufacture of ferro-alloys, nonferrous 
metals, diesel engines, bicycles, sewing machines, machine tools and cutting tools 
were set-up some of these industries were granted protection. In 1944 the 
government of India established a Planning and Development Department. Lord 
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Wavell made a statement on industrial policy in 1945 prescribing that all ordnance 
factories, public utilities, railways and basic industries of key importance should 
be nationalized if private capital was not forthcoming. Industries like shipping, 
locomotives and boilers were kept in mixed sector and aircraft, automobiles, 
tractors, iron and steel, electric machinery and transport vehicles were treated 
basic and hence were put in state sector. 
The Fiscal Autonomy Convention passed by the British Parliament, 
authorized the Indian government to pursue an independent fiscal policy aimed at 
developing the industrial infrastructure of the country. The Fiscal Commission, 
appointed subsequent to the convention, wanted the government to extended 
discriminating protection to the Indian industries. This made the government 
extend its half-hearted protection to only iron, steel, cotton, textiles, sugar and 
paper pulp industries in which the British capital had a overwhelming interest. 
This half-hearted encouragement given to only a chosen few industries related the 
proper development of the key infrastructural industries upon which free India's 
fiiture economic-industrial super structure was to be built after 1947.'^ 
In order to meet the war needs of the allied forces in world war second, 144 
private enterprises were asked to supply machine tools, lathes, drilling, sharpenmg 
and planing machines, explosives, guns torpedo boats, drugs, leather goods and 
heavy chemicals. The total export of all the manufactured indigenous articles rose 
from about Rs. 48 crores in 1939 to about Rs. 82 crores in 1941. The British 
government of India was most reluctant to establish and expand large-scale 
indusfries to be managed and controlled solely by the Indians. When world war 
second ended, the demand of the war supplies disappeared in thm air, leaving 
Indian industries and thousands of frained and experienced employees idle and 
redundant. The British government of the Indian dominion was opposed to the 
development of heavy industries or ordnance industnes, particularly under 
indigenous control or management.'^ Before independence, the Reserve Bank of 
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India (RBI Act of 1934), the Bombay Port Trust, the Calcutta Port Commission 
and the Madras Port Trust were estabUshed as PubUc Corporations. '^  
After independence, the national government was called upon to play a 
pivotal role by concentrating its energies on establishmg new units of public 
enterprises in other fields of economic-industrial activities as well as to continue 
nationalizmg the existing ones. The Swadeshi Movement heralded by Indian 
National Congress was more particular regardmg industrialization and planning. 
The Working Committee of the Congress in August, 1937 recommended its 
provincial governments to appoint committees of experts to draw up schemes of 
"National Reconstruction and Social Planning". The Committee felt that national 
problems couldn't be dealt with in piecemeal or by provincial ministries of 
industries. The Conference of 1938 reached the conclusion that poverty; 
unemployment, national defence, rapid economic development and regeneration 
can only be solved by comprehensive scheme of industrialization. For making a 
comprehensive scheme of industrialization, a National Planning Committee was 
set up under the chairmanship of Mr. Jawahar Lai Nehru. The Committee 
classified the industries into three categories: (a) Defence (b) Key, (c) Public 
Utilities. Defence industries should be under 'Public Sector' not only to maintain 
secrecy, but also to protect against external aggression. Key industries may either 
be state regulated or state owned. Public Utility industries compulsarily should fall 
in purview of the state enterprises. Meanwhile individual or group attempts were 
also made in this regard. Bombay Plan prepared by the industrialists promised to 
double the per capita income in fifteen years through industrialization. People's 
plan prepared by M. N. Roy also emphasized the agricultural development of the 
nation. Some other plans were put forward. But shortly India won her freedom and 
the destiny of the Indian people came in their own hands. Before Independence, 
India had established few industries such as: 
1. Garden Reach Workshop Ltd. (1934). 
2. Mazagon Dock Ltd. (1934). 
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3. Fertilizers and Chemicals Ltd. (1943). 
4. National News Prints and Paper Mills (1947). 
5. Mogul Line Ltd. (1938).^° 
Besides these five nationalized undertakings on the eve of Independence, a 
few industrial units were also started. The government was given extensive powers 
to establish new public enterprises in particular fields like coal, iron, steel, 
shipbuilding, manufacture of aircraft, telephones, telegraph and wireless in 
addition to managmg national industries like railways, arms and ammunition. 
Additionally, the Directive Principles of the Constitution of India further 
empowered the National government to expand the public sector enterprises to 
cover all and sundry socio-economic activities. 
According to Minhas (1974) apart from ideological preferences for the 
public sector, planners believed in the following: 
1. Private investors may demand a higher risk premium for mvestment m 
some industries than would be socially justified. 
2. The scale of investment effort in heavy industries may be beyond the 
capital raising capacity of the private sector. 
3. The public sector, through appropriate price policy for its output, will 
generate profits for fiirther investment in the economy. 
4. By production and or distribution of crucial inputs, the state will be able to 
control the private sector, and 
5. The employment and wage policy of the public sector can be directed to 
benefit disadvantaged groups in the society.^' 
Keepmg this perspective in view, the major objectives of setting up of 
public enterprises were to; 
(a) Help in the rapid economic growth and mdustrialization of the 
country and generate the essential mfrastructure for economic 
development. 
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(b) Earn returns on investment and consequently generate capital for 
development. 
(c) Encourage redistribution of income and wealth. 
(d) Generate employment opportunities. 
(e) Promote balanced regional development. 
(f) Support the development of small scale and ancillary industries, and: 
(g) To encourage import substitutions, save and earn foreign exchange 
for the economy. 
The Nehru Government was, therefore, entrusted with the task of achieving 
a socialistic pattern of society out of chaotic conglomeration of people that had 
been created during the Bntish rule. The first five year plan classified the 
mdustries into: -
1. Industries, the future development of which was to be the exclusive 
responsibility of the national government. 
2. Industries, which would progressively be owned by the government and the 
state will take initiatives in establishing new industries but m which pnvate 
enterprises would also supplement the efforts of the government, and 
3. Industries, excluding (1) & (2) above, the future development of which 
would be left to the initiative and enterprise of the pnvate sector 
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entrepreneurs alone. 
The Planning Commission which was entrusted with the task of translating 
the Directive Principles of the Constitution into practical propositions, appomted 
Gorwala to study, in depth, the possibilities of future establishment and 
management of public enterprises which would help the country' in building up the 
Indian national economy. In his report, Gorwala enunciated many criteria to judge 
the efficient working of prospective public enterprises. Some of the important 
observations of his are as follows: 
62 
1. Public enterprises must be judged solely by the standard of efficiency 
employed, every unit of production of goods and services, minimum cost 
and requisite quality. 
2. Since the public enterprises are to be financed by the government, every 
importance should be given to have accurate estimates of the projects, 
presence of personal risk and ensuring freedom of the management to take 
prompt action. The management of public enterprises, he suggested, should 
have freedom in the internal management of the enterprise. 
3. Since public sector enterprises belong to the whole nation, the taxpayers, 
the citizens, the government and the Parliament should have infinite mterest 
in the management as well as in the success of these enterprises. 
4. Since the government is an active participant in the development of public 
sector, it should evolve suitable forms of control and direction of the 
management and to have an expandable nucleus of suitable personnel like, 
directors, managers and technicians to man these enterprises. The 
government should ensure building up of sound traditions, appropriate 
methods and new devices, in the sphere of activity, which should be quite 
different from ordinary governmental administration. He suggested 
reorganization of individual enterprises in such a way that it retains the 
flexibility and effectiveness of the best private enterprises; be able to work 
under the parliamentary and ministerial control; and the government to run 
them in a way that the administration of the public enterprises safeguard the 
national interests without latter's encroaching upon administration's 
independence m their internal managerial autonomy. 
5. Parliament must have an adequate opportunity of discussing and debating 
all aspects of the working of public sector enterprises when the govemment 
comes before Parliament for grant of budget from the Consolidated Fund. 
The yearly reports of such undertakings should be an occasion to 
Parliament to discuss the working of such enterprises minutely and 
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objectively. Since the Parliament is both, the shareholder and the consumer 
of such enterprise and has the right to protect the national interests, it 
should raise questions only on those matters, which are directly related to 
ministerial responsibility and or policy matters. 
6. The minister of the administrative ministry must, however, have full rights 
to appoint the chairman and members of the boards and also to direct the 
board on matters of national interest, importance and capital outlay for 
expansion since the minister is the representative of both, the shareholders 
and the consumers. His advice must, therefore, be obtained by the 
enterprise concerned in respect of investment, borrowings of money or 
allocation of profits. The board should be composed of suitable men who 
could maintain consistency with autonomy and efficiency, must discharge 
its duties adequately to the consumers, employees, government and the 
nation. The board must consider itself as a custodian of public interests, no 
less of the concerned enterprise. 
7. There may be two types of boards (a) Policy Board, and (b) Functional 
Board. 
8. Each enterprise must have a chief executive as the 'Centre of Energy' for 
direction and administration of management, to be assisted by appropriate 
managerial and staff agencies. 
9. Employees of the public enterprise must be given adequate livelihood, 
reasonable conditions of work, and full share of opportunity to share in 
making of conditions conducive to happiness. The employees must, 
however, not be given undue latitude to hinder smooth working of the 
enterprise." 
The Gorwala report was in the hands of the Planning Commission when it 
was formulating the first five year plan. Although socialistic in nature and 
democratic in character, the Indian national government sought to follow neither 
the Russian, nor the Egyptian nor the Yugoslavian pattern. It was keen to follow 
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only the British pattern of nationaUzation as adopted by the Attlee's Labour 
government in England. Through the Resolutions of 1946 and 1956 the National 
government strove to pursue a policy of setting up an unending number of 
commercial and industrial enterprises in the public sector. These enterprises, inter 
alia, were designed to play their crucial part by occupying commandmg positions 
in the developing national economy of the country. The public sector enterprises 
were expected to be the sinew of self-reliant and self-generating economy. 
Through the Resolution of 1956 the Indian government declared 
unequivocally that: -
1. The people through their chosen government have the unquestionable 
power to take over, nationalize or establish socio-economic enterprises, 
either existing or prospective. 
2. The government should accept additional responsibilities of extending its 
administrative sway over the economic activities, which have hitherto been 
monopolized by the private entrepreneurs. The sole object of the takeover 
by the national government of economic or commercial enterprises, 
formerly owned by the private industriahsts, was aimed at attaining a 
socialistic society in India. 
3. The private capital, initiative and ingenuity, however, were to be given 
encouragement to undertake private enterprises, albeit, with governmental 
approval and under her regulation. No private enterprise was to be allowed 
to function in a way detrimental to the social or economic good or national 
interest. 
The public enterprises, although to be run on commercial principles and 
business patterns, were envisaged to serve socio-economic objectives and to help 
create means and methods for achieving equitable distribution of material wants 
and economic needs of socialistic nation. These enterprises were not intended to 
be governmental departments manned by bureaucrats and were not to be bogged 
down by red-tapism. They were to be run as autonomous commercial entities 
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although under governmental control. They were to be responsible to the people 
through the legislature, which enjoyed an inalienable right to sanction or withhold 
finance for them. These enterprises were designed to have built-in high degree of 
freedom for initiative, boldness and decision-making, and were also meant to 
induct democratized functioning in to the body and arteries of the management of 
each of the constituents of the public sector. 
Indira Gandhi was elected prime-minister of India on January 24, 1969. She 
wanted to vivify her deceased father's promises of establishing a socialistic 
society through the public sector. Her success depended up on her ability to 
reorient the public sector economy. By the end of March 1973 an amount of over 
Rs.5, 000 crores had been mvested in the public sector which consisted of 102 
enterprises. If the average rate of net returns on this amount of capital was 10 
percent, there would be an amount of nearly Rs.450 crores for additional 
mvestment in the public sector." The economic development of a country is also 
known through its mdustrial structure. If the mdustries are just m a primary stage 
the economic development will be m primary stage too. For being fully developed 
the industries must be m tertiary stage. In fact, the shape of the industrial structure 
that is before us today is through an evolution and the public sector has a major 
role m shaping the mdustrial structure for the take-off phase in the Indian 
economy. 
In Indian economy, it becomes essential that the government agencies 
should come forward for active participation m the establishment of industrial 
undertakings because: 
1. The industrial base in India had not been built up sufficiently and the 
capital investment fund still needed a great deal of buildmg up and gearing 
state intervention becomes imperative. 
2. A government such as a present government in India, which is committed 
to the objectives of socialist society, is increasingly compelled to enter 
directly into mdustrial and commercial field.'*" 
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3. The industrial development needed a coordinated plan regarding what 
industries are to be established, how to be run and where to be established, 
these problems were such which private enterprise could not cope with. 
4. For the fulfillment of some of the specific aims and objectives incorporated 
in the Constitution of India it became essential for the state to embark upon 
commercial and industrial enterprises to change the structure of industry m 
the country for meeting the economic growth. In a developing country like 
India, It is essential to develop certain industries for building up the 
superstructure of economic growth and accelerated rate of economic 
growth.'^ 
The modem economy has inevitably to be a planned economy and as a 
planned economy the national responsibility of planning is something that cannot 
be assumed or discharged by any authority finally other than the government 
which the people have elected to office to look after the affairs of the country. In 
India, It was also essential to have a balanced development m different parts of the 
country and m different sectors of the economy. The government has been anxious 
to see that there may not be serious imbalances. Further, for the purpose of 
economic development in the field of mdustrial sector abundance of funds were 
required. Therefore, the government through public sector could only prove as a 
source of flmd. The government may like to have a hand in industry in order to 
sway the pattern of source allocation in national interests. The government also 
participates m industry durmg national emergency and it was thought that after 
mdependence the economic liberalisation of India would be likely through 
mdustrial development. 
Therefore, m 1948, the government of India "gave a carefiil thought to 
economic problems facmg the country and adopted an Industrial Policy 
Resolution" which declared that the problem of state participation m industry 
together with private enterprise will continue and with a view to bring change in 
the industrial structure it classified the industnes into "planned" and "unplanned" 
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sector. In the planned sector some industries were considered as the exclusive 
privilege of the state governments and a few others, which already existed, were 
allowed under the private ownership to continue till the time they were properly 
directed and regulated. It was, however, felt that for some time to come in this 
category of industry the state could contribute more quickly and new undertaking 
will be established only by the state. The rest of the "unplanned" industrial field 
remained normally open to private enterprise, individuals as well as cooperatives 
but the state government reiterated to participate in the field. The Industrial Policy 
Resolution, 1948 stated: "There can be no doubt that the state must play a 
progressively active role in the development of industries, but the ability to 
achieve the mam objectives should determme the immediate extent of state 
responsibility and the limits to private enterprise." '** 
The Industrial Policy Resolution, 1948, divided industry into four 
categories: (i) Defence and strategic industries were to be the exclusive monopoly 
of the state (central government), (li) Basic and key industries were to remam with 
the existing private undertakings and reasonable opportunities of expansion were 
to be allowed to them but new undertakings m these industries were to be set up 
only by the state. The question of nationalization of private enterprises in this 
category was to be decided after ten years, (in) Twenty important industries were 
to be in the private sector but subject to government control and regulation (iv) 
The residual industries were to be run by private enterprise and were to be subject 
to only the general control of the state ''^  According to the Journal Mainstream, 
"The state was to be responsible for the fijture development of basic and heavy 
mdustries like coal, iron and steel, aircraft manufacture, shipbuilding, manufacture 
of telephone, telegraph wireless apparatus and mineral oils..."''" 
River valley projects, fertilizers, manufacture of essential drugs, synthetic 
wire were already started by the government. Sindn Fertilizers, Chittaranjan 
Locomotives, Indian Telephone Industries, a new aircraft factory at Banglore, The 
National Instrument Factory, the Hindustan Shipyard and factories for the 
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manufacture of penicillin, D D T and newsprint were among the projects 
completed m public sector during the first plan period. Certain industries of basic 
importance such as; salt, automobiles, tractors, heavy machinery, machine tools, 
heavy chemicals, electro-chemical mdustries, non-ferrous metals, cement, sugar, 
paper and news prints, etc., were also regulated and planned irrespective of 
location and other matters by the government." '^ The first public sector 
undertaking, which was established after independence in August 1950, is India 
Rare Earth Ltd., to recover thorium and uranium values contained in minerals. The 
second one is Indian Telephone Industries Limited. During the first five-year plan 
14 industries were either started or taken over. After this many industries under the 
guidelines of different Industrial Policy Resolutions were started. By the end of 
March 1992, such industries have gone up to the number 246, whose working has 
been published, time-to-time by the Bureau of Public Enterprises ' ' 
The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956, states that "the adoption of the 
sociahstic pattern of society as the national objective as well as the need for 
planned and rapid development, require that all industries to basic and strategic 
importance, or m the nature of public utility services should be in the public 
sector. Other industries, which are essential and require mvestment on a scale, 
which only the state, in the present circumstances, could provide, have also to be 
in public sector. The state has, therefore, to assume direct responsibility for future 
development of industries over wider areas. 
The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 categorized industries into three 
classes: Firstly, those which were to be exclusive responsibility of the state It 
included 17 industries such as; arms and ammunition, atomic energy, iron and 
steel, heavy casting, heavy engineering, coal, iron ore, oil, air and rail transport, 
shippmg, telephone, telegraph and radio equipment, etc. The second category 
included those mdustries, which were to be progressively state owned, and in 
which the state would generally set up new enterprise, but the government will get 
support from pnvate enterprises. This category included 12 industries of which the 
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following industries are worth mentioning; machine tools, chemical industry, 
antibiotics, fertilizers, synthetic rubber, chemical pulp, road transport and sea 
transport. Third category comprised all the rest of industries whose future 
development would be generally under private sector. The policy also remarked 
that the "last category must fit into the framework of social and economic policy 
of the state and will be subject to the control and regulation in terms of industries 
and other relevant legislation." The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 
envisaged speedy industrialization with particular prominence on the development 
of heavy and machine-buildmg industries and a leading role to the public sector. 
On the recommendation of the Dutta Committee (known as Industrial 
Licensing Policy Enquiry Committee) the government of India amended the 
present policy m February 1973 and the concept of a jomt sector was announced. 
But this could not get success. Meanwhile another scene unfolded in the country 
The 'Janta party government' in the centre was throned and it armounced a new 
industrial policy on December 1977. But this new policy didn't mention the 
reservations for public sector. Industrial structure was, thus, neglected. After two 
and half years of reign, the Janata party government collapsed. Again the Congress 
came to power in the centre. It announced its new mdustrial policy in 1980, which 
became the base for industrial development of the country. This policy stressed the 
priority of public sector and accepted its role in commandmg heights of the 
economy. The policy stressed the need for increased mdustrial production through 
optimum utilization of installed capacity and expansion of industries. It also 
emphasized a balanced and rapid industrialization of the country with a view to 
benefit the common man. The major functions laid down by the new Industrial 
Policy Resolution was solvmg the problems of shortage of major industrial inputs 
like energy, transport and coal. H.K Hazari has pomted out that 1980 policy 
statement doesn't perfectly fit m the framework of the 1956 Resolution as it 
allows the private sector to set up industries in the sector reserved for the public 
sector in 1956 Resolution. Thus, the leading share of private sector in national 
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economy had increased after fifth five year plan and pace of commanding heights 
of pubhc sector had come down in after that. The industrial structure of the 
economy, which got speedier momentum in the two decades after Industrial Policy 
Resolution of 1956 began to decline during sixth plan period. 
The central government announced the new Industrial Policy in July 1991. 
The new mdustrial policy has removed 9 industries, which have been reserved for 
mvestment by the public sector such as iron and steel, electricity, air transport, 
shipbuilding, heavy machinery industries such as heavy electrical plants and 
telecommunication cables and instruments, from the reserved list. Only 8 
industries which continue to be reserved for the public sector, are m areas where 
security and strategic concerns prevail. The government also announced its 
mtention to offer a part of government shareholding m public sector enterprises to 
mutual funds, financial institutions, general public and workers. The new 
Industrial Policy Resolution of 1991 abolished all mdustrial licensmg irrespective 
of the level of investment, except the mdustries related to security and strategic 
concerns, social reasons concerned related safety and overriding environmental 
issues and manufacture of products of hazardous nature. Under the new policy 
there is a provision of abolition of Phased Manufacturmg Programme, which will 
remove a major nuisance that a large number of firms have felt in terms of 
discretionary power and government's interference in business decisions. This 
policy also provided private sectors the option of converting part of their loans 
into equality if felt necessary by their management. Through it, investment 
controls on large business house removed. In the light of the New Industrial 
Policy, the role of public sector has been slashed down to only basic and key 
industries. Only 8 mdustries have been kept for public sector to facilitate the 
infrastructural conveniences for private sector. It is only because the govemment 
believes that India has strong and solid industnal structure and we need no further 
reservation of industries for public sector. This idea has been endorsed in Eighth 
Plan. 
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(C) PATTERNS OF PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS IN INDIA 
Although socialistic in nature and democratic in character the Indian 
government sought to follow neither the Russian, nor the Egyptian nor the 
Yugoslavian pattern. It was to follow only the British pattern of nationalization as 
adopted by the Attlee's Labour party government in England. The British pattern 
of corporations have been, "corporate body created by public authority with 
defined powers and fionctions and fmancial independence. It is admmistered by a 
board appointed by the public authority to which it is answerable. Its capital 
structure and fmancial operations are similar to those of public company but its 
stockholders retam to equity interests and are deprived of voting rights and power 
of appomtment of the board. Regardmg salient features of public corporations, 
justice K.K Mathew held: "A public corporation is a legal entity established 
normally by Parliament and always under legal authority, usually m the form of a 
special statue, changed with the duty of carrying out specified government 
functions m national mterests, those functions bemg confmed to a comparatively 
restricted field and subject to control by the executive, while the corporation 
remains justifiably an independent entity not directly responsible to parliament." '^* 
A peculiar feature of the Indian pattern of devising and managmg the public sector 
is that the public sector has been promoted without displacmg or liquidatmg the 
private sector. Whenever any private enterprise havmg direct affectation on 
economic life of the people or was unable to withstand competition any longer or 
was likely to go out of existence, the government felt compelled to take it over 
through nationalization or by ordinance. 
Organizational Structure of PSUs: Public Enterprises or PSUs are only one of 
the major components of the public sector. The four major components of public 
sector are: Government Admmistration, Departmental Commercial Enterprises 
(these two together constitute 'Public Authorities') Government Companies (the 
PSUs generally come in this category) and Statutory Corporations includmg Port 
Trusts. All the four constituents of the public sector may be located anywhere m 
72 
the country but are under either the central or any state government. The aggregate 
balance sheet assets of all public sector undertakings amount to roughly Rs. 22 
lakh crores;'^ and these undertakings are just one component of the public sector 
The central government announced in 1961: Govemment has had under 
consideration the recommendations made by the Krishna Menon Committee and 
various other reports and studies on the running of public sector undertakings. 
Govemment considers that the form of management of the undertaking should be 
determined by the requirement of each case. Accordingly, from the point of view 
of flexibility of operations, the company form of management would be 
preferable. In some instances, it would be necessary to form statutory corporations 
while in a few others, for various reasons, it would be desirable to run the 
undertakings as departmental organizations. Consistent with this decision, almost 
all the central public undertakings set up during the second plan period were 
organized as companies. Of 33 undertakmgs set up during this period, 29 were 
companies, 3 were statutory corporations and 1 was a departmental undertaking.^'' 
Public sector undertakmgs encompass a broad range of organizational 
forms, and the important ones are; 
(1). Departmental form undertakings 
(2). Jomt stock company or govemment company, and 
(3). Public corporation 
In addition to these, other forms are: 
(4) Holding company, and 
(5). Deemed govemment company." 
Departmental Form Undertakings: This is the traditional form of managing 
govemment enterprises. Even today the undertakings like the transports, posts and 
telegraphs, railways etc., are operated through the device of the public and private 
corporations. Other examples of this type are Punjab/Haryana Roadways, All India 
Radio, Tarapore Atomic Energy Plant, and Integrated Coach Factory. This form of 
enterprise may constitute a department m itself or may be an integral part of a 
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department. In this form of enterprise, the employees are largely civil servants 
who are subject to the laws, rules and regulations govemmg the civil services The 
department as a whole or its units is/are fmanced by the annual appropriations and 
Its income is deposited with the government treasury. In India, the railway 
department has a separate budget as distinct from the general budget The 
department undertakmg is subject to accounting and audit controls applicable to 
all government departments. A basic characteristic of the government 
departmental form of enterprise is the sovereign immunity of the state, and 
immunity from bemg used without the consent of the govemment. 
The departmental enterprise is found to be inadequate, as its rules do not 
allow It too much autonomy. The first five year plan (1951) stated, "successful 
conduct of such enterprises requires a great deal of initiative and power to take 
quick decisions on the part of the executive-in-charge, and these can hardly be 
secured if the enterprise is under a govemment department. This form of 
organization is subject to the parliament even for matters of day to day 
T O 
operations." The departmental undertakings operate subject to the "procedures 
obtaming in the administrative department of govemment, including the 
procedures that govern budgeting, accounting and audit in these departments."''^ It 
is generally recognized that the departmental undertakings are unsuitable for 
running commercial and mdustrial enterprises. In the pre-independence period, 
govemment participation in manufacturmg and other organized busmess was very 
limited and whatever business units were owned and controlled by the govemment 
they were mamly organised as part of the government departments. Railways, 
posts and telegraphs, defence production units, various workshops, All India 
Radio, and industrial units under state governments were all organized as 
departmental units. New projects like the telephone factory and the fertilizer 
factory were organized as departmental units in their early stages of development 
and other newly started units like Chittranjan Locomotive Works and Integral 
Coach factory were made a part of the departmentally mn railway organization. 
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Departmental form of organization is still commonly employed when the main 
purpose of the enterprise is to provide revenue. The great advantage of this system 
IS that it IS well knowm form of organization with set structural patterns and fixed 
procedures. Staffing also poses no serious problem. In addition, it also assures the 
maximum degree of control by politically responsible officials, which is a factor 
of great importance. But this form lacks managerial flexibility so very essential for 
more effective operations. 
The Krishna Menon Report on state undertakings in India sets out the 
limitations of this form as follows: 
1. Permanent staff is subject to rules and regulations applicable to civil 
servants, thereby preventmg both promotion on merit and prompt 
disciplmar>' action, where necessary, 
2. Tardy procedures for arranging funds, for instance, the necessity for getting 
sanction for expenditure and other matters m every single case. 
3. Cash receipts have to be put in to government account and can not be taken 
out without special sanction. 
4. The complicated system of accounting and audit; and 
5. The departmental methods of purchase of raw materials, sale of products, 
etc; lead to delays. 
Of course, many governments have attempted to alleviate these weaknesses 
by introducing new forms of structure and mere flexible procedures with a view to 
giving autonomy to management; for example, the setting up of the Railway 
Board for managing railways and the posts and Telegraph Board for managing the 
posts and telegraphs m India. But the problem is more basic, and in the words of 
the Rangoon Semmar Report, "As long as an enterprise is not clearly 
differentiated from other types of governmental activity, strong pressure will be 
brought to make it conform to standard government regulations and procedures, 
smce emphasis on uniformity is a common characteristic of a bureaucratic 
administration."^' Under departmental form of undertaking a clear relationship 
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between it and other agencies of the government is estabhshed. This brings about 
greater co-ordination. 
Joint Stock Company or Government Company: This is estabhshed under the 
Company Act law in which the government and /or pubhc enterprises hold at least 
fifty percent of the equity capital. Sector 617 of the companies Act, 1956, defines 
a 'government company' as "any company in which not less than fitty-one percent 
of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central government or by any state 
government or governments, or partly by the central government and partly by one 
or more state governments and mcludes a company which is a subsidiary of a 
government company." Thus, any company in which government share holding is 
fifty-one percent or more becomes a government company. Section 619 provides 
for audit by the Comptroller and Auditor-General and Section 619A requires that 
the annual report of the company should be placed in Parliament or the state 
legislature. Since the company is registered under the Companies Act, it has 
undoubtedly a juristic personality apart fi'om that of its shareholders Not 
withstanding that the ownership of its shares lies exclusively with the government, 
or that it is controlled by the government, its employees are not civil servants/^' 
The Indian Companies Act, 1956 recognizes two forms of companies-private 
limited and public limited. The formation of a private limited company needs only 
two shareholders at the minimum, while to form a public limited company at least 
seven shareholders are required. There is no restriction on the maximum number 
of shareholders in the case of public limited companies while the number of 
shareholders m private limited companies cannot be more than fifty. In case of 
private limited company there is restriction on the right of a shareholder to transfer 
his shares, but public limited companies suffer from no such restrictions. The 
number of joint stock companies mcorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and 
at work in India on 31" March 1975 was 41,763 of these 7,493 were public limited 
and 34,270 private limited companies having a paid-up capital of Rs. 2,231.8 
crores and Rs.5, 165.9 crores respectively. On the same date the number of 
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government companies stood at 545, of which 187 were pubRc^Jmiitedi 
were private hmited companies having a paid-up capital of Rs.285.0 crores and 
Rs 4,575.7 crores respectively. On the same date there were 510 foreign 
companies in India, which were joint stock companies incorporated abroad but 
having a place of business m India. In 1982 the number of government companies 
stood at 894.''"' In India there are approximately two hundred thirty govemment 
companies owned by the central govemment and another one thousand companies 
are owned by the state governments. The creation and functions of a govemment 
company does not require the approval or sanction of the legislature and can be set 
up by an executive order of the govemment. In a majority of cases, govemment 
has provided for hundred percent of the capital required for these enterprises and 
yet given it the shape of a company. Some of the examples of govemment 
companies are: 
I Hindustan Cables Ltd; 
2. Hindustan Insecticides Ltd; 
3. IBP Company Ltd; 
4.Heavy Engineermg Corporation; and 
S.Hindustan Latex Ltd. 
The joint stock company, set up mamly for profit making business, is not 
subject to the regular controls or rules goveming normal govemment activities. 
The auditor of govemment company is appointed by the central govemment on the 
advise of the CAG However, the govemment exercises control indirectly through 
the directors who are appointed by the govemment. However, the govemment 
company does its business under the provisions of the Company Law. Though, it 
does not enjoy sovereign immunity of the state, it is free as a legal person. The 
govemment company is normally easier to form than the public corporation, 
which calls for specific legislation. This is govemed by its Memorandum of 
Association and Articles of Association. 
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However, the government company form of enterprises has certain 
weaknesses. First, it does not guarantee for public accountabiHt>' due to the fact 
that a company is created by an executive decision and not by parhamentary 
sanction. Second, in most cases, employees of a government company are not civil 
servants. A company determmes the conditions and other aspects of service of its 
employees without being restricted by civil service rules and regulations. Third, 
the law regulating limited companies has become a mere fiction because all or 
most of the functions normally vested in the shareholders and in the management 
are reserved for the government. A meetmg of shareholders in the case of a 
government company is meaningless as the declaration of dividends and the 
appointments to the board are already settled in advance. Further, the extent of 
autonomy that it provides for can be materially altered by executive agencies of 
the government. 
Company form of organization evades the constitutional responsibilities 
which a state controlled enterprise has, in a democratic society, to the government 
and to parliament, and the use of company form and to the law regulatmg 
commercial companies usually becomes a mere fiction because all or most of the 
fiinctions normally vested in the shareholders and in the management by the 
statute settmg up the company are disadvantages of this kmd of organization. 
Holding Company: A company is a holding company when it acquires a majority 
of shares in the ownership capital or controls of the management of the other 
company. The other company is its subsidiary. These subsidiaries have their 
separate existence and are managed by independent governing boards The Steel 
Authority of hidia and the Gas Authority of India are some of the examples of 
holding companies 
Section 4 of the Companies Act, 1956, defines a subsidiary company in the 
foUowmg words: A company is a subsidiary of another (a) if the other (i.e., the 
controlling company): (i) controls the composition of its board of directors, or (ii) 
exercises or controls more than half of its total voting power, or (in) in case any 
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other company holds more than half of the nommal value of its equity share 
capital or (b) if it is a subsidiary of the controlling company. The operation of a 
holding company in India could be traced to the settmg up of the Steel Authority 
of India (SAIL) in 1973 as a result of the initiative of Mohan Kumarmanglam who 
was then mmister for steel. The company aimed at ensuring vertical integration in 
respect of steel and related PEs, which was constituted as its subsidiaries. 
Somehow the government policy in this regard has not been very consistent. "^  
The main advantages of a holding company are: (i) that its subsidiaries tend 
to pursue common policies, (ii) that it helps in establishing a uniform information 
and reporting system and (lii) that it helps in inter transfer of funds, technology 
and personnel when the necessity arises. However, a holding company is not 
without some disadvantages: (i) that it is likely to curb not only operational 
freedom of its subsidiaries but also in their policy-making decisions, (ii) that the 
creation of subsidiaries involves costs of establishment, personnel and ftinctions 
resulting in their duplication, and (iii) that for successfril operation the holding 
company may have to delegate powers to subsidiaries which may create problems 
for the holding company.""^  
Deemed Government Company: Deemed government companies, created under 
section 619 B of Indian Companies Act, 1956, are those where more than fifty-one 
percent shares of the company are held by public financial corporations either by 
themselves or jomtly with government companies. In case of deemed government 
companies, the auditors are appointed by the central government on the 
recommendation of the C AG, who has a right to conduct supplementary audit of 
their annual accounts. However, annual accounts of deemed government 
companies are neither placed in parliament or state legislature nor do they attract 
the jurisdiction of the committee on Public Undertakings. It may be noted that 
deemed government companies do not attract any of the government's regulatory 
mechanism and are free to carry on their activities like any private sector corporate 
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entity. As on March 2001, there were approximately fifty-five deemed government 
companies at the central level. 
Public Corporations: During the last 40 years or so, a new form of organization 
for managing public enterprises have evolved in the shape of public corporations 
The corporation is a corporate judicial person capable of entering mto contracts 
and acting in its own name. Public Corporation is an autonomous commercial 
organization established at government instance outside the framework of 
government departments and company legislation. In independent India the 
growth of public corporation dates from April 1948 when the Government of 
India, by its resolution on industrial policy, announced that "management of state 
enterprise will, as a rule, be through the public corporation under the statutory-
control of the central government..." 
According to Rangoon Seminar, the principal characteristics of the Public 
Corporation are as follows: 
1. It is wholly owned by the state. 
2. It is generally created by, or pursuant to, a special law defining its powers, 
duties and immunities and prescnbmg the form of management and its 
relation to established departments and mmistries. 
3. As a body corporate, it is a separate entity for legal purposes, and can sue 
and be sued, enter into contracts and acquire property in its own name 
Corporations conducting business in their own names have been generally 
given greater freedom in making contracts and acquiring and disposmg of 
property than ordmary government departments. 
4. Except for government appropriations to provide capital or to cover losses, 
a public corporation is usually independently financed. It obtains its funds 
from borrowings either from the Treasury or the public, or from revenues 
derived from the sale of goods and services. It is authorized to use and re-
use its revenues. 
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5. It IS generally exempted from most regulatory and prohibitory statutes 
applicable to expenditure of public funds. 
6. It IS ordinarily not subject to the budget, accounting and audit laws, and 
procedures applicable to non-corporate agencies. 
7. In the majority of cases, employees of public corporations are not civil 
servants, and are recruited and remunerated under terms and conditions, 
which the corporation itself determines. 
Certain public corporation created in India may be grouped under the 
followmg heads; 
(1) Commercial and Financial Undertakings: -
(i) The Industrial Finance Corporation Act (XV of 1948) had set up an Industrial 
Finance Corporation for the purpose of making medium and long-term credits 
more readily available to mdustrial concerns m India. Smce July 1993, IFCl has 
been converted into a public limited company under the Indian Company Act, 
1956. 
(li) The State Financial Corporation Act (LXIII of 1951) empowers the state 
governments to set up State Financial Corporations for promoting industrial 
development. 
(ill) The State Bank of India has been created by the State Bank of India Act, 
1955, to carry on banking business under government control. ... '"'^  
(2) Economic and Industrial Undertakings: 
(i) The Damodar Valley Corporation Act (XIV of 1948) has set up a corporation 
called the Damodar Valley Corporation. The objectives and functions of the 
corporation were: 
(a) To control floods in the Damodar River; (b) to utilize its water for irrigation, 
generation of electrical energy, and navigation; (c) to promote sanitation and 
economic and social welfare of the Damodar Valley, and the like. 
Its legal personality makes itself liable to income tax as well as state taxes on its 
transactions, such as sales tax. 
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(ii) The Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) has been set up by the Oil and 
Natural Gas Commission Act, 1959, for the development of petroleum resources 
(3) Public Service Entities: 
(i) The Road Transport Corporation Act (LXIV of 1950) empowers state 
govemments with the incorporation on Road Transport Corporations in which the 
central and state govemments shall be properly represented for the purpose of 
improving road transport facilities. 
(ii) The Life Insurance Corporation has been established by the Life Insurance 
Corporation Act, 1956, to carry on the business of life insurance, which had then 
been nationalized. 
(lii) The Air Corporation Act, 1953, similarly set up two corporations, namely, Air 
India and Indian Airlines, for carrying on the business of air transport. 
(iv) The Food Corporation of India was set up under the Food Corporation Act, 
1964, for the purposes of procurement, preservation and distribution of food in the 
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country. 
Public Corporation form of organization has come to be regarded as the 
best form for carrying out the functions of public enterprise. W. A. Robson states: 
"The public corporation is m my judgment by far the best organ so far devised m 
this or any other country for administering nationalized industries or undertakings. 
Allowing for some teething troubles which are still not entirely cured the public 
corporation which we have evolved is an outstanding contribution to public 
administration m a new and vitally important sphere."" 
(D) WORKING OF PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS IN INDIA 
As evident from the evolutionary history of the public sector enterprises, 
neither has the national government nor has the controlling or managing 
authorities of these enterprises succeeded in evolving a definite system and precise 
framework or a clear-cut working pattern of any of these public enterprises. With 
budding enthusiasm and bubbling zest of socialism these enterprises were initiated 
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and established. But with sneezing cold indifference have they been controlled by 
the administrative ministers as well as by those at the helms of these enterprises. 
This failure on the part of the ministers and the echelons concerned may assuredly 
be attributed to various factors. But the fact that remains unchallenged till date is 
that the present workmg of the public enterprises is anything but conducive to the 
contemplated socio-economic build up of the country to establishing an egalitarian 
society. 
Public sector had been playmg a vital role in building up the basic 
infrastructure for growth and settmg up core and basic heavy industries in the 
initial stages of the country's development by making large public investment with 
long gestation periods, which the private sector would not have been able to do at 
that stage. Such investment created the infrastructure and the investment climate 
required for the growth of private mvestment. The public sector was protected 
from competition by state benefaction m various forms like budgetary support, 
pnce preference and capital restructurmg. This coupled with bureaucratic control, 
political greed, lack of autonomy m taking commercial decisions and consequent 
lack of accountability adversely affected the efficiency and profitability in the 
public sector, and made many public enterprises sick, their net worth bemg totally 
eroded by their accumulated losses. The haphazard and unplanned proliferation of 
public sector undertakings thus became a haul on the country's indusfrial 
development rather than an engine of self-reliant growth due to the malftinction of 
many PSUs to generate profits or surpluses that could be ploughed back for their 
extension and modernization. They continued to survive due to government's 
meeting their working capital requirements and reimbursmg their losses from their 
budgetary resources, thereby mcreasmg their revenue deficits. 
fri July 1991, when the Government of fridia (GOI) had to take IMF loan to 
tide over an unparalleled Balance of Payments crisis, a package of measures called 
"economic reforms" based mostly on "Washington Consensus" had to be adopted 
of which "privatisation" was an integral part. Government of India proclaimed a 
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new Industrial Policy in July 1991 containing several decisions to honour their 
commitment to privatisation besides opening up several areas previously reserved 
exclusively for the public sector for private investment and inviting foreign 
capital. 
Some of the measures, which were taken to improve the working of public 
sector undertakings under 1991 policy statement, are as follows: 
1 Portfolio of public sector investments will be reviewed with a view to focus 
the public sector on strategic, high-tech and essential infi-astructure 
Whereas some reservation for the public sector is being retained, there 
would be no far area of exclusivity to be opened up to the private sector 
selectively. Similarly, the public sector will also be allowed entry in areas 
not reserved for it. 
2. Public enterprises that are chronically sick and unlikely to be turned around 
will, for the formulation of revival/ rehabilitation schemes, be referred to 
the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR), or other 
similar high-level institutions created for the purpose. A social security 
mechanism will be created to protect the interests of workers likely to be 
affected by such rehabilitation packages. 
3. In order to raise resources and encourage wider public participation, a part 
of the government's shareholding in the public sector would be offered to 
mutual funds, fmancial institutions, general public and workers. 
4. Boards of public sector companies would be made more professional and 
given greater powers. 
5. There will be greater thrust on performance improvement through the 
Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) system through which managements 
would be granted greater autonomy and will be held accountable. Technical 
expertise on the part of the government would be upgraded to make the 
MoU negotiations and implementation more effective. 
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6. To facilitate a fuller discussion on performance, the MoU signed between 
government and the public enterprises would be placed in Parliament. 
While focusing on major management issues, this would also help place 
matters on day-to-day operations of public enterprises in their correct 
perspective^^ 
The main elements of the NDA government policy towards PEs were as 
follows: 
1. Bring down government equity in all non-strategic PEs to 26 percent or 
lower, if necessary; 
2. Restructure and review potentially viable PEs, 
3. Close down PEs which can not be revived, and 
4. Fully protect the mterest of workers.' 
It has also been decided to revitalize the potentially viable PSUs and close 
down those, which cannot be revitalized. A National. Renewal Fund (NRF) was 
formed in February 1992 for retrainmg, redeployment and counseling of surplus 
employees of PSUs who may have to take voluntary retirement. A Disinvestment 
Commission was set up m August 1996 "for working out the terms and conditions 
and modalities for dismvestment, which has submitted several reports and 
suggested "strategic sales" to a single party capable of managing the PSU From 
dilution of Government equity and broad-basing ownership and management, the 
focus has shifted to such strategic sales. 
To see the impact of liberalisation process and economic reforms 
mtroduced in 1991 on the public sector undertakmgs, it is proposed to analyse the 
trends of profitability of PSUs during the last ten years 1992-93 to 2001-2002 
Trends of Profitability 
(1992 
Table 
of Public Enterprises 
-93 to 2001-2002) (Rs. 
During the Last Ten Years 
in corers) 
Particulars 
No. Of 
operating 
Enterprises 
Capital 
employed 
(CE) 
Profit before 
dep. Int. & 
tax (PBDT) 
Depreciation 
Profit before 
Int & Tax 
(PBIT) 
Interest 
Profit before 
Tax 
Tax 
Provisions 
Net Profit 
Profit of 
Profit-
making PEs 
Loss of loss 
incurrung 
PEs 
PEs in 
profits 
PEs in 
Losses 
PEs in no 
profit/loss 
1992-
93 
239 
140110 
25227 
9270 
15957 
10881 
5076 
1805 
3271 
7384 
4113 
131 
106 
2 
1993-
94 
240 
159836 
27707 
9151 
18556 
11901 
6655 
2110 
4545 
9768 
5223 
121 
116 
.1 
1994-
95 
241 
162451 
33384 
10754 
22630 
12862 
9768 
2581 
7187 
12070 
4883 
130 
109 
2 
1995-
96 
239 
173948 
40161 
12574 
27587 
13966 
13621 
4047 
9574 
14763 
5188 
132 
102 
5 
1996-
97 
236 
231178 
44457 
13542 
30915 
15537 
15378 
5192 
10186 
16125 
5939 
129 
104 
-> 
.1 
1997-
98 
236 
249855 
53062 
15856 
37206 
17990 
19216 
5634 
13582 
20279 
6697 
134 
100 
2 
1998-
99 
235 
265093 
56495 
16768 
39727 
20025 
19702 
6499 
13203 
22508 
9305 
126 
107 
1 
1999-
00 
232 
302367 
62212 
19942 
42270 
20233 
22037 
7706 
14331 
24633 
10302 
126 
105 
' 
2(»00-
01 
234 
331401 
69287 
20520 
48767 
23800 
24967 
9314 
15653 
28494 
12841 
123 
110 
1 
2001- ! 
02 
230 
390261 ' 
89619 
1 
26362 1 
63257 
1 
24958 ; 
38299 ' 
1 
12254 '• 
1 
26045 
36432 ! 
10387 ; 
119 
109 
~i 
86 
DK'idcnd 
Dhidcnd 
Tax 
Retained 
Profit 
Financial 
Ratio (%) 
PBDIT to 
CE 
PBIT to CE 
DK'idend 
Payout 
Source: Depa 
792 
2479 
18 0 
11.4 
24.2 
rtmcnt ol 
1028 
3517 
173 
11.6 
22.6 
' Public E 
1436 
5751 
20.6 
13 9 
20.0 
enterprise 
2205 
7369 
23.1 
15.9 
23.0 
2836 
261 
7089 
19.2 
13.4 
278 
3609 
464 
9509 
21 2 
149 
26.6 
4932 
537 
7734 
21,3 
15.0 
37.4 
s. Government of India. New Delhi. 
5455 
790 
8086 
20.5 
14.0 
38.1 
Public E 
8260 
842 
6551 
20 9 
147 
52.8 
8067 
9 
i 
17969 
i 
230 
i 
16.2 
310 : 
enterprises 
Siu^ey: Vol.1. 2001-2002 
The above table shows the performance of pubhc enterprises during 1992-
93 to 2001-02. The salient features of this table are as follows: 
1. The capital employed has increased by 350 per cent between 1992-93 to 
2001-02. 
2. PEs obtamed cash profit of 18 per cent in 1992-93, which increased to 23 
per cent in 2001-2002. 
3. Profit Before Interest and Tax (PBIT) to Capital Employed ratio was 11.4 
per cent m 1992-93, which mcreased to 16.2 per cent in 2001 -02. 
4. The Capital Employed to Turnover/Operating Income Ratio was 1.05 per 
cent m 1992-93, which mcreased to 1.22 in 2001-02. 
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Table: 
Profitability of Central Public Sector Undertakings (Rs. Crores) 
Year 
1 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
No. 
Of 
units 
2 
237 
239 
240 
241 
239 
236 
236 
235 
232 
Net 
Worth 
3 
60300 
70500 
79500 
90000 
99200 
113900 
135000 
148100 
161100 
Capital 
Employed 
4 
118000 
140100 
159800 
162500 
174000 
231200 
249900 
265100 
303400 
Gross 
Profits 
5 
13700 
16000 
18600 
22600 
27600 
30900 
37200 
39700 
42400 
Gross 
profit to 
Capital 
Employed 
(%) 
6 
12 
11 
12 
14 
16 
13 
15 
15 
14 
Profit 
After Tax 
(PAT) 
7 
2400 
3300 
4600 
7200 
9600 
10200 
13700 
13200 
14600 
PAT 
(Net 
Profit) 
to Net 
Worth 
(%) 
8 
4 
5 
6 
8 
10 
9 
10 
9 
9 
Source: Government of India: Economic Survey. 2001-2002 
From this table we come to know that the number of central PS Us had only 
shghtly declmed from 237 m 1991-92 to 232 tn 1999-00. Over these nine years 
their net worth (paid up capital plus free reserves) increased from Rs. 60,300 
crores to Rs.l, 61,100 crores (167.16%), capital employed from Rs. 1,18,000 
crores to Rs. 3,03,400 crores (157.12%), and Gross Profits from Rs.l3, 700 crores 
to Rs. 4,24,00 crores (209.49%). Profits After Tax also increased from Rs.2, 400 
crores to Rs. 1,46,00 crores (508.33%)). Gross Profit to Capital Employed Ratio 
increased from 12 percent to 14 percent and Net Profits to Net Worth Ratio from 4 
percent to 9 percent over these nine years of reforms. 
There are areas of great concern relating to PE performance. Public 
enterprises have excessively invested in capital employed. Their marketing 
organizations are not efficient enough to accomplish a better tumover/capital-
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employed ratio. They desened the issues connected to brand development, 
globalisation, optimal product mix efficient cost management, and decline in 
interest burden. There is no denying the fact that many of these concerns have not 
been resolved to the fullest amount due to the backseat driving by the political 
executive and bureaucrats. The internal structure of a public enterprise is also of 
critical importance to the working of the public enterprise It is closely related to 
its form of organization. In a government department, the internal organization has 
a bureaucratic structure. But m a government company and public corporation, the 
public enterprise is normally subject to "some kind of collegiate leadership " 
Decisions m these two forms (Government Company and Public Corporation) are 
taken by a Board of Directors. 
The Board of an enterprise is normally the link between the owners of the 
enterprise and the executives who operate it. The owners appoint the Board to take 
proper care of their interests. In a public enterprise, the governing Board plays a 
very important role in its fianctioning. The Board is the top management organ, 
which is expected to implement the objectives of an enterprise. There are three 
types of Board namely; Policy-making Board-consisting of part time members 
except the chief executive who may be a full time chairman or managing director, 
Functional Board-consisting of fiill time members havmg specific responsibility 
for different areas of management like personnel, finance, production and Policy-
Cum Functional Board-consists of both part-time and full time directors. In India 
most of the Boards of PEs are policy-cum-functional boards. Although these 
Boards have a considerable degree of autonomy in policymakmg and policy 
execution, yet often they are under the pressure exerted by political, bureaucratic 
or regional groups.^' 
In a developing country like India, having board members mostly from the 
current ruling party has politicized public enterprises. The civil servants manage 
the government department form of enterprise, but government companies and 
public corporations have their separate personnel systems outside the civil service. 
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Yet even in these two forms, a large number of civil servants are appointed on the 
boards, with the result a board may have more a degree of autonomy in the 
execution of its functions. A recent survey of one hundred ninety-eight public 
enterprises showed that out of one thousand one hundred ninety eight directors in 
office mcludmg CMDs/MDs, workmg directors and part-time directors, 
government officials constituted forty percent of the total strength of directors 
(excluding CMDs/MDs).^'' The officials of the admmistrative ministries alone 
constitute twenty five percent of their strength. The members of parliament are not 
appointed to the board of directors as far as workers nominees on the board of PEs 
is concerned, the government has taken a decision that there should be a greater 
degree of worker's participation in management but has not yet helped in giving a 
seat to worker's representatives on the board. In the developing countries, like 
India a politician, a mmister or a senior civil servant often holds as a part-time or 
flill-time position m the board of public sector undertakings. Such an arrangement 
results in the political or governmental interference in the smooth flinctionmg of 
the enterprise. 
Committee on Public Sector Undertakings in India recommended m its 
twentieth report that "members of parliament be appointed chairmen and directors 
of boards of public enterprises as they have greater mvolvement m enterprises". 
The committee also recommended that no person from the private sector should be 
appointed on the boards of the public undertakmgs.' hi order to eliminate 
disadvantagous possibility of ministerial or otherwise political chairmanships, on 
balance it is preferable to make the chairman a flill time executive." That there 
should be as a rule full-time chairman-cum-managmg director in public enterprises 
to be appointed by the government). It is generally recognized that most public 
enterprises in India are failing to deliver satisfactory performance due to lack of 
managerial effectiveness. 
From the performance and profitability pomt of view, PSUs would fall m 
the following broad categories: 59 
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(a) Loss making PSUs whose net worth has been totally eroded by their 
accumulated losses. 
(b) Other loss making PSUs, which do not fall in category (a) 
(c) PSUs earning profits at rates which compare favourably with similar other 
units in the private sector. 
(d) PSUs earning profits at rates, which are significantly lower than the rates at 
which similar, other private enterprises are operating. 
The PSUs falling in category (a) are required by law to make a reference to 
the BIFR which will decide whether they are sick; and if so, whether they could be 
rehabilitated or need to be wound up. Government has to take a view as to what 
contribution they would make for their rehabilitation by their capital restructuring 
(conversion of loans into equity, rescheduling of loans, mobilizing bank or 
institutional finance, sale of surplus assets, etc.), providing assistance in making 
the required change m product profile, or their modernization or expansion. Any 
indecision or delay in decision making in this regard wound result in further 
accumulation of losses and may jeopardize the chances of revival. If the 
Government for any reason does not intend making any contribution or providmg 
any assistance, it would help if they make their stand clear to the BIFR at the 
earliest appropriate stage. 
In the case of PSUs in categones (b) and (d), the management may be 
required to make an m-depth diagnostic study and come up with specific 
suggestions for cutting down losses and making their operations efficient and 
profitable. 
For category (c) PSUs, the government only needs to allow full autonomy 
to the management in making commercial decisions and make them fully 
accountable, refraining from undue interference and insulating them from political 
pressures. 
The Navarafna concept which originated in the Common Minimum 
Programme 1996 of the United Front Government promised identification of PEs 
having comparative advantages to be supported in their drive to become global 
giants. Other profit making PEs were to be strengthened and their management 
professionaUsed. It was however on July 4,1997 that the government decided to 
confer wide powers to nine PEs as Navaratnas. Two more PEs were added to this 
later «' 
The first category covered enterprises, (i) making profits continuously for 
the last three years, with a pre-tax profit of at least Rs. 30 crores in at least one of 
the three years, (n) having a positive net worth, (iii) not having defaulted on 
government loans, and (iv) not receiving any budgetary support The second 
category comprised PEs with pre-tax profits (no amount mentioned) during the 
last three years, (ii). (iii) & (iv) being the same, as for category-I. Category-I PEs 
were empowered to: (i) incur capital expenditure upto Rs.300 crores or equal to 
their net worth, whichever is lower, (ii) establish joint ventures and subsidiaries in 
India, and if abroad with the concurrence of the administrative ministry, with an 
equity limit of Rs. 100 crores or 5 per cent of the net worth in any case, and 15 per 
cent of the net worth for all joint ventures and subsidiaries put together, and (in) 
negotiate technology joint ventures and strategic alliances subject to government 
guidelines. For category II, the figures under various heads were restricted to: (i) 
Rs.l50 crores or 50 per cent of the net worth, (ii) Rs.50 crores, in any one project 
not exceedmg 5 per cent of the net worth in any one project, or 15 per cent of the 
net worth of PE in alljomt ventures of the subsidiaries put together. ' 
According to R.K.Mishra "there is a strong case for the government to 
formulate its PE policy. The institution of Navaratana Miniratana PEs deserves 
fiirther impetus in the form of a continuous upward revision m the managerial and 
operational autonomy. The Navaratana Miniratana experience very clearly brings 
out the relationship between their improved performance and autonomy. The 
board-led PEs posses' potential to grow as organic business entities. Against the 
operating perception m the government, it has been noted that the government has 
to empower PE boards with enhanced authority and limit the number of its 
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nominee directors to one or two. The entire exercise of disinvestment needs to be 
confined to loss-making revival PEs and IPDs should be preferred to strategic 
sale. 62 
Table 
Navaratana/Miniratana Package and its Impact on Board Dynamics 
Name of PE Impact on Board Dynamics 
1 .HPCL Board is broad-based by mduction of 4 additional part-time non- i 
official Directors with different background and experience The 
Board has been given fiarther delegation of power including in the 
capital expenditure, forming joint venture and other administrative '. 
areas Matters concerning corporate strategy, future plans are j 
deliberated m the Board for guidance/direction/approval as the case ' 
may be. 
2.0NGC The Board now consists of three main groups, the Functional | 
Directors, Government nominees and Independent (non-official i 
part-time) Directors. Deliberations hence are more broad-based | 
covering the concern of the Government, the needs of the i 
organization and independent opinion. 
3.SAIL The Board has become more broad-based with outside expertise 
and Professional Directors were inducted. There is great 
transparency in the ftinctioning of the Board. 
4, NTPC Inclusion of Non-official Directors has brought outside intelligence 
into decision-making. Board is taking investment decisions hitherto 
reserved to government. For participation in joint venture within the 
limit prescribed in the guidelines the approval of MOP is not 
required, hence such proposals are also being approved by the 
Board. 
5.PCIL Induction of 3 part-time non-official Directors. This has added to 
the professionalisation of board. Many committees of the board are 
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; formed. Board became more strategic and dynamic m decision-
making. 
6 NMDC 
7. KRL 
Diversification into new areas as "joint ventures or moving on 
owns has become a reality. It has become feasible to easily open up 
overseas offices, subsidiaries since only the concurrence of 
administrative ministry is required. 
Miniratna status is yet to become effective for KR.L. However, the 
delegation of enhanced authority to the board would enable 
expeditious implementation/action on various proposals in the areas 
of capital expenditure, jomt ventures/subsidiaries/overseas offices, 
technology joint venture and strategic alliances and schemes for 
HRD 
8. STC H-Moderate impact. 
9. CCIL The introduction of external members has made the management 
I more responsive. 
10. NFDC I Policy decisions were expected. Financial performance got focused. 
Professionalism at the functional level of executives improved. 
! HRD matters/problems got resolved more effectively. 
11. WPCSL I Strong linkages with good financial powers have not been 
: confirmed as yet. 
For foreign tour, CMD has to depend much on the Power Ministry 
12. HSCCL Moderate impact. 
13.HPC No impact. 
14.PFCL i No impact. 
15. TCIL : Discussions are lively and successful. Board Audit Committee has 
• been formed. 
Source: R.K. Mishra, A Study of Operational and Financial Autononi>- to Novaraiana and 
Miniratana PEs, Ministr\' of Heavy Industn,' and Public Enterprises. Go\ cmment of India. New 
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Delhi, Planning Commsission. Institute of Public Enterprises, Government of India. Hyderabad. 
2003 
With growing liberalisation of the economy, policy makers must 
concentrate sincerely to protect the PSUs and the domestic private sector even 
while encouraging the flow of foreign investment because neither can be 
sacrificed. This is the most important aspect since we need both foreign 
investment and the domestic enterprise. Reform should not direct to displacement 
of Indian skills and capital and at the same time the firm signal should be sent to 
the international community that the Indian economy was opening up and must 
cease to be viewed as a closed shop. This is a tricky preposition, but the reformists 
m the Government must be flexible enough to guarantee both sides that neither is 
neglected. No thought is bemg given to PSUs while reformists have heeded the 
private sector's call for a level playing ground vis-a-vis the overseas companies. 
Under liberalisation, the government can no longer assume that a mere 
reduction of the budgetary support to PSUs and asking them to fend for 
themselves would do the trick. The MoUs concluded earlier have to be reviewed 
m the light of the changed ground realities. While nobody can object to 
progressive cuts in import duties, still, knowing that it is the public sector which 
has to bear the incidence of this aspect of fiscal reform there must also be an 
action plan to make it fitter and yield better results, all the more since, with the 
government having given its assent to the new global trade agreement, the public 
sector will have greater problems surviving because import duties have to be 
further reduced as part of the accord. The government, therefore, has to address 
itself seriously to creating an environment where the public sector generally can 
hold Its own.^^ 
The government's commitment to liberalisation and consequently the 
progressive cut in import duties is hurtmg public sector undertakings On the 
recommendations of the Chelliah Committee, the Ministry of Finance has cut the 
import duties on capital and basic goods. These cuts will persist as part of India's 
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approval of the new global trade agreement. Public sector producers have been 
feeling the pinch and must resign themselves to cheaper foreign substitutes. 
(E) CONTROL OVER PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS IN INDIA 
Independent India adopted comprehensive planning for mdustrialization 
and state control over key mdustries and mineral resources as tools for economic 
development and to deal with problems of mass poverty, unemployment, regional 
imbalances and defence. A number of public enterprises were set up m core 
sectors and as monopolies of government, in addition to enterprises competing 
with private sectors The public sector undertakings were provided with a form of 
organization to free them from day-to-day control of government departments and 
parliament. While legal forms of organization endow an enterprise with certain 
attribute and provide it with certain privileges and immunities, the manner in 
which advantage is taken of these facilities depends on the skills, values and 
assumptions of those who run the enterprise and trust the supervisory government 
reposes in them. Even though the enterprise are required to act in accordance with 
the Companies Act or the relevant law creating the enterprise, the government 
which plays a dual role as a shareholder and as an oversight authority takes part m 
the management of the public enterprise and this has resulted in interference in 
day-to-day management of the public enterprises. The existence of these 
constraints has been accepted by the Parliamentary Committees and other 
commissions and committees, which inquired into the public enterprises 
management over \ears 
The Economic Administrative Reforms Commission commented that 
because public enterprises are run by 'detailed controls' the enterprises have been 
reduced to agencies merely complying with the directions and regulations of 
government and accountable for procedural lapses only and not answerable for 
shortfall in achievements. The Seventh Plan document stated, "the approach of 
concerned ministries m guiding industrial development should henceforth He not 
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in extensive powers to control and regulate but in their efforts to provide technical 
and administrative guidance to industries." 
Thus, a public undenaking is fundamentally an economic unit under the 
charge of a board, owing adherence to a political entity to whom it looks for 
survival and maintenance. It is because of this mix-up of economic and non-
economic factors that the constitution, autonomy and the functioning of public 
enterprises boards have received much attention. 
In case of departmental form of enterprises, there is direct control by the 
concerned department in the ministry. They are allowed to function within the 
limited delegation of power allowed to the Managing Director or the General 
Manager In actual practices, it is concerned ministry, which controls the policies 
as well as important decisions of the departmental enterprises. The statutory 
corporations are controlled through the specific statutes and almost all-important 
matters are regulated through the specific provisions given in the statues. 
Necessary delegation of power is made to the chief executive and they run the 
undertakings within the permitted autonomy, ' 
Control can be classified into administrative control and management 
control. Administrative controls are based on rules, regulations; standards etc. and 
constrain action, reduce uncertamty and reduce the need for decision. Management 
control aims to ensure attainment of objectives such as consumer satisfaction and 
resource productivity. The management control system has to be designed taking 
into account the size, nature of the enterprise, activities and purpose of the 
organization and the nature of administrative controls and operating system 
structures.'''' 
In studymg the control exercised by the administrative mmistries it should 
be kept in mind that the ministries have no direct operating responsibility for 
management of any public enterprise (excluding departmental undertakings) and 
has only the function to oversee capital investments beyond the powers of the 
enterprise. As far as management of commercially oriented public enterprises is 
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concerned the bureaucracy is responsible for placing business management 
techniques m the context of the political process. Administrative Ministries are not 
running control rooms, which can directly bring about desired changes (effect) by 
pressing levers (issuing instructions). Their instructions have to be operationalised 
by public enterprises at several levels. The enterprises prescribe datum lines for 
goals to be monitored by them (goals or results m which they are interested) assign 
priorities and weights. The reports, which the enterprises submit to the 
government, are based on what the government thinks it needs and specifically 
calls for. 
A basic prmciple of management is that those responsible for management 
f 
must be given the full opportunity to manage, unfettered by interference of those 
who do not share this responsibility. On the other hand, with massive public 
investments and the minister being answerable to the legislature for the 
performance of public undertakings, the government cannot divest itself of its 
responsibility and obligation. The concept of accountability arises not merely from 
the fact that the owners of the undertakmgs, that is the people and their 
representatives in parliament and government, have a right to call these 
undertakings to account by virtue of such ownership, but from the more practical 
fact that having made the mvestment decisions they are the best judges of the 
objectives of the investments and the best authorities to decide whether or not, or 
to what extent, the objectives are being served. 
Accountability and autonomy need to be viewed as two sides of the same 
coin. Indeed, the two go together and what conflicts with both is control The more 
detailed and extensive a system of control over the actions and decisions of the 
management, the less accountable the management becomes. An agency, which 
merely complies with directions or regulations, cannot be answerable for shortfalls 
in achievement but only for procedural lapses. Without adequate degree of 
autonomy, there can no real accountability, unless the undertaking and its 
management accepts full accountability, they cannot ask for autonomy. Autonomy 
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should not cross the hmit where accountabiHty is compromised and similarly, the 
accountability should not be over-emphasized. Some sort of balance has to be 
struck between the two. 
Instruments of Control: - There are three agencies through which public control 
over public enterprises are exercised- the Ministry, the Parliament and Special 
Agencies. 
Ministerial Control: The Ministry may consult the enterprises before formulation 
of policy and once a decision is taken the enterprises have to implement them and 
bring to notice of the ministry any problems connected with implementation. The 
Chief Executive of the Enterprise should be accountable for efficient 
implementation of the policy. 
The Ministry has responsibility for: 
1. Industrial policy. 
2. Specific directions under the policy to public enterprises. 
3. Approval of strategic plans of enterprise. 
4. Approval of annual plans. 
5. Pointing out activities or neglect of activities, which may damage the long-
term interests of the enterprise. 
6. Establishing performance yardsticks, financial and non financial, in 
accordance with plans. 
7. Monitoring action taken on plans and their effects and gettmg plans revised 
whenever it becomes necessary. 
8. Institutional strengthening of the enterprise. 
9. Approval of capital expenditure proposals. 
10. Ensuring accountability of Chief Executive of the Enterprise.*''^  
The control system established at the mmistry should cover all these aspects. 
In the administrative field the controlling powers of the minister concerned 
are exercised m the following matters: 
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(1) The government is empowered to appomt the chairman and 
members of the board of management and the managmg director In 
addition, the government retains the power of approval of 
appomtment to posts carrying salaries above a certain limit, namely. 
Rs. 2, 250 a month; 
(2) Under certam conditions, the government can remove from office 
any member of the management board; 
(3) If a particular board of management fails to carry out the purpose 
for which it was set up or if it fails to carry out the directives issued 
by the government, the latter can supersede it and appoint a new 
board, 
(4) The government is authorized to frame rules and regulations to 
facilitate the working of these enterprises. It can prescribe forms, 
lay down procedures and even prescribe the activities to be 
undertaken, 
(5) The government can institute enquiries into the working of a 
corporation. Such an inquiry committee was appomted m the case 
of the Damodar Valley Corporation in 1952. 
(6) The power of issuing directives is by far and most important power 
to be exercised by a minister. Clause 48 of the Damodar Valley 
Corporation enjoins upon it to be guided by such instructions in 
questions of policy as may be given to it by the central government, 
A sub-clause lays down that, if any dispute arises between the 
central government and the corporation as to whether a question is 
or IS not a question of policy, the decision of the central government 
shall be final.^* 
In the fmancial field, mmisters are authorized to appoint to a financial 
adviser on the governing board of a corporation. Such adviser exercises a sort of 
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veto over matters affecting expenditure and the financial policy of the 
government. 
In practice the relationship between mmisters and public undertakings has 
not entirely worked smoothly or fairly. Ministers are usually cautious of issuing 
clear directives m writing as they are supposed to do and take responsibility for 
such directives before the parliament. They have instead chosen to depend upon 
influence and secure compliance of their wishes through informal means like 
appointment of "trust worthy", "reliable" and "dependable" persons as chairman 
and members of governing boards; deputizmg serving government officers to 
executive posts in public undertakings and making the status of heads public 
enterprises infenor to that of the secretary to the ministry concerned The result is 
that there is neither autonomy nor control. 
In regard to the informal methods of control, a non-official informed the 
Committee on Public Undertakmgs in evidence that the controlling ministry 
continuously got detailed information regarding day-to-day working of the 
enterprise. Frequent meetings between the top bureaucrats of the controlling 
ministry and also the minister himself on the one hand and the top executive of the 
enterprise on, the other were held at which the views and suggestions of the 
minister or the secretary of the controlling ministry were expressed which virtually 
became directives for the enterprise. An enterprise could not reasonably ignore 
expressed suggestions of the controlling ministry or the minister.™ 
R. Venkataraman advocates that there must be some authority to oversee 
the functioning of the administrative ministries oversight function of public 
enterpnses. For the sake of termmological simplicity this authority which is 
responsible for the overall control of all commercially oriented public enterprises 
under the Government of India, will be called Controller of Public Sector (COPS) 
and for ensurmg that the objectives of public enterprises are achieved. COPS, in 
the ultimate analysis, is represented by the cabinet, one of whose members is the 
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physical embodiment of government m each mmistry. For purposes of control 
COPS may be a committee of cabmet. 
Parliamentary control: - Public enterprises are owned by the state and are 
created by mvestment from public funds. Therefore, they must be subject to the 
accountability to the parliament, which is not merely the custodian of public funds 
but also represents the shareholders, that is, the taxpayers. "The relationship 
between the parliament and public enterprises has to be considered within the 
overall equation of the parliament-minister-enterpnse relationship. Members of 
parliament feel keen sense of responsibility for the efficiency and achievements of 
public enterprises. They, therefore, want minister to answer for the shortcomings 
and difficulties and failures of the public enterprises. Faced with this detailed and 
continuous scrutmy by parliament, the responsible minister has little chance but to 
keep himself informed on all matters that relate to a public enterprise includmg 
matters of day to day administration".^' 
Parliamentary questions on public enterprises pertam to: 
1. The overall performance and the government policy, and 
2. Individual public enterprises while answering, the government has 
miserably failed to keep its promises of reform to improve PE workmg, but 
pointed questions m this regard were not asked.'''' 
Thus, the question device becomes a medium of reflectmg problems of the 
constituents by the members of parliament. The vital question is how for a 
member of parliament can go either in the exercise of his right or in the discharge 
of his responsibility, as stated above. The scope of parliamentary knowledge about 
public undertakmgs is restricted and second hand. Ministers sometimes come to 
parliament and often decline to reply to question on the ground that this 
responsibility is non-existent. 
Discussions of the conduct and methods of domg business of CEOs and 
other officers of public enterprises on the floor of the Houses of the Parliament 
without giving them an opportunity to be heard, has also not only sapped the 
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initiative, risk taking and innovative qualities of the management of public 
enterprises, when these are the very same qualities which are necessar>' at high 
levels of management of any business enterprises for its success, but also creates a 
fear complex. Further the habit of Central Bureau of Investigation (CBl) mquirmg 
into transactions exceeding certain monetary limits m a routine manner does not 
help development of an entrepreneurial behaviour. Politicization of decisions long 
after they are taken and making them subject to CBI investigation has also 
contributed to following the path of least resistance and safety. "^ 
Experience, however, reveals that the statutory means of accountability 
possessed by ministers are of less importance in the relationship between 
government and public enterprises in India than persuasion and pressures 
exercised mformally through discussions, negotiations and influence. It has been 
noticed that mmister usually hesitate to use their statutory powers which entail 
responsibility to the parliament. Most of the reports of the Parliamentary 
Committee on Public Undertakings, confirm that the boards remam constantly 
informal consultations with mmisters and the ministenal view is listened to with 
respect. Sometimes, minister intentionally keeps their activities almost secret in 
order to avoid accountability to parliament.^'' 
Parliament is obviously a political body composed of persons elected on 
political lines. There is a general tendency among them to emphasize the interests 
of workers and consumers of the enterprises concerned. It is an amateur body 
incapable of exammmg the technical, financial and managerial matters of public 
enterpnses. The annual report of public enterprises contains insufficient 
mformation, and on their basis parliamentarians cannot initiate meaningful action 
against any public sector executive. The executive of a public sector undertaking 
in India, today, is not at all happy. The unnecessary scrutiny and harassment to 
which he is subjected to under the pretext of public accountability, dampens his 
enthusiasm and initiative. Too much interference in day-to-day operations and 
raggmg and rubbing of public sector personnel by parliamentarians has resulted in 
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loss of managerial freedom. The executives have to restrain themselves and accept 
'willy- nilly' the safe approach of'take no initiative and invite no risk! 
Special Agencies to Control the PSUs: The Committee on Public Undertakings 
(CPU), smce its inception, has played a useful role in improvmg the flinctionmg of 
central public sector undertakings and bettering the system of financial control 
The CPU has produced over four hundred fifty reports up to tenth Lok Sabha, 
which can be classified into three categories: 
1. Examination of individual undertakings (it examined one-hundered twenty 
undertakings up to April 1989), 
2. Horizontal Studies, dealmg with a particular aspect of public enterprises 
(such as personnel policies, foreign collaboration, structure of the board of 
management, etc.), and 
3. Action Taken Reports, where the committee examines the action taken by 
the government/ management on its earlier reports (about two hundred are 
action taken reports). 
According to B.P. Mathur, "While the Public Accounts looks backward the 
Estimates Committee looks forward and CPU is a combmation of the functions of 
the two committees that ads to the effectiveness of the committee."'''' This 
statement of B.P Mathur reflects the utility of the Committee on Public 
Undertakings. 
Most of the chief executives who testified before the Sengupta Committee 
felt that, "government's supervision or guidance was unavoidable but that it was 
excessive and not based on well established rules and conventions. More often 
they are not related to efficient fijnctioning or for achieving the objectives of the 
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enterprise." The Committee further observed, "it is recognized by all that, on 
paper, managements of public enterprises enjoy large autonomy, sometimes much 
more than even by the private sector managements. However, in practice of 
mformal and formal involvement of ministries and departments takes place m 
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areas wholly within the dec is ion-making powers of public enterprise 
management." 
This reduced the theoretical autonomy of the Board of Directors by 
circumventing their freedom by regulations and traditions which leave them little 
freedom to take any major decisions and even for minor ones, they often have to 
seek the formal or informal approval of the government department under which 
they are placed and which may, in practice, mean the approval of the cabmet, the 
minister-in-charge or a junior official of the ministry. According to the Economic 
Administrative Reforms Commission Report, however, " these healthy trends and 
concepts have suffered a set back in later years... It will not be an exaggeration to 
say that the ministries have tended to integrate and absorb public enterprises and 
convert them into mere extensions of themselves." ^^  
In his testimony before the COPUs a retired secretary of government of 
India who also had been Chairman and Managing Director of a Central Public 
Undertaking stated: "I was actively associated with the public sector m the late 50s 
and 60s.., The amount of autonomy that we experienced then does not exist today. 
I have spoken to number of persons on the executive side. But the reply invariably 
I get is 'we will be thrown out the next day if we resist.' Probably they are right. 
There have been cases of people having been thrown out. I do not, however, blame 
them, whether they are ministers, bureaucrats or politicians, for the pressure of the 
social circumstances is great... Therefore, what I suggest is that instead of 
blaming these people...we should have some mstitutional arrangements which 
wdll discourage these practices."*" 
The First Conference of Chief Executives of Public Enterprises convened 
by BPE (April 1983) m its recommendations stated, "unlimited autonomy for the 
management of the public enterprises is neither possible nor desirable... as the 
Minister-in-charge is accountable to the Parliament for the runnmg of a public 
enterprise... A proper balance should be struck between autonomy and 
accountability. The benchmarks of accountability shall be spelt out with clarity 
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The issue of erosion of managerial autonomy by dysfunctional mterference from 
some of the admmistrative ministries is sensitive and requires to be viewed with 
concern so that avoidable obstacles are removed in the steady growth of the public 
sector in the country 
Accountability through CAG: Under the Constitution of hidia, all the powers 
regarding the audit have been vested m the Comptroller and Auditor General of 
India. He derives his authority from Articles 149 to 151 of the Constitution. The 
CAG plays a crucial role m audit of public enterprises. He has the legal authority 
to audit the affairs of most public enteiprises and his reports are laid before the 
central legislature as prescribed by Article 151 of the Constitution. ' However, it is 
also quite essential that the weakness and financial irregularities or mishandling of 
hinds of the enterpnses on the part of the management should be fully exposed by 
some external agency and it is here that the audit comes to play a crucial role. The 
audit observes public enterprises at close quarters and could act as a 'constructive 
critic' for effecting improvement. For this new role, the audit would have to re-
onent its approach and win the confidence of the management of public 
enterprises. In addition public enterprises have to present their annual audited 
statements to the legislature either under the Companies Act or under specific act 
of their incorporation. Thus, the Parliament gets a lot of information about public 
enterprises based on audit reports. Audit plays a pivotal role in government 
companies. It proMdes for audit by an auditor appointed on the advice of the 
Auditor General. Prior to the enactment of Section 619, the Auditor and 
Accountant General authority to audit a government company was based on the 
articles of association of the company, which provides for such an audit. ^ '^  
On the recommendations of the Administrative Reforms Commission, the 
Government of India m 1969 set up an Audit Board for the audit of public 
enterpnses, which works under the supervision of CAG. After review of the CAG, 
the comments of the Audit Board are incorporated in the audit report, which is 
placed before the legislature. These reports constitute a very effective device of 
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controlling the affairs of public enterprises. The controversy that the financial 
audit of public enterprises could be conducted by private auditors seems to have 
been settled. The suggestions that the CAG should confine his audit to the 
propriety and performance aspects of an undertaking without any jurisdiction 
regarding certificate of audit by the statutory auditor's is not a sound one but as 
long as the CAG has the duty to frame his reports intended for the Parliament, ha 
has to be assured that the accounts have been properly certified. Audit has to be 
tolerated even though not always liked; it is quite necessary that it is made 
acceptable to public enterprises.**^ 
G. V. Mavalankar, former speaker of Lok Sabha, once said "both executive 
and the legislature feel that judiciary is puttmg a brake on their forward march. 
Similarly, all these feel that the auditor is a source of great trouble because he 
raises various types of objections about the competence or propriety of this or that 
expenditure. This requires a change in the attitude of both the management and the 
auditor. Audit has to be conducted in such a way that it because duly acceptable to 
the management of these enterprises without any element of fear, with the public 
sector assuming a crucial place in the economy, and the audit trying to see whether 
their operations are conducted with wisdom, faithfulness and economy. Thus the 
auditing should be viewed as an important and potent instrument of positive 
control over the public enterprises of the country. " Government audit in India has 
generally enjoyed a good prestige and is held m high esteem. It had its moments of 
glory when the Bofors audit report convulsed the country and shook the 
government.*^ 
Till now, the 51 percent limit guarantees that not only the public sector 
undertakings are answerable to parliament but the CAG is also authorized to carry 
out regular audits. Now, with the prospects of the government freely giving up a 
51 percent stake and accepting a reduced holding m a number of public sector 
undertakings, not only these undertakmgs would stop reportmg to parliament but 
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they would also move out of the domain of CAG audit. This raises numerous 
questions about future. 
Thus, we can say that the time has come for a fresh look at the sanctity of 
51 percent holding and to provide for a device that would facilitate shareholders 
with a lower stake to have a say in the management of the privatized undertakings 
as well as others. The immediate issue is not what will happen to the CAG audit-
though with a sizeable privatisation, 70 percent of the public sector undertakings 
will move out of the CAG audit. The constitutional provisions pertaining to this 
fiinctionary have to be amended to provide for CAG audit even where the 
government shareholding has fallen below 51 percent. The advocates of 
privatisation say that the government is trying a back door de-privatisation, when 
somebody in North Block sets m motion a process that will keep the govemment 
in the picture even where it loses its 51 percent stake. But then, the fact that the 
PSUs that have been privatized will not have to account to parliament for the 
simple reason that the govemment does not have a majority stake cannot be made 
light of even in the midst of all the ecstasy over reform. Under private 
management, the former PSU is generally expected to give a return that has so 
long proved subtle, but that does not legitimize a system where the govemment 
will recognize an enhanced retum without askmg any questions about how the 
undertaking is managed. While there is a provision that the govemment can 
mvoke the law pertaming to CAG to ensure that the CAG continued to audit 
undertakings, where the govemment has lost its 51 percent stake, still, it does not 
seem likely if this provision will be made use of to ensure CAG's inspection under 
a regime of privatisation. 
The object of accountability is to satisfy the govemment, the parliament 
and the public that the public undertakings are bemg run efficiently and 
progressively. The accountability in public sector comprises control upon them 
directly by the parliament and indirectly through the minister concemed The 
management of public sector is responsible and answerable to the minister and 
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through him to the padiament The minister concerned is the chief instalment of 
the state who controls the working of pubhc enterprises related to his ministry 
The minister has the constitutional responsibility for the actions of his 
subordinates, and is concerned accountable to the parliament for the policies and 
results of the enterprises under his charge. All major policy decisions are taken by 
the minister concerned and the responsibility of coordinating and planning the 
whole activity in a public enterprise rests with him. Parliamentar>' control over 
public enterprises is exercised through questions and mterpolations put to the 
minister, debates on the performance of public undertakmgs, and examination by 
parliamentary committees. Too detailed and continuous examinations by 
parliament compel the minister to call for more and more mformation from public 
tmdertakings, and to insist that his prior approval should be taken even on matters 
commg within the orbit of management. 
This brings us to the very basic issue whether with privatisation of 
undertakings in which the government still has a substantial stake should be 
treated as any of the other private sector undertakings. While in the private 
corporate sector the governing stake does not have to be considerable to ensure 
that the governing interests appoint their own chairman and managing directors 
and pick their directors, what to speak of appomting auditors they favour, with 
privatisation of PSUs, a situation could easily emerge where despite a substantial 
holding by the government m financial terms and not in percentage terms the 
government will be unable to assert itself in the matter of appointment of the 
managing director, members of the board of directors and the auditors. The most 
important thing is that how the enterprise is managed and who is managing it and 
in what way. Generally, with reference to state government enterprises, as the 
CAG had noted, the government equity has been sought to be brought down to a 
level where the CAG would not be able to undertake regular audits. This 
emphasizes the fact that in respect of these enterprises, the government equity has 
already been generally reduced to less than the governing stake. This is a signal 
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that in respect of privatisation of state level PSUs the central government has to 
look beyond the basics of financial restructuring. The assumption that a governing 
private stake will serve as a magic wand has to be reviewed in the context of what 
is happening in respect of state government enterprises 
The OECD (1999) had drawn up a set of principles of 'Corporate 
Governance, which aimed at improving its legal, institutional and regulatory 
framework. Basic rights included secure ownership and registration, transfer 
shares, obtains relevant information, share in residual profits, participate in general 
shareholder meetmgs and transparent transfer of control Insider trading and 
abusive self-dealing are to be prohibited. The principles recognize rights of 
stakeholder that are established by law. Transparency aspects called for timely and 
accurate disclosure on all material regarding the company, including its financial 
situation. It was suggested that high quality standards of accounting, disclosure, 
and audit should be followed as per internationally recognized accounting and 
audit standards. Channels for disseminating information should provide for fair, 
timely, and cost-efficient access to information by users. Effective monitoring of 
management by the board and board's accountability to the company and 
shareholders was underlined. Members should act on a frilly informed basis, m 
good faith and in the best interests of the company and shareholders. In addition, 
formulating strategy, managmg potential conflicts of mterest, ensurmg compliance 
with law and assurmg the integrity of the company's accountmg, reportmg and 
communications should be taken cognizance of The rules that govern the Indian 
manufacturing industry changed rapidly with launching of the economic reforms 
m the early 1990s As part of these reforms, the recommendations of the 
Narasimhan Committee brought about changes in the financial market and an 
independent regulator replaced the administrative machinery that directed the 
capital market. ^'^ 
The clamour for greater autonomy of public sector is at best a demand for 
ending the informal exercise of power by government functionaries over the day-
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to-day working of the enterprises, for clearly defining the internal and external 
power structures with reference to public enterprises and for reposing greater irust 
on enterprise management. At worst it is a smokescreen created to conceal 
realities and develop handles to explain away failures and non-performance 
I I 
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CKA^TM^III 
LIBERALISATION AND ECONOMIC REFORMS 
(A) The Concept Of Liberalisation 
Liberalisation is one of the basic concepts in classical economics 
Physiocrats, the 18"' century School of French economic thinkers, initially 
developed the major ideas underlying economic liberalism. A number of moral 
philosophers and political economists in the late 18"' to late 19" century, like Adam 
Smith, Robert Malthus and David Recardo, gave fijll expression to lalssez-fanx' 
and to liberalisation later.' Adam Smith was the first economist to provide 
systematic arguments agamst intervention by the state in the functioning of the 
market-which still serve as the basis of conservative economic ideology At the 
same time, unlike modem conservative economists. Smith did not ignore the 
essential role that the state has to play for ensuring the very existence of organized 
market.' 
Liberalisation implies a process of freeing the economy, from various 
governmental regulations such as industrial licensing, control on pricing and 
distribution of products and services, import licensing, foreign exchange 
regulations, control of capital issues by companies, credit controls, restrictions on 
investment, etc., so that the development and operation of the economy is 
increasingly guided by free operating market forces. Thus, liberalisation is 
essentially a process of withdrawal of all direct controls on the economy.^ 
Although liberalisation is basically an economic phenomenon, it is grounded in the 
political ideology of liberalism. It is a political and ideological trend that unites 
supporters of the bourgeoisie-parliamentary system and the votaries of freedom for 
capitalist enterprise. Some people perceive it as an expression of the interests of 
the industrial bourgeoisie in the period of its struggle for political and economic 
supremacy. Politically, it manifest itself as the doctrme of Laissez-faire and 
extreme individualism. Its basic tenet is the organization of society in a manner as 
to best serve and protect the pursuit of individual interests, as opposed to the 
collective interests and majority rule." 
According to Jilberto and Mommen, the following are the main 
components of liberalisation: 
1. Privatisation of state and prostate enterprises m order to reduce 
inefficiencies and government protection monopolies; 
2. High interest rates and credit squeeze in order to reduce inflationary 
tendencies, 
3. Trade liberalisation in order to open up the internal market and expose local 
industry to world market competition and boost foreign trade exchange, 
4. Domestic Demand Management, leadmg to a lowermg of state budgets and 
decreasmg expenditure in the social sector; 
5. Currency adjustment in order to improve the balance of payment by raising 
import prices and makmg exports more competitive, 
6. Free market prices in order to remove distortions resulting from import 
taxes on luxury items.'' 
Whatever may be the concept of liberalism and liberalisation, as central 
pomt of a change of a policy regime, it cannot make sense except as substitute of 
some kind of radicalism or a radical policy regime. The liberal policy initiatives of 
the kind initiated in mid 1991 have a long chain of predecessors. Various episodes 
of 'liberalisation' can be seen with a nearly continuous regularity on India's policy 
firmament since the death of Jawahar Lai Nehru, if not even earlier (like e.g., 
foUowmg the mid-term crisis of the Second Plan). The policy regime during 1950-
64 cannot, on any logical grounds, be considered radical. The current Indian 
liberalisation has certainly to respond to detrimental growth or mal-development, a 
task, the very design of liberalisation rules out. There existed no radical policy 
regime to which it could become a substitute. Thus, in so far as the liberalisation 
programme is supposed to be a remedial to a non-existent radical policy regime, it 
amounts to tilting a windmill. 
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Several tumultuous events of the 1980s and 1990s have led to the 
enthronement of Liberalisation, Privatisation, Globalisation (LPG) as the dominant 
force and the ideological anchor of the late 20"' century. These include collapse of 
the Soviet Union, sweeping politico-economic changes m Eastern Europe, end of 
Cold War, ascendance of neo-liberalism (as manifest in the Reagonomics in USA 
and the Thatcherism in UK), proliferation and expansion of Transnational 
Corporations (TNCs) and Multinational Corporations (MNCs), the growing clout 
of IMF and the World Bank, emergence of macro-economics (academically 
nurtured by the journal The Economist of London), emergence of Rightwing 
Political formations as ruling parties in several countries of the world, 
establishment of WTO, Communication and Internet revolution, collapse of Third 
Worldism as a distinct theory and practice, ascendance of monocultures, decline oi' 
counter cultures, erosion of cultural plurality and a host of others. These 
phenomenon changes of an unprecedented magnitude have been variously termed 
as 'transition from authoritarian rule' (0 Donnel, Schewetter and Whitehead), 
New World Order (Bush), 'The End of the History' (Fukayama), 'New World 
Disorder' (Ignatieff), 'Clash of Civilizations'? (Huntington) and as the 'Return of 
the Capitalist Colonialism', (Rajini Kothari). 
David C. Korten in his famous book When Corporations Rule the World 
exposes the mystery behind the genesis of liberalisation, which is an integral part 
of the globalised economic system. He explains that the roots of the system go 
back to the US trauma of the depression that preceded World War II On July 1-
22, 1944, representatives of 44 nations attended the U.N. Monetary and Financial 
Conference at Bretton Woods in New Hampshire. They agreed upon an 
institutional framework for the post World War II global economy. The purpose 
was to create an open world economy unified under the U.S leadership that would 
ensure unchallenged US access to the World's markets and raw materials. The 
MNCs have become an instrument of the US Economic Domination Seventy 
percent of the world trade is controlled by 500 corporations and a mere 1 percent 
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of all MNCs own half of the total stock of Foreign Direct Investment The MNCs 
are consolidating their hold on global economy. They exclusively serve 
demanding world consumers and are not concerned with the national goals of 
countries. 
Economic liberalisation is of two kinds: one, macro liberalisation or 
liberalisation at the global level, two, micro-liberalisation or liberalisation at the 
national or sub-national levels. While the first kind of economic liberalisation is 
known as globalisation, the second variety of it is known as liberalisation/;c;/- .se or 
as the composite of liberalisation and privatisation Thus, liberalisation of 
economy as a whole, both domestic and global, could be more meaningfully 
termed as liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation or LPG for short.' There 
are two views regarding the historical context of the LPG. While according to one 
of these views, globalisation is seen as a development of the last two decades or 
so, according to the other it is not an altogether new phenomenon and thai it is as 
old as the capitalism itself These contendmg contextualisations not withstanding, 
there is a near consensus on the pomt that the globalisation process of today, 
which got Its major impetus with the demise of the Soviet System, has certain 
features that distmguish it from the earlier forms of globalisation and 
internationalization.^'' One important difference between the older and the newer 
strains of globalisation relates to their relative polarity, wherein the older version 
of globalisation was a kind of bipolar or multipolar globalisation. The newer one is 
marked by unipolarity under the US hegemony.'' 
There may appear to be some opposition between internal and external 
liberalisation. External liberalisation provides increased space freely accessible to 
foreign capital, goods and services, finance and technology (with improved and 
especially favourable terms, by the countries facing chronic trade deficit, foreign 
exchange shortage and heavy indebtedness), it may reduce the opportunities for 
the domestic capital. Such views tend to ignore the emergence of collective, 
transnational capital, which is becoming increasingly dominant. After the end of 
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the US economic and financial supremacy, the emergence of Germany. Japan, and 
the newly industrialized countries (NlCs) as the new centres of economic power, 
the MNCs, transcending the national barriers have become the vehicles of global 
economic hegemony. With command over huge turnover, technology, diversified 
and geographically dispersed product-mix, and their huge R&D oudays to quicken 
the pace of obsolescence, the MNCs are in need of unrestricted access to global 
markets in which the third World countries and the former command economies 
are holding promising prospects (the emerging markets) particularly with then-
control over many source of energy, minerals and agro-based raw materials. 
highly qualified man power, growing Balance of Payment (BOP) deficit, debt-
swing obligations, and the follower syndrome. The methodology and approach of 
the MNCs is to renounce strict and open national identification. Hence, external 
liberalisation is not viewed by local capital as something inherently inimical On 
the contrary, pleas for level playmg field with MNCs becomes a basis for the 
domestic capital to wrest concession and get rid of controls and regulations, 
necessitated on account of domestic socio-economic compulsion. " In so far as 
external liberalisation is concerned, its basis consists of the theoretical position 
and historical evidence of trade as an engine of growth. This is based on the 
principle of comparative advantage in which specialization based on factor 
endowment, competition (Survival of the fittest or natural selection) leads to gains 
for all the trading partners. In this open economy model, trade leads to factor price 
equalization and an optimum pattern of resource allocation globally. 
Revival of protectionism m the rich countries shows that the external 
liberalisation is basically a part and parcel of the IMF-World Bank programme of 
structural adjustment dictated by the countries flush with huge-short and long-term 
investible financial resources, which control the Bretton Woods Twins The 
incompatibility of the SAP-based external liberalisation with the socio-economic 
aspirations and objectives of the Third World and its negative pay-off in Latin 
American and sub-saharan economies are also well known 
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The policies for internal economic liberalisation are based on arguments, 
which are analytically similar to the theories supporting external liberalisation 
They base at empirical level their support on the 'failure' of import substituting 
and heavy and capital goods based industrialization with accent on direct state 
participation and direct physical control over private investment and other aspects 
of industrial decision making. It is argued that the bureaucratic management of 
public industrial enterprises without the discipline of the market and absence of 
competitive pressure owing to protectionism and licensing based entry restrictions 
led to inefficiencies, high cost and technological backwardness. With heavy 
dependence on imports of energy, capital goods, raw materials, components, 
technology, savings, etc., these countries experienced slow-down of industrial 
growth, heavy debt burden to finance chronic external deficits, and international 
non-competitiveness. In the former command economies with severe curtailment 
of consumption, hea\7 defence spending and artificially low prices of essential 
consumer goods and social amenities, the system became non-sustamable. The 
bureaucratic management of mdustrial enterprises blocked cost reduction, qualit>' 
improvement and innovations. Instead, it bred corruption, inefficiencies and a 
flourishing underground economy. These enterprises were not giving adequate 
financial return and many were becoming non-viable. Thus, it was agreed that by 
dismantling controls and reviving the market processes of price determination, 
which respond to demand and supply forces and usmg these market signals for 
mvestment decision will go to replace government regulations by the market 
forces. The inefficient firms, it was believed, would be weeded out. Thus, it was 
believed that economic liberalisation would lead to fast and efficient growth 
whose benefits will trickle-down to the poorer sections. The negative aspects of 
liberalisation are decontrol, deregulation and reduction in governmental 
intervention and involvement. 
The reorientation of economies in the direction of market prmciples is the 
fundamental objective of liberalisation. The stress on elimination of subsidies, 
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price supports, user-pay-principle, privatisation, etc., are steps considered 
indispensable for liberalisation that is professed as the only possibility for grov.th 
The net results of liberalisation for the economies of the Third World nations, 
however, have been far sterner than just an augmented orientation towards 
markets. Liberalisation in its present materialization has not only tainted these 
economies; but has also brutally oriented them towards elitist interests, keeping 
out and marginalisation of resource poor, and unsustainable pattern of 
development. The task bemg played by liberalisation policy in successful 
moulding of the economies of poor Third World countries towards the need of 
powerflil states calls for comment. In the present state of affairs of economic 
dependence, adjustment conditionalties as well as penetration of new technologies 
of ideological manipulation, integration with global economy has almost become 
the new strategy, main concern of most Third World countries. The belief is that 
devoid of this, there can be no salvation. There is an emergent competition among 
these countries to accomplish the objective of integration with the global 
economy. To achieve it, more liberalisation is considered to be the only device 
available to them. 
Thus, we see that the commitment to liberalisation purportedly implies a 
commitment to market orientation of the economy and incorporates a alleged 
compulsion of state to push policy towards deregulation, privatisation, selective 
state withdrawal and expenditure cuts, and eventually integration with the global 
economy. While economy is predictable to be liberated fi'om political directions 
and interferences, state is ceased from taking up a competing or preventive role 
vis-a-vis private enterprise. Liberalisation, as it is being effected, does not propose 
any proclivity towards full withdrawal of state from the economic sphere. This is 
not even hunted by its supporters. 
Amiya Kumar Bagchi culled out nine distinct features of liberalisation, 
privatisation and globalisation as follows: spread of international trade in goods 
and services, migration of people between countries or regions, exchange of 
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money and means of payment on increasing scale across countries or regions, flow 
of capital from one country to another to help produce goods and services; flow of 
finance (not necessarily Imked to the production of goods and services) between 
different countries; emergence of the TNCs engaged in the activities listed above, 
international trade m technology, spread of print and electronic media; and growth 
in international trade and production of services of all kinds-shipping, insurance, 
banking, finance and health care. 
Liberahsation and the changing of the course of development of the Indian 
economy have been endeavoured even in early eighties. Serious and critical 
questions about the public sector have been raised, policy of administered prices 
has been reviewed with a view to cover the production costs, to lessen/eluninate 
losses and possibly to generate surpluses for investment to finance the fliture 
development. Raising the levels of efficiency, productivity and profitability and to 
upgrade the technological base of production has been acknowledged as the goals 
of managing the economy, including public sector. Instruments of joint ventures, 
relaxation and liberalisation of controls and licensing regimes have been forged 
and implemented selectively for ensurmg greater degree of competitiveness m the 
economy with these objectives in view. Modem liberalisation is the revival of this 
policy of early eighties. 
Liberalisation and deregulation may enable a developing country to benefit 
from globalisation m achievmg a higher rate of economic growth and raising the 
living standards of its people."" The Government of India has espoused policies of 
globalisation and liberalisation and market economy in the wake of serious 
economic crisis which arose due to the economic consequences of upheaval in the 
erstwhile USSR and East Europe-the effects of the Gulf war, the shift in global 
economic power balance and the economic policies followed by the Union and the 
State Governments smce the 90s. The immediate reasons was a serious balance of 
payment crisis owing to a steady decline in exports, negative growth rates in 
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industry and agriculture, and 0.3 percent decline in the domestic production of 
crude oil 
India's adoption of a programme of globalisation market economy and 
competitiveness came after more than six months of negotiations with the World 
Bank starting in Januar\' 1991. The package of reform measures announced by the 
newly installed Narasimha Rao Government in July 1991 consisted of two 
separate economic policies: 
(a) a macro-economic stabilization programme (IMF inspired) essentially 
focusing on reducing the twin deficit on BOP and on the state budget, and 
(b) a comprehensive programme for structural change of the economy (World 
Bank inspired) in the fields of trade, industry, foreign mvestments, public 
sector and the fmancial sector among others. 
Thus, globalisation, competitiveness and liberalisation came to India as a 
booster and through the backdoor of "economic reforms". 
The liberalisation process has come in for criticism from two opposite ends 
There are those who feel that the process has been slow and not sufficiently 
comprehensive. At the other end, there are critics who view the reforms process as 
misconceived, ignoring the basic requirements of the people. 
Indian policy of liberalisation and globalisation of the economy rests on the 
market-friendly approach. But, by and large, currently the global markets, 
particularly those of the developed countries and their economic policies are 
unfriendly to practically all developing economies. As recent reports emanating 
from U.N agencies particularly the UNDP reveal, the disparity between the 
world's richest and the poorest 20 percent has constantly been mcreasing and it 
now has reached the explosive ratio of 150:1, which decidedly is a very grim 
picture. The harsh truth as explained at the recent UNDP sponsored semmar on 
economic growth in India by none other than the redoubtable liberal late Dr 
Mahabubul Haque, former Finance Minister of Pakistan is that trade barriers put 
up by the developed world deprived the developing nations of an estimated 450 
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billion dollar annually or 10 times the amount they received in aid. In view of this 
harsh reality can we safely rely wholly on the so-called market-friendly economic 
policies and globalisation? 
(B) Laissez Faire 
The laissez-faire disciples usually refer to Adam Smith as the father of 
laissez-faire and free market capitalism, but they fail to understand that Smith's 
society was not a fully capitalist society. He was trying to predict what it would be 
like, to ft'ee society from the feudal and church power. Even though Adam Smith 
"was a Free Trader and an opponent of many eighteenth century restrictions on 
trade... his attitude towards the Navigation act of the Usury laws shows that he 
was not dogmatic"'^ Keynes argued that "the phrase laissez-faire is not to be found 
m the writings of Adam Smith, of Ricardo, or of Malthus". In fact the use of the 
term laissez-faire, laissez-passer is attributed to Vmcent de Goumay (1712-59) a 
precursor of the physiocrats and of Adam Smith. He was interested m reforming 
the French economy and in abolishing trade restrictions. Keynes strongly affirmed 
that the maxim of laissez-faire was created by political philosophers not by 
political economists. It "is what the economists are supposed to have said... It is 
what the populansers and the vulgarisers said... It is what the Utilitarians... were 
driven to believe in, if they were to effect a synthesis".'" Karl Polanyi explained 
that for "politicians and administrators laissez-faire was simply a principle of the 
ensurance of law and order, with the minimum cost and effort"'' 
"While laissez-faire economy was the product of deliberate state action, 
subsequent restnctions on laissez-faire started in a spontaneous way. Laissez-faire 
was planned; planning was not" ' Smith's belief that competition, the market's 
invisible hand, would lead to proper pricing played a large role m his economic 
policy recommendations. He therefore strongly opposed any government 
intervention mto busmess affairs. Trade restrictions, minimum wage laws, and 
product regulation were all viewed as detnmental to a nation's economic health. 
This laissez-faire policy of government non-intervention remamed popular 
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throughout the Victorian Era and still plays an important part in present-day 
economic policy.'^ Francis Brown declared that laissez-faire means "things 
regulate themselves'...which means, of course, that God regulates them by his 
general laws, which always, in the long run, work to good."' 
According to James Bryce, " Laissez-faire is the orthodox and accepted 
doctrine in the sphere both of federal and of state legislation." When Bryce wrote 
these words the doctrine of laissez faire was under strong attack, but it had long 
been a major tenet of the American faith In theory at least, Americans had 
adhered to the view that although government was, unfortunately, a necessity, its 
functions should be reduced to a rnmmium. Free individuals, left to their own 
devices, could solve the problems that confronted them without the aid of the 
state. The state might wage war, protect property, and administer justice, but in 
everyday life of the people it was not to interfere." 
The birth oi laissez-faire in the 19* century and its rebirth in the 1970's is 
not a natural phenomenon that emerged out of capitalism. According to Polanyi, 
"free markets could never have come into bemg merely by allowmg thmgs to take 
theu" course... Laissez-faire itself was enforced by the state.. Laissez-faire was not 
a method to achieve a thmg, it was the thing to be achieved""'' Laissez-faire did not 
come out of capitalism as a "natural" mode of functioning of society. It was 
purposely created to appease selfish elitist desires. One might think of capitalism 
as the best social and economic system yet discovered, but we should also think of 
the evolution and diversity of socio-economic systems. We must recognize intra-
capitalism diversit\\ which acknowledges an evolution of capitalism along with its 
institutions. In fact, Minsky identified as many as 57 varieties of capitalism in 
America.' 
Laissez-faire capitalism is a system based on four "laws of nature." First, 
the laws of personal interest and competition, which represent the fundamental 
forces dnving rational individuals to achieve social welfare while pursuing their 
own personal interest. The second sets of 'natural laws' - private property and 
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freedom - are the institutional prerequisites that guarantee the existence of the first 
two 'natural laws'. Therefore, the role of government has to be limited to the 
protection and reinforcement of private property and freedom. Rational individuals 
seeking their own personal interest and competing against one another will 
ultimately lead the economy to "equilibrium." Being away from the "equilibrium" 
position means that the government failed to guarantee private property and 
freedom. Under laissez-faire capitalism, unemployment is voluntary because 
rational individuals prefer leisure to the "disutility" of work. The breakdown of the 
old laissez-faire model occurred in the 1929-33 period. Government intervention 
became a necessary and sustainable policy that helped to increase investment, 
mcome and consumption through the govemment spending multiplier The 
concept that prevailed after the Second World War was that the govemment was 
the main moving force for social and economic development. Between 1933 and 
1969, the American economy reached a considerable level of economic growtli 
and social welfare. When the govemment got heavily mvolved m solving the 
economic problem, unemployment and mcome mequality decreased, and 
"American capitalism - though not perfect - was a successful economic system."" 
Free trade is primarily a good thmg because it brings freedom: freedom for 
people to buy what they want from whoever they please, but also to sell to 
whoever wants to buy. As an added economic benefit, this freedom leads to the 
efficient use of resources and capital. A company, a region or a country specializes 
where it has comparative advantages and can therefore generate the greatest value 
Capital and labour from older, less competitive sectors are transferred to newer, 
more dynamic ones. That means that a country switchmg to a more-free-trade-
friendly policy nses to a higher level of production and prosperity, and can 
therefore anticipate a substantial acceleration of growth for at least the first few 
years. But economic openness also leads to an enduring effort to improve 
production, because foreign competition forces firms to be as good and as cheap 
possible, and this leaves consumers free to choose goods and services from the 
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seller-making the best offer. As production in established industries becomes ever 
more competent, resources are freed up for investment in new methods, 
mventions, and products. This same argument supports competition generally, it 
simply extends competition to even bigger fields, thus making it more intensive 
(C) Economic Reforms 
The Concise Oxford dictionary defines reforms as, "make or become better 
by the removal of faults and errors". It is essentially a normative concepts 
involvmg value judgment, both in detectmg the faults and errors to be removed or 
diagnosing the ailments to be cured as well as in deciding the measure to be taken 
or the treatment to be given. Any reform, economic or otherwise, cannot therefore 
be free from ideological bias; and economic reforms particularly from 
considerations other than economic-ideological, political or diplomatic, or pure 
self interest of those who are in a position to dictate or direct what the contents of 
such reforms would be. 
In many developing countries there is widespread concern with poor public 
enterprise performance, and it is generally agreed that reform of the sector is 
needed urgently. The earlier hopes that public enterprise would assist in the 
development of key productive activities, would fill the entrepreneurial and skill 
gaps left by the pnvate sector, and would generate a financial surplus for 
government investment, have not been fulfilled. Typically, the sector's 
performance has fallen short of expectations, and governments have had to 
shoulder heavy fiscal and managerial burdens, absorbmg an increasing share of 
scarce public resources. Poorly performing public enterprises, sheltered from 
market competition and enjoying preferential access to scarce inputs, have limited 
the growth of the enterprises, increasing their costs of business and blocking their 
access to market. The reasons for poor public enterprise performance are varied, 
but for many observers the ftindamental cause is a lack of market disciplme, where 
the public enterprise sector has been protected from the pressures of market 
competition that would have ensured better economic and financial performance. 
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Consequently, reform efforts are centred on measures which were mtended to 
make the pubhc enterprise sector more responsive to market forces and tlie price 
mechanism. 
Pohcy reforms has been the central theme of development economies since 
the 1980s and many Asian countries have undertaken comprehensive reforms in 
recent years under the auspices of the stabilization and structural adjustment 
programmes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The 
basic objective of reforms is to reduce the scope of the public sector, to create an 
enabling environment for private participation and government-private sector 
partnership, to enhance efficiency and the international competitiveness of 
domestic industnes and to impart dynamism to the overall growth process 
Although the scope, sequencing and speed of reforms differ from country to 
country, a comprehensive reform programmes includes almost all facets of the 
economy, such as the factor market, industry, mfrastructure, trade, fmancial and 
public sectors. Countries of the region continued to pursue more outward-lookmg 
strategies through trade liberalisation, exchange rate reforms and further reduction 
to tariff and non-tariff barriers. Personal income and corporate taxes and capital 
gains taxes were reduced in many countries to encourage private investment and 
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savings. 
They must focus more mtensely on the management and governance issues 
and speed up efforts aimed at improvmg the competence of the public sector 
enterprises in the condition and quality of services, cost recovery and regulatory 
omission. 
The process of economic reforms is an ongoing process and it builds upon 
the past experience and the need and necessity to amend and improve the existing 
system. In India, however, the term 'economic reforms' has come to be associated 
with the changes brought about in the early nmeties of the preceding century. 
Political instability resulting in three successive governments in a short span of 
two years from 1989-91, accompanied by the Gulf-war, threw the country into a 
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real economic crisis. The situation is very well summed up by Dr. Manmohan 
Smgh, the then Finance Minister in his budget speech 1991, in the following 
words: - "The origins of the problems are directly traceable to large and persistent 
macro-economic imbalances and the low productivity of investment . there has 
been an unsustainable increase m expenditure Budgetary subsidiaries, with 
questionable social and economic impact, have been allowed to grow to an 
alarming extent. The tax system... lacks transparency. The excessive and often 
mdiscrimmate protection provided to industry has weakened to develop a vibrant 
export sector. The mcreasmg difference between the income and expenditure of 
the Government has led to widening of the income and expenditure of the 
economy as a whole. This is reflected in growmg current account deficits and in 
the crisis in the economy is both acute and deep."^" The process of economic 
reforms m India was thus, initiated to ward off a crisis situation. 
Montek S. Ahluwalia classifies the reform agenda ahead of us into three 
categories; 
1. The first item on this agenda on which there is great deal of agreement must 
be to restore fiscal discipline. This is actually a first generation reform, 
which we have not been able to carry out as planned. 
2. The second category consists of first generation reforms, which are more or 
less on track, but are still to be completed because of our deliberate choice 
of gradualism as a reform strategy. 
3. The last category consists of what can be called genuine second-generation 
reforms, which take the reform process to new areas not addressed thus 
far.-^ ' 
The organization of Economic Cooperation and Development prepared a 
scheme for the private sector development throughout the world as an essential 
aspect of economic reform process to brmg efficiency in the public sector 
undertakings m the following manner. 
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Private Sector Development Activities: A Schema 
1. APPROACHES 
(a) Policy dialogue to promote the private sector 
(b) Enterprise development, privatisation, export, fmancial development, 
foreign direct investment 
(c) Technical assistance for the above activities 
(d) Institution building to strengthen public sector capacities for the above 
policy 
2. EFFICIENT ENVIRONMENT 
(a) Macroeconomic policy fostering growth and deregulation 
(b) Protection of property rights by legislative changes 
(c) Creation of efficient markets by promoting transparency and competition 
(d) Redesigned fiscal policies and collection of revenues 
(e) Institutions and distribution system for information 
(f) Support services for business 
3. FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT 
(a) Action plans to free financial markets to respond to demand and supply 
factors 
(b) Free interest rate controls to make mobilization easy 
(c) Incentives for development to deepen markets 
(d) Transparency of regulation of the financial sector 
(e) Openness international flows of resources in stages 
4. PRIVATISATION AND PUBLIC SECTOR REFORMS 
(a) Effective transfer of ownership in pnvatisation 
(b) Restructured state-owned enterprises to prepare them to return to the 
private sector 
(c) Public service production contracted out 
(d) Skill conversion programmes for the unemployed 
133 
5. ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT 
(a) The establishment and growth of business entities facilitated 
(b) Educational institutions to train a pool of skills 
(c) Modernization of existing industries and technology 
6. MICRO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
(a) Provision of credit and technical assistance for seif-sustainable 
development 
(b) Non-governmental organization development within sectors to promote 
self-help. 
Note: This Schema is based upon the organization for Economic Cooperation and Dc\ clopmcnl 
(OECD) model for pri\ ate sector de\ clopmcnl. 
This table provides details on an approach to private sector development. It 
can be seen that private sector development can be planned over a period of time 
by taking a number of interlinked steps to scale dov^ Ti the public sector while 
deregulating economic activities so as to allow busmess enterprises to work 
efficiently with transparent government practices consistent with the growth 
oriented strategies. The three roles of government are achieved, if possible, by 
employing the private sector production and delivery of goods and services in a 
competitive environment. Obviously a private sector approach to development 
must slowly withdraw the public sector from agricultural, industrial, and service 
sectors (which mcludes the financial sector) while speedily removing constraints 
on private sector development. 
Usmg the private sector as the engine of growth requires a clear 
understanding of the roles of the public and private sector must be acknowledged 
It IS responsible for establishing a secure and stable environment for the effective 
operation of private sector organization within a political boundary: this is the so-
called law and order agenda. In addition, the public sector is responsible for 
transparent rule-making and rule enforcement to facilitate market to function 
competently. In the case of occasional market failures, the public sector provides 
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those affected a certain degree of protection consistent with its resources so long 
as the extent of assistance does not lead to an enduring withdrawal of those 
exaggerated from private sector resources. Thus, these three roles of the public 
sector, a friendly environment for business operations, transparent regulation and 
public assistance in cases of market failures, are legitimate functions of the state or 
public sector since a strong and direction providing government is necessary for 
economic activities to take place in any civil society. 
Government in power, having adopted the objective of private sector 
development as the engine for sustainable growth, must take responsibility to 
promote (i) transparency and (ii) accountability in the administrative process. The 
two major tools are needed, one to make the government administration 
responsive to demands for public services, and two to deregulate those aspects of 
government activities that do not require approval by government administrators. 
Another is freeing of economic activities from approval of government 
departments."'^  
In designing the poUcies for public sector we did not adequately think of 
the role of incentives, particularly incentives provided for the management or the 
bureaucracy to ensure that the shareholder value or national wealth is maximized 
Our legal system may have frirther aggravated the problem by treating public 
sector as an extension of the state, which meant that we lastly robbed the public 
sector of any risk taking ability, a key hallmark of an entrepreneur. Consequently, 
public sector, which was supposed to be the primary force of capital accumulation, 
became a drain on fiscal resources. 
In September 1997, a committee headed by Shri N. Vittal, Chairman of the 
PESB, undertook a review of guidelines for public sector enterprises. It 
recommended outright deletion of 762 out of existing 892 guidelines and 
summarily dismissed government's control on functioning of PSEs through these 
guidelines. The report offered a practical and pragmatic way of granting autonomy 
to PSEs to enable them to operate in a commercial environment and displayed a 
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healthy approach to deregulate the public sector. Its recommendations covered 
guidelines on accountability, deregulation, human resource management, financial 
management, project management, production and material management if 
accepted and implemented in a proper spirit, they will facilitate day-to-day 
operations of PSEs by their managements. Incidentally PSEs were always 
empowered to reject or accept guidelines, but most PSEs did not use this privilege 
and took shelter behind them for delays or unsound management decisions. 
But It is a well-known fact that performance of a number of PSLs has gone 
from bad to worse after the economic reforms were introduced. This was mainly 
on account of the fact that those companies were ill equipped to face the 
challenges of liberalisation. To alter this situation special attention needs to be 
paid to PSUs adversely affected by economic reforms and all possible efforts 
made to improve their fmancial health. They would like to be apprised of the 
action taken by Government in the matter. 
The structural adjustment programme adopted by India has been in the 
mould of orthodox package of reform that has come to be referred to as the 
Washington Consensus. 
Some of the important measures taken were: 
1. Abolition of industrial licensing except for select list of hazardous and 
environmentally sensitive industries. 
2. Abolition of separate permission for capacity creation and expansion by 
MRTP companies. 
3. Drastic reduction in the number of industries reserved for the public sector 
and allowing private sector investment in the industries reserved for the 
public sector. 
4. Tariff reduction and removal of QRs 
5. Elimination of most of the export restrictions, revampuig of various export 
mcentive schemes, streamlming of procedures and abolition of most of the 
sector specific direct export subsidies and export taxes. 
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6. Devaluation of the rupee and leaving the determination of exchange rate to 
the demand and supply in the foreign exchange markets. 
7. Taking various measures to attract foreign investment. 
8 Reforms in the system of personnel taxation, customs duties and exercise 
duties to increase revenue, reduce the cost of imported mputs and simplify 
and rationalize the excise duty structure. 
9. Improving the liquidity of the banks for financing private investment by 
cuts in CRR and SLR, adoption of capital adequacy norms (Basle) by the 
banks and givmg freedom to banks and financial institutions to fix rates of 
interest. 
10. Doing away with direct government control of capital issues and leaving 
their volume and pricmg to be determined by the market subject to 
regulation by the Secunties and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) 
11. Public Sector reforms, such as phasing out budgetary support in the form of 
non-plan loans to loss-making PSUs, disinvestments of public sector 
equity, allowing public sector enterprises to form joint ventures and raise 
fresh equity from the market, bringing PSUs withm the jurisdiction of 
Board for Indusfrial and Financial Reconstruction and permitting greater 
flexibility in taking pricing decisions, particularly in the case of steel, 
petroleum products and coal. 
12. Reducing fiscal deficit by reduction of subsidies and m budgetary' 
allocation to PSUs, expenditure control and tax reforms. 
The reforms mitiated in June 1991 sought to make the Indian economy a 
fast growing one. Rapid growth was desired in order to deal better with the 
problems of poor human development. It was to be realized through more efficient 
use of resources. For efficiency, both domestic and international competitions 
were considered essential. One of the reasons for the relative steadiness of the 
Indian economy in the midst of Asian crisis may be the existence of relatively 
large public enterprises. 
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In July 1991, when the Government of India had to take IMF loan to tide 
over an unprecedented Balance of Payments Crisis, a package of measures called 
"economic reforms" based largely on 'Washmglon Consensus' had to be adopted 
of which "privatisation" was an mtegral part. Government of India announced a 
new Industnal Policy in July 1991 containing several decisions to honour their 
commitment to privatisation besides opening up several areas hitherto reserved 
exclusively for the Public Sector for private investment and mvitmg foreign 
capital. Of course, one of the most important reforms would be redefining the role 
of government and downsizing the government while improving the quality of 
governance. The downsizing of the government will also meant privatisation of 
non-strategic public sector enterprises as well as banking sector The strategic 
public sector enterprises are those that deal with atomic energy, space and defence 
production. In all other areas, we should privatize the public sector enterprises. 
The Prime Minister's Economic Advisory Council recommended following 
points to improve the conditions of sick industries and restructure them. 
(i) SICA should be scrapped and BIFR wound up to be replaced by a 
process in which defaultmg companies are given time to work out an 
anangement with creditors, 
(ii) The Debt Recovery Tribunals should be strengthened so that creditors 
can go to these tribunals for debt recovery. 
(ill) Companies Act should be amended to allow for reorganization and 
revival where feasible and rapid bankruptcy or liquidation where 
necessary. Outside expert agencies such as accountmg firms and 
consultancy companies should be empanelled and empowered under 
court jurisdiction to conduct the relevant investigation in order to hasten 
the process.''^ 
In India, the first phase of reforms saw some very' important steps in 
industrial and trade policies, specially delicensmg of industry, abolition of MRTP 
restrictions on mvestment by large firms, opening up of areas earlier reserved 
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exclusively for the public sector, liberalisation of foreign direct investment, 
progressive abolition of quantitative restrictions and substantial reduction in 
import duties. These steps were intended to increase domestic competition and 
progressively expose Indian mdustry to international competition. 
However, the transformation required in the industrial sector is far from 
complete. This is bom out by the following facts: 
(i) The industrial sector has not yet shown the double-digit growth rates, 
which are necessary if GDP growth is to accelerate to beyond 8 percent 
(ii) Employment in industry has not yet expanded rapidly, reflecting the fact 
that labour intensive industries have not yet seen rapid growth, 
(iii) Exports of manufactured goods have also not grown as rapidly as in 
many other countries, 
(iv) The small-scale sector remains nervous about its ability to cope with the 
removal of quantitative restrictions on imports of consumer goods.^'' 
A second-generation of reforms in industrial and trade policies is necessary 
to address these problems. 
To improve the performance of central public sector undertakmgs reforms 
are needed in the following areas: 
1. Setting of explicit and realistic objectives that are consistent with the 
commercial operation of the enterprise. 
2. Giving management greater autonomy over the operation of the enterprise, 
in the areas of resource purchasing, marketing and pncing policy. 
3. Establishing transparent rules and procedures for limiting government 
involvement in enterprise decision-making 
4. Increasmg management accountability for performance and results, and 
relating reward structures to performance." 
These measures offer the prospect of improving the performance of public 
undertakings, while facilitating government to keep hold of ownership of 
productive assets that it regards as essential to the economy's development. Thus, 
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in my point of view, a nation wide and broad-based consensus to reform our 
economy and to put the individual states and the country as a whole on a path of 
higher productivity and growth is already in place. What is requisite now is for 
this consensus to be built upon and carried over mto the realm of policy and 
implementation. 
(D) Disinvestment and Divestment 
The public sector enterprises have traditionally been considered in 
European countries and in many developing nations an effective device for 
achieving a diversity of specific objectives like allocative efficiency, full 
employment, sectoral regional or general development, etc., and increasing the 
general consistency of corporate behaviour with policy objectives for example, 
promoting exports, abstaining from activities that replicate private sector 
behaviour, fri the United States and Japan, public enterprises have traditionally 
been assigned a smaller role. The large number of privatisations in various 
countries since the mid-1980s is a tangible sign that, at least from a practical and 
contmgents have lost confidence in public enterprises. 
The word 'privatisation' is taken to mean: (a) transfer of ownership of state 
assets from the public to the private sector; or (b) transfer of provision of services 
from public bodies to private enterprise. 'Privatisation' is synonymous with 
denationalisation. The years of the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s were the 
period of nationalization when Socialist ideology was bemg put into practice 
throughout the world. The means of production, distribution, finance and 
communication were taken over by the state to a varying extent in different 
countries. The 1980s saw a return to a modified version of the laissez-faire 
philosophy and to market economics. The UK pioneered privatisation in 1979 It 
became, and continues to be an international phenomenon in the 1990s.^ *' 
Globally, government initiatives in the area of privatisation of state 
enterprises and assets have increased substantially in recent years. It has been an 
important constituent of their efforts to rationalize their public sector. In most 
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cases, the aim has been to reduce its burden on the national exchequer, improve 
efficiency of individual public enterprises, assure wider ownership or achieve a 
combination of these objectives. The process, modalities and pace of privatisation 
are necessarily a function of government's objectives, the state of economy, 
conditions of the state sector and the country's social and political temperament.^ '^  
Privatisation or disinvestment entails transfer of ownership, direction and 
effective control to the private sector. There can be privatisation of a PSU without 
transferring its ownership to the public in various ways. It may engross 
contractmg, leasing or hiring out the PSU or its services to be managed and 
controlled by the private sector working according to the guidelines laid down by 
the State/PSU. But the most accepted form of privatisation that is much debated 
also is the transfer of ownership by selling out the enterprise. Equity participation 
with effective control and management being transferred to the private sector also 
involves transfer of ownership, though partially. There is another form suitable as 
a long-term measure, i.e. high and higher allocation of mvestible fund to the 
private sector. It is generally agreed that reduction of stake of the government is 
not an end m itself The decisive objective is to facilitate public sector to 
participate m the process of reformmg economy and to face challenges of 
globalisation. Lessening of government stake in PSEs through disinvestments may 
result in part privatisation and dilution of ownership but does not necessarily 
reorder the role of government m respect of corporate governance. Thus, different 
people have used the word 'privatisation' for varying paradigms according to 
interests that they sub-serve In general, it signifies transfer of ownership or 
control from public to private sector in a mode that gives private operators or 
owners, substantive autonomy and independent power to run the enterprises. \i 
does not always mean majority ownership. Methodologies for transfer of 
ownership or control include trade sales to strategic investors, public offer, close 
subscription, jomt ventures, liquidation, concessions, auctions, voucher or 
certificate based transfer, employee or management buy-outs or a variety of 
combmations of two or more of these. 
Privatisation is perceived to represent any one or a combination of the 
foUowmg:-
(i) Transfer of ownership, management, operation or control of public 
enterprises, 
(ii) Restructuring of public enterprises and making them commercially 
more viable, 
(ill) Deregulation facilitating enhanced role of private sector to achieve 
competition in sectors where public sectors operates, 
(iv) Liberalizing and globalismg the economy through increased the 
economy through mcreased reliance on market forces and competition, 
(v) Introduction of sound business practices in public enterprises to 
improve their performance.*' 
Thus, disinvetsment conveys a multiplicity of thoughts such as part/hill 
transfer of ownership of government assets to private sector, autonomy m 
management, liberalizing administrative pricmg and control with no change of 
ownership and dismantling of monopolies. 
The aims of the privatisation programmes are political and economic. The relative 
importance of the reasons for privatisation differs from country to country but 
basically they are: 
(i) Disenchantment with Communism and Socialism as the poor 
performance of command economies became apparent, 
(ii) Failure of nationalised industries in general to meet consumers' needs 
effectively, 
(iii) The wish to reduce the power of the state and its role m the economy 
(iv) Belief that an enterprise-based economy would allow for greater 
flexibility and a better response to consumers' demands, 
(v) Determination to create capital-owning democracies.^' 
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Thus, goverttments privatize to: 
(i) Reduce the size of the pubhc sector of industry 
(li) Increase competition in the market. 
(lii) Improve efficiency among suppliers of goods and services. 
(iv) Extend share ownership in companies by investors with small amounts 
of savings 
(v) Ease the pressure on central governments' budgets/^' 
Privatisation is expected to contribute to a range of government objectives 
These objectives are likely to include: 
1. Improvement in Public Enterprise Efficiency Performance- With 
widespread evidence of poor economic performance of the public enterprise 
sector, privatisation may be seen as a way of improving performance by 
increased economic efficiency, improvement in quality of products and 
services and removmg budgetary constraints to investment finance. 
2. Improvement in Government's Budgetary Position- Faced with 
significant net financial flows to the public enterprises sector, privatisation 
is seen as a way of improving the government's budgetary position. The 
contribution can be in the form of generation of additional revenue from the 
sale of the enterprise, increase in receipts from taxes on enterprise sales 
revenue, and reduction in size of government subsidy payment to public 
enterprise sector. 
3. Encouragement of Private Investment and Development of Local 
Capital Markets. 
4 Increased Competition. 
5. Political Objectives- These objectives could include: reduction in size and 
influence of public sector, wider distribution of asset ownership.'*'' 
The policy of reducmg government equity in public sector undertakings has 
been followed by all governments m the past ten years and has now evolved to the 
point where the government has announced its intention to reduce its equity to a 
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minority in a large number of undertakings, including the possibility of a change 
in management control in many cases. Past experience in India as well as in other 
countries shows that government control makes it difficult if not impossible for 
PSUs to function as commercial organizations able to compete with other private 
sector units and also with imports, as they will have to do. There is little rationale 
for continuing to msist on government control over management m such cases 
Recent experience in India also shows that except where PSUs are in a monopoly 
or semi-monopoly position, their commercial performance has been 
disappointmg. 
One basic rationale for privatisation is the concept that private ownership 
leads to better use of resources and their more efficient allocation. Through out the 
world, the preference for market economy received a boost after it was realized 
that the state could no longer meet the growing demands of the economy and the 
state shareholding inevitably had to come down. The 'staff in business' argument 
thus lost out and so did the presumption that direct and comprehensive control 
over the economic life of citizens from the central government can deliver results 
better than those of a more liberal system and directly responds accordmg to the 
market driven forces. Another reason for adoption of privatisation policy around 
the globe has been the inability of the government to raise high taxes, pursue 
deficit/ inflationary financing and the development of money market and private 
entrepreneurship. Further, technology and W.T.O commitments have made the 
world a globe village and unless industries, including PSEs do not quickly 
restructure, they would not be able to survive. Public enterprises, because of the 
nature of their ownership, can restructure slowly and hence the logic of 
privatisation gets stronger. Besides, techniques are now available to control public 
monopolies like power and telecom, where consumer interests can be better 
protected by regulation/ competition, and investment of public money to ensure 
protection of consumer interest is no longer a convmcing argument. The objectives 
of disinvestment programme vary from improvmg efficiency of the public sector 
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enterprises to transformation of the society for making Indian economy more 
vibrant, healthy and adequately equipped to contest m global arena. 
Public enterprises can be privatised in a number of different ways. These 
different methods of privatisation can be grouped in two categories: 
1. Methods involving the sale of the public enterprises (divestiture )-
there are three methods of divestiture namely public floatation, 
private sale and management buyout 
2. Methods involving transfer of control from public to private sector-
there are three methods of control transfer namely contractmg out, 
management contract and leasing and franchising.*" 
The following Table lists the main advantages and disadvantages associated 
with each method of privatisation. 
Table: Methods of Privatisation 
METHOD ADVANTAGES 
Public Offering of 1.Widens share ownership includmg 
Shares possibility of employee share 
participation. 
2. Short-term revenue gams to 
government. 
3.Encourages development of capital 
market and fmancial institutions 
4. Attractive to foreign investors. 
i 5.Permits flexible arrangements for 
retainmg control over strategic 
1 
decision and sectors through, for 
example, golden shares. 
i 
1 
DISADVANTAGES 
1. Requires well-
developed local stock 
exchange and equity 
market. 
2.Costs of 
professional adviser 
and institutions in 
arrangmg the public 
offering. 
3.Effect on efficiency 
performance 
uncertain. 
4.Likely to involve 
reduction m 
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i employment 
Private Sale of l.Easy to Arrange; does not require 1.Possible under 
Sales developed stock exchange and capital pricing of assets, it 
market. government deals 
Management and 
Employee Buy-Out 
2.Allows government to identify the 
buyer. 
3 N4ay enable the enterprise to under 
take necessary technology 
restructuring. 
1.Continuity of Management of 
enterprise. 
2.Reduced need for public disclosure 
of competitively sensitive enterprise 
information. 
with single buyer. 
2. May increase 
market concentration 
and reduce 
competition. 
3. May involve 
government 
expenditure in 
restructuring and 
rehabilitation of 
enterprise prior to 
sale. 
4. Purchaser may 
request warranties 
from government 
e.g., tax concessions 
or policy controls on 
competition. 
1. Maintains existing 
management 
structures. 
2.Best suited to 
enterprises with 
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3.Reduced risk of ownership passing 
into foreign control. 
4. Provides employees and 
management with direct financial 
interest m the performance of the 
enterprise. 
favourable cash tlow 
position 
3. Requires financial 
institutions willing to 
lend to management 
and employee 
purchasers. 
Contracting Out 1.Government retains ownership of 
assets, and control of level of service 
provided. 
2.Introduces incentive for cost-
efficiency improvements. 
3. Benefit from management and 
technical expertise of private 
enterprise. 
l.Risk of distribution 
to service supply. 
2. Problems in 
monitoring quality of 
service supplied. 
3.Can result in large 
redundancies. 
4. Government main 
remam responsible 
for capital 
expenditure and debt 
payments. 
Management 
Contract 
1. Access to new technology, 
management practices and markets. 
2.Potential for increase in government 
revenue from performance. 
3.Can be used as means of preparing 
enterprise for subsequent divestiture. 
1 Government has 
contmued fmancial 
liabilities or assets 
and debt financing. 
2.May be insufficient 
incentives on 
contractor to improve 
efficiency and 
profitability 
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Leasing 1 Government obtains a guaranteed 
payment, irrespective of enterprise 
profitability. 
2.Government is not responsible for 
enterprise staffing and employment. 
3.Term of agreement is fixed, and can 
be revised periodically. 
performance. 
3. Potential for 
uncertainty about 
respective 
responsibilities of 
government and 
contractor, with 
respect to labour, 
capital expenditure 
plans, and provision 
of working capital 
1 Difficulties in 
setting appropriate 
leasing fee level. 
2. Need to ensure 
adequate provision 
for mamtenance and 
repair of assets. 
Source: Management of the Privatisation Process: A Guide to Policy Maiving and 
Implementation, London. Management and Training Services Division. Commonwcaltli 
Secretariat, September 1994. pp 17-18 
Although privatisation may be pursued for a variety of reasons, the desire 
to improve enterprise performance or efficiency is often the mam objective It is 
important to consider, therefore, whether a change m ownership from public to 
private can be expected to produce an improvement in economic performance 
There is another view, which states that managerial effort to maximize economic 
performance is related to the degree of control that the enterprise owner has over 
management. The degree of control over the managers of the enterprise may be 
linked to the enterprise's organizational structure. 
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An important question which arises here is, if privatisation is an attainable 
option, how should one go about it? Amitabh Kumar in an article titled as 
"Privatisation in India" points out how one should go about privatisation. 
1. Identification-The first step is to identify which enterprise to privatize 
Whether profit making or loss making, which one should be selected"^ If a 
loss making, enterprise is selected, should privatisation follow restructuring 
and/or revival or should it be offered on as-it-is basis'^  A choice has to be 
made between monopolistic enterprises and enterprises operatmg in varying 
degrees of competition. A more difficult choice is between enterprises 
having large social obligations and externalities. Some of the loss-making 
enterprises are intrinsically viable (i.e., economically viable) while some 
profit-eammg ones owe their status to administered prices or to their 
monopoly status. 
2. How much to disinvest? -The levels of disinvestments will perhaps 
depend upon the perceived degree of competition, apprehension of labour, 
concern for security and desire to let go of control. We may remember that 
100 per cent privatisation need not necessarily result m a net benefit to 
society. The Rangarajan Committee, which studied this problem suggested 
zero per cent state ownership as a rule in commercially run enterprises and 
51 per cent where the state wanted to retain effective control. The 
Committee suggested 26 per cent holdmg to ensure limited control. The 
British created" a "special share" which empowered the minority 
shareholder, the state, to veto certain pre-specified action. 
3. At what price? -This is the most rancorous decision of all Seldom have 
governments escaped allegations of favouritism or going wrong on 
fundamentals or even being naive in this regard This problem is 
compounded for a number of reasons. There are certain activities which are 
only performed in the public sector and there can obviously be no 
benchmark or referral. The valuation of assets of public enterprises is beset 
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with problems of its own. Book values often are much less than market 
values. Land is one example, as are replacement costs, which are 
recognized reference points for pricing. 
4. To whom? -The target client could be a small group identified in advance 
It could be the large but amorphous body of investing public. It could well 
be foreign investors attemptmg to enter without setting up a green field 
project (some prefer joint ventures until they learn to deal with the local 
situations). This decision largely depends on the decision to democratize 
public sector ownership and the effort to bring competition in the particular 
industry. 
5. When? -The timing of the offering is as important as any of the decisions 
above. A public offering at a time of slump in the capital market is destined 
to fail in spite of the quality of the share. 
6. Time frame-It is not necessary to have goals for the degree or quantity of 
divesting ownership. ICnowledge of such a policy is likely to spur people to 
take undue advantage and brings lesser returns to the state. Such a policy 
statement can make people perceive it as distress sale with known 
consequences.'*' 
There is another important point to be emphasized here that the majority of 
public sector enterprises are not saleable in their existing 'as is' condition, and a 
range of preparatory measures will need to be undertaken prior to privatisation or 
disinvestments. It is normally the case that public enterprises cannot be privatised 
in their existing legal form. The degree of restructuring required ranges from 
simple amendments to the articles of association, to the dissolution of an 
enterprise and transfer of its assets and liabilities to a new corporate entity. Where 
the enterprise is a statutory body established by an Act of Parliament, it will need 
to be converted into a joint stock corporation or public limited company. An 
intermediate step towards changing the legal form of the public owned activity 
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may involve conversion of a government department or authority mto a state 
48 
corporation. 
Monitoring of the privatisation process is essential in developing countries 
where achieving transparency has sometimes proved diflFicult and where 
implementation has often faltered. Monitoring refers to the continuous appraisal of 
the privatisation programme as it progresses through its various stages and 
thereafter at the post-privatisation stage. While regulation implies mtervention in 
the economic decisions of an enterprise or firm and evaluation focuses on drawing 
conclusions and making judgments on the outcomes or results or impact of the 
privatisation programme, monitoring is concerned with systematically appraising 
key areas of the pnvatisation programme. If objectives have been stated precisely 
then monitoring of them ought to be possible. But as it is the case with the 
statement of objectives of various public enterprises, privatisation objectives are in 
many instances stated m general terms and this hampers efforts to monitor them. 
Complex monitoring techniques and criteria should be avoided if monitoring is not 
become overly cumbersome and unproductive. Monitormg is required to check 
that: 
(a) The set of the privatisation is being achieved. 
(b) Specific strategies and policies agreed to are adopted, such as labour 
retrenchment agreements. 
(c) The privatisation process is proceeding accordmg to plan and proceeds 
from transactions are received. 
(d) Transparency is achieved for implementing privatisation. 
(e) Wider policy reforms are compatible with the objectives of privatisation."*'^  
In its PE policy, the Indian government did not outline the basic principles 
governing disinvestment. However, in a suo-moto statement laid m both the 
Houses of ParUament on 9 December 2002, the government mdicated that the 
disinvestment specifically aimed at the modernization and up gradation of public 
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enterprises. Creation of new assets, generation of employment, retirmg of public 
debt and creation of disinvestment fund. 
The following is the chronology of evolution of the government thinking on 
disinvestment. 
Evolution of Disinvestment Policy in India 
1. PHASE! 
Initial stages 
The policy of the government on disinvestment has evolved over a period 
and according to the Mmistry of Dismvestment Report it can be briefly stated in 
the form of followmg policy statements arranged in a chronological order; 
A. Interim Budget-1991-92 
The policy was to divest up to 20% of the government equity in selected PSEs in 
favour of public sector institutional mvestors. The objective of the policy was to 
broad-base equity, improve management, enhance availability of resources for 
these PSEs and yield resources for the exchequer. 
B. Industrial Policy Statement of 24'" July 1991 
The Industrial Policy Statement of 24"' July 1991 stated that the government 
would divest part of government holdings in selected PSEs but did not place any 
cap on the extent of disinvestment. Nor did it restrict dismvestment in favour of 
any particular class of investors. The objective for disinvestments was to provide 
further market disciplme to the performance of public enterprises. 
C. Budget Speech: 1991-92 
In this pronouncement, the cap of 20% for disinvestment was remstalled 
and the eligible mvestors universe was again modified to consist of mutual funds 
and investment institutions m the public sector, and the workers m these firms 
The objectives too were modified, the modified objectives bemg: "to raise 
resources, encourage wider public participation and promote greater 
accountability." 
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D. Report of the Committee on the Disinvestment of Shares in PSEs 
(Rangarajan Committee): April 1993 
The Rangarajan Committee recommendations emphasized the need for 
substantial disinvestments It stated that the percentage of equity to be divested 
could be up to 49% for mdustries explicitly reserved for the public sector. It 
recommended that m exceptional cases, such as the enterprises, which had a 
dominant market share or where separate identity had to be maintained for 
strategic reasons, the target public ownership level could be kept at 26%, that is 
disinvestments could take place to the extent of 74% m all other cases, it 
recommended 100% dvestment of government stake. Holdmg 51% or more 
equity by the government was recommended only for six schedule industries, 
namely: Coal and Lignite, Mineral oils. Arms ammunition & defence equipments. 
Atomic Energy, Radioactive Minerals, and Railway transport. 
E. Common Minimum Programme, 1996: 
The highlights of the policy were as follows: 
• To carefiilly examine the public sector non-core strategic areas. 
• To set up a Disinvestment Commission for advismg on the disinvestment 
related matters. 
• To take and implement decisions to disinvest in a transparent manner. 
• Job security, opportunities for retaining and redeployment to be assured. 
No disinvestment objective was however, mentioned in the policy statement. 
F. Disinvestment Commission Recommendations: February 1997-October 
1999 
(i) 72 PSEs were referred to the Disinvestment Commission durmg 1996-
99. out of these, 8 were withdrawn from the Commission and 6 were 
under reference to BIFR. The Disinvestment Commission gave its 
recommendations on 58 PSEs. 
(ii) The Dismvestment Commission recommendations gave priority to 
strategic/ trade sales, with transfer of management, instead of public 
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offerings as was recommended by the Rangarajan Committee in 1993 
also. The foUowmg table gives the details: 
Mode of dismvestment recommended Number of Companies! 
A. Involving change in ownership/management 
1. Strategic sale 31 
2. Trade sale 8 
3. Employee buy out/Strategic sale 2 
B. Involving no change in ownership/management offer of shares 5 
C. No change (disinvestment deferred) 8 
D. Closure/Sale of assets 4 
Grand Total: 58 
2. PHASE-II 
A. Budget Speech 1998-99 
In budget speech of 1998-99 following policy regarding dismvestment of 
PSUs had been announced: 
• To bring down government shareholdmg m the PSUs to 26% m the 
generality of cases, (this facilitating ownership changes, as was 
recommended by the Disinvestment Commission) 
• To retain majority holding in PSEs involving strategic considerations 
• To protect the interest of workers in all cases. 
B. Budget Speech 1999-2000 
The policy objective announced in budget speech of 1999-2000 were as 
follows: 
• To strengthen strategic PSUs 
• To privatize non-strategic PSUs through gradual dismvestment or strategic 
sale. 
• To devise viable rehabilitation strategies for weak units. 
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Approval of clear guidelines for strategic/non-strategic classification by the 
Cabinet on the 16"' March 1999. 
Strategic and Non-Strategic Classification: -
Cabinet classified the PSUs into strategic and non-strategic areas 
• Strategic PSUs include (i) Defence related; (ii) Atomic Energy related with 
some exceptions; and (in) Railway transport. 
• Non-strategic PSUs include all others non-strategic public sector 
enterprises, reduction of government stake to 26% to be worked out on a 
case to case basis, on the following considerations: 
(a) Whether the industrial sector requires the presence of the public sector as a 
countervailing force to prevent concentration of power in private hands, 
and 
(b) Whether industrial sector requires a proper regulatory mechanism to protect 
the consumer interests before public sector enterprises are privatized. 
C. Budget Speech 2000-2001 
The main elements of the policy laid down m budget speech of 2000-2001 
were as follows: 
• To restructure and revive potentially viable PSUs. 
• To close down PSUs which cannot be revived. 
• To bring down government equity in all non-strategic PSUs to 26% or 
lower, if necessary. 
• To fiiUy protect the mterest of workers. 
• To put in place mechanism to raise resources from the market against the 
security of PSUs assets for providing an adequate safety net to workers and 
employees. 
• To establish a systematic policy approach to disinvestment and 
privatisation and to give a fresh impetus to this programme, by setting up a 
new Department of Disinvestment. 
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• To emphasize increasingly on strategic sales of identified PSUs. 
• To use the entire receipt from disinvestment and privatisation for meeting 
expenditure m social sectors, restructuring of PSUs and retiring public debt 
D. Budget Speech 2001-2002 
The main objectives of the budget speech 2001-2002 were to use the 
proceeds for providing restructuring assistance to PSUs, safety net to workers, 
reduction of debt burden, and additional budgetary support for the plan, primarily 
m the social and infrastructure sectors (contmgent upon realization of the 
anticipated receipt). 
E. Excerpts from Budget Speech 2002-2003 
"With the streamlined procedure for disinvestment and privatisation, 1 am 
happy to report that the government has now completed strategic sales m 7 public 
sector companies and some hotel properties of the Hotel Corporation of India 
(HCI) and the Indian Tourism Development Corporation (ITDC). The change in 
approach from the disinvestments of small lots of shares to strategic sales of 
blockage of shares to strategic mvestors has improved the price earning ratios 
obtained..." 
F. Budget Speech 2003-2004 
"Details about the already announced Disinvestment Fund and Asset 
Management Company, to hold residual shares post disinvestment, shall be 
finalized early m 2003-2004".^' hi January 2003, the government decided to offer 
for sale 35.2% of its equity in BPCL. In June 2003, it decided to go for offers for 
sale in the domestic market of its residual equity m five disinvested PSUs (VSNL, 
BALCO, IBP Ltd., IPCL and CMC). In July 2003, it decided to offer 20 % of its 
equity in Dredging Corporation of India in the domestic market. In December 
2003, the government also decided to offer for sale upto 10% of its equity m 
ONGC and GAIL m the domestic market." 
At one stage the government expressed the will to consult the managements 
of PEs whose shares had been dismvested. In his speech presentmg the budget for 
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1996-97 the then Finance Minister had stated that "Government has approved the 
proposal to establish a Disinvestment Commission. Any decision to disinvest will 
be taken and implemented m a transparent manner. Revenue generated from such 
disinvestment will be utilized for allocations for creatmg a fund to strengthen 
public sector enterprises."^"^ The Dismvestment Commission was set up by 
Government Resolution dated 23 August 1996 m pursuance of the Common 
Minimum Programme (CMP) of the United Front Government. The pursual of the 
terms of reference would indicate that Government intended to give advisory as 
well as supervisory and monitormg role to the Commission. For mstance, para 4 of 
the Commission of reference states as follows; "The Disinvestment Commission 
will be an advisory body and the Government will take a final decision on the 
companies to be dismvested and made of disinvestment on the basis of advice 
given by the Disinvestment Commission. The PSUs would implement the decision 
of the Government Under the overall supervision of the Dismvestment 
Commission." This had been further confirmed by item IX of para 3 of the terms 
of reference, which states: "To monitor the progress of disinvestment process and 
take necessary measures and report periodically to the Government on such 
progress. 
Dismvestment Commission constituted in 1996 and then reconstituted in 
July 2001 has submitted 22 reports m all. The first commission had made 
recommendations on 58 CPSUs in 12 reports and the second commission had 
given 10 reports till November 2003, numbered as XIll to XXll contammg 
recommendations m case of 33 CPSUs. The recommendations by the commission 
mdicate a shift in policy from public offerings to strategic/trade sales, along with 
transfer of management. " In its first Report submitted m February 1997, the 
Commission gave its views on the long-term strategy that should be followed on 
disinvestment. In line with CMP classification the commission laid down the 
Criteria for classifying PSUs mto strategic, core and non-core units for the purpose 
of deciding on the extent of dismvestment of government shares in these units.'''' 
157 
Dismvestment policy and its implementation during the nineties show how 
m Its quintessential form it is arguably the most telling example of market 
fundamentalism. The Disinvestment Commission of the Government of India 
says, "Disinvestment has been viewed as a tool for bringing dowm the budgetary 
deficits of the Government."" Disinvestment of equity in Central or State PSUs 
should be viewed as a mechanism for facilitating the Government to withdraw 
from merely commercial activities, predominantly in non-core or consumer goods 
sector, and create an atmosphere of fair competition which would benefit both the 
producers and the consumers; and not as a revenue raising device for reducing 
budgetary deficit. 
One of the concerns often expressed with respect to strategic sale is that 
with the transfer of management to private hands, employee interest may suffer. 
Adequate provisions are made in the shareholder agreements, executed as part of 
strategic sale, to ensure that there is no retrenchment of employees at least till a 
period of one year after disinvestment and even thereafter separation is possible 
only under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme as applicable under Department of 
Public Enterprises (DPE) guidelines or the Voluntary Separation Scheme, which 
was prevailing in the company prior to disinvestment, which ever is more 
beneficial for the employees. 
However, uncertamties remain m the public mmd about the extent to which 
the government should go for disinvestments or privatisation. Many people 
believe that while sale and transfer of management is acceptable for weak PSUs, 
we should not give up majority control m the so-called '"navaratnas". Others 
believe that the revenues from dismvestments should be used to fortify other 
public sector units. As far as the issue of majonty ownership is concerned, the fact 
is that we cannot achieve the desired fiscal correction if we do not off-load a 
majority stake in the equity of many of the navaratnas. The public must therefore 
be swayed that such dismvestments or privatisation is desirable and will help to 
pay for the creation of socially more useful assets such as schools and hospitals 
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and other forms of rural infrastructure. Nor should we assume that the revenues 
from dismvestments would necessarily be ploughed back into other PSUs. We 
have to consider what is the unsurpassed use for these resources and if hospitals 
and schools and roads are more important, that is surely what we should build. 
Instead of debatmg the question whether there should be wholesale 
pnvatisation, we could agree on certain specific steps to increase the efficiency 
and reduce the financial burden on the governments. Raja J. Chellia m an article 
"Economic Reforms: Strategy for the Next Decade" suggested some important 
points with regard to improving the efficiency of public sector undertakmgs in 
new liberalized era. These are as follows: 
1. Sell or close down loss-making public enterprises producing all non-
strategic private goods m a phased manner. One-tenth of the total number 
of such public enterprises should be closed down each year. In this way, we 
can avoid causing hardship to a very large number of employees within a 
short period. It would be easier to take care of a limited number of 
people/labourers affected in any one year. The labourers who would loss 
their jobs should be given generous compensation and also prionty for 
appointment to fill vacancies that rise in the government of other public 
enterprises (other thmgs being equal). 
2. Private shareholdmg should be brought into profit-making public 
enterprises in all areas except railways, atomic energy and most defence 
related industries. Among them can distinguish three categories: (i) those 
which are to be sold off to the private sector; (ii) those in which the 
government need only have 49 percent of equity, so that the enterprises can 
become truly autonomous; and (in) those m which for policy purposes or 
because of the importance of the mdustry concerned, the government would 
like to have majority shareholdmg. 
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(i) Enterprises to be sold off: public enterprises engaged in 
producing consumer goods and services or some minor producer 
goods, 
(ii) In many public enterprises, which are not producing basic or 
strategic goods (but only goods such as chemicals, 
petrochemicals, drugs) or are running hotels or engaged in 
transport services, the government should hold only 49 percent of 
equity. 
(ill) In public enterprises m the areas of basic goods, aeronautics, 
bankmg, development finance, petroleum exploration and 
refinery, etc, if they are profit making and reasonably efficient, 
the government should retain 51 to 74 percent equity. Where 
important policy decisions are involved it may be necessary for 
the government to hold 74 percent equity. This is also necessary 
if a foreign private parmer is involved. In bankmg, government 
equity could be brought to 51 percent.'*^ 
Thus, except for railways, atomic energy and strategic defence related areas 
(e.g.. Missile development); public enterprises should not be monopolies. Public 
enterprises m both categories (ii) and (iii) should be subjected to competition 
Such competition has been allowed now m many sectors. There must be good 
exposure to pnvate sector competition in all areas. All this mvolves about brmgmg 
private sector equity into public enterprises and reducmg the government's stake 
It involves disinvestments as well as issue of new equity. As of now, funds from 
disinvestments are used to cover government sector deficit. In view of Mr Raja 
J.Chelliah, this is a totally wrong pohcy.^'' 
According to the report of the Dismvestment Mmistry main benefits 
expected to be derived from dismvestment are as follows: 
(i) Dismvestment would expose the privatized companies to market 
disciplme, thereby forcing them to become more efficient and survive or 
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case on their own financial and economic strength. They would be able 
to respond to the market forces much faster and cater to their business 
needs in a more professional manner. It would also facilitate in freeing 
the PSEs from the government control and introduction of corporate 
governance in the privatized companies, 
(ii) Disinvestment would result in wider distribution of wealth through 
offermg of shares of privatized companies to small mvestors and 
employees 
(ill) Disinvestment would have a beneficial effect on the capital market, the 
increase in floatmg stock would give the market more depth and 
liquidity, give investors easier exit options, help in estabhshmg more 
accurate bench marks for valuation and pricing, and facilitate raising of 
funds by the privatized companies for their projects of expansion, in 
future, 
(iv) Opening up the erstwhile public sectors to appropriate investors would 
increase economic activity and have an over all beneficial effect on the 
economy, employment and tax revenues in the medium to long term, 
(v) In many areas, e.g., the telecom sector and petroleum sectors the end of 
public sector monopoly would bring relief to consumers by way of mere 
choices, and cheaper and better quality of products and services- as has 
already started happening. 
Thus, privatisation is being pursued as a means to an end, rather than as an 
end in itself, then the policy makers need to undertake a careful evaluation of the 
various options available and of the practical constraints that arise in particular 
circumstances. No single privatisation process will be appropriate for all 
circumstances and conditions, and the effective policymaker's skill will be in 
selectmg the balance of methods which ensure the maximum contribution to the 
government's various privatisation objectives. 
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Prior to privatisation most public utilities were regulated directly by central 
government. In the main regulation consisted of quantitative controls and elements 
of price control. These were often imposed by individual ministries or government 
departments on enterprises and activities under their jurisdiction. Inevitably, under 
this approach it was difficult to avoid overlapping responsibilities of different 
agencies, guidelines that were unclear and in some mstances contradictory, and 
enforcement that was imperfect. Therefore, mtroducing measures that increase 
competition may not be enougli to ensure that monopoly abuses are nullified. 
Regulation will therefore be required in the following circumstances: 
1. Where the public enterprise is a so-called natural monopoly with extensive 
market power and in which privatisation alone is unlikely to lead to an 
increase in competition and hence efficiency performance. 
2. Privatisation of a natural monopoly accompanied by deregulation (the 
removal of previously government-imposed restrictions that prevent entry 
by private sector rivals) may not lead to effective competition. The 
removal of the statutory entry bairiers may simply result in the enterprise 
erecting its own entry constraints. 
3. Privatisation of a monopoly without some form of regulation may permit 
the enterprise to engage in anti-competitive and predatory activities that are 
designed to eliminate potential competing enterprise. ^' 
Regulation will be guided by the objectives of privatisation which is to 
unshackle enterprises from the often punitive and excessively bureaucratic 
controls of the government. This will enable enterprises to pursue commercial 
objectives and improve efficiency and to reduce the emphasis on wider social 
objectives. The objectives of regulation will then be to: 
1. Permit enterprises to pursue commercial objectives but to maintain some 
kind of competitive environment which will improve the scope for 
efficiency gains. 
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2. To protect consumers without stifling incentives to privatized enterprises 
In particular, to prevent enterprises charging excessively high prices for 
their outputs and using lower standards to cut the costs.""^  
In most cases regulation in the privatisation programme can be viewed as 
an evolving process. Invariably some forms of regulatory measures will have been 
in place to monitor and control publicly-owned enterprises. With privatisation new 
forms of regulation will need to be developed. The development of the regulatory 
system will be related to the way m which privatisation itself proceeds, whether 
companies are transferred with shareholders who can exercise forms of corporate 
control and management, or whether private placement are made by government. 
There will be need to ensure that regulation does not undermine what privatisation 
is supposed to accomplish. 
The success of a privatisation or enterprise reform programme will depend 
heavily on the government's commitment to programme, and on its ability to 
sustain this dedication during the execution period. Therefore, it is significant that 
the government ought to commence by preparing a policy statement of its 
intentions. It must allow sufficient time for a process of public discussion to take 
place, and be supposed to consult widely with affected parties and interest groups. 
(E) Industrial Policy Resolutions 
The development of mdustry, trade and finance in the country has been 
guided by different mdustrial policy resolutions since independence. The 
Industnal Policy Resolution of 1948, even before the inception of the First Five 
Year Plan, started an era of government's active participation in the 
industrialisation of the country. The Industnal Policy Resolution 1951 provided 
the legislative mstruments to implement the industrial policy. The Industrial 
Policy Resolution of 1956 was an enlarged and improved version of the earlier 
policy. On the whole, the government mtervention in economic activities was 
highly praised. This tendency continued till the seventies but after the 
dismtegration of erstwhile USSR, the condition was changed. Excessive 
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importance and interference of the government had started to be questioned 
People began to disbelieve the efficiency of the government in managing and 
controllmg the economy. 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY RESOLUTION 1948: In 1948, the Government of 
India "gave a careftal thought to economic problems facing the country and 
adopted an industrial policy resolution" which declared that the problem of state 
participation in industry together with private enterprise will continue and with a 
view to bring change in the industrial structure it classified the industries into 
"planned" and "unplanned" sector. In the planned sector some mdustries were 
considered as the exclusive privilege of the state government and a few others, 
which already existed, were allowed under the private ownership to continue till 
the time they were properly directed and regulated. It was, however, felt that for 
some time to come m this category of industry the state could contribute more 
quickly and new undertaking will be established only by the state. The rest of the 
"unplanned" mdustrial field remained normally open to private enterprise, 
individuals as well as cooperatives but the state Government reiterated to 
participate in the field. The Industrial Policy Resolution, 1948 stated: "There can 
be no doubt that the State must play a progressively active role in the development 
of industries, but the ability to achieve the mam objectives should determme the 
immediate extent of State responsibility and the limits to private enterprise." 
In the 1948 Industrial Policy Resolution, the manufacture of arms and 
ammunition, production and control of atomic energy, ownership and management 
of railways became the state monopoly. Six basic industries viz, iron and steel, 
coal, aircraft manufacture, ship building, mineral oils, manufacture of telephone, 
telegraph and wireless apparatus were to be developed by the state. All other areas 
were left open to pnvate initiatives.^^ 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY RESOLUTION 1956: Within a decade of laying down 
the policy parameters m 1948, another policy statement was issued m April 1956 
by the government to give a new orientation to the mixed economy concept. The 
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Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956, states that "the adoption of the socialistic 
pattern of society as the national objective, as well as the need for planned and 
rapid development, require that all industries to basic and strategic importance, or 
in the nature of public utility services should be in the public sector. Other 
industries, which are essential and require investment on a scale, which only the 
state, in the present circumstances, could provide, have also to be in public sector 
The state has, therefore, to assume direct responsibility for fiature development of 
mdustries over wider areas." The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 categorized 
industries into three categories: Firstly, those which were to be exclusive 
responsibility of the state. It mcluded 17 industries such as, arms and ammunition, 
atomic energy, iron and steel, heavy casting, heavy engineermg, coal, iron ore, oil, 
air and rail transport, shipping, telephone, telegraph and radio equipment, etc The 
second category included those industries, which were to be progressively state 
owned, and in which the state would generally set up new enterprise, but the 
government will get support from the private enterprise. This category included 12 
industries of which the following industries are worth mentionmg: machme tools, 
chemical industry, antibiotics, fertilizers, synthetic rubber, chemical pulp, road 
transport and sea transport. Third category comprised all the rest industries whose 
future development would be generally under private sector. The policy also 
remarked that the "last category must fit into the framework of social and 
economic policy of the state and will be subject to the control and regulation in 
terms of industries and other relevant legislation.'''' The hidustrial Policy 
Resolution of 1956 envisaged speedy industrialization with particular prominence 
on the development of heavy and machine-building industries and a leading role to 
the public sector. 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY RESOLUTION 1977: In the 1977 Policy Statement it 
was noted that though some elements of the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 
still remained valid, certain structural distortions had crept in the system. The new 
.^^^ 
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policies were hence directed towards removing these distortions. The areas 
dehneated for the large-scale industry were as follows: 
(a) Basic industries that are essential for providing infrastructure and for the 
development for small and village industries, such as steel, non-ferous 
metals, cement, oil refineries; 
(b) Capital goods industries, 
(c) High technology industries that require large scale production and that are 
related to agricultural and small scale industrial development such as 
fertilizers, pesticides and petro-chemicals; and 
(d) Other industries that are outside the list of reserved items for the small-
scale sector, such as machine tools, and organic and morganic chemicals.' 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY RESOLUTION 1980: The Industrial Policy Statement 
of July 1980, which is based as the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956, spells out 
the following socio-economic objectives: 
(i) Optimum utilization of installed capacity; 
(li) Maximum production and achieving higher productivity; 
(iii) Higher employment generation; 
(iv) Correction of regional imbalances, 
(v) Strengthening of the agricultural base through agro-based industries and 
promotion of optimum inter-sectoral relationship; 
(vi) Promotion of export-oriented industries; 
(vii) Promotion of economic federalism through equitable spread of investment 
and dispersal of returns; and 
(viii) Consumer protection against high prices and bad quality.' 
The Industrial Policy Statement of 1980 while emphasizing government's 
commitment to "rapid and balanced industrialization of the country" and laying 
down "the socio-economic objectives of the new policy", says that "for the 
attainment of these objectives, a rehabilitation of faith in public sector was 
considered essential".^^ 
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INDUSTRIAL POLICY RESOLUTION 1991: The industrial policy resolution 
announced in 1991 outlined the following major planks of public enterprise 
reforms: 
(i) Portfolio of public sector investments will be reviewed with a view to 
focus the public sector on strategic, high-tech and essential 
infrastructure. Whereas some reservation for the public sector is being 
retained, there would be no bar for area of exclusivity to be opened up 
to the private sector selectively. Similarly, the public sector will also be 
allowed entry in areas not reserved for it. 
(ii) PEs which were chronically sick and which are unlikely to be turned 
around will, for the formulation of revival/ rehabilitation schemes, be 
referred to the Board for industrial & Financial Reconstruction (BIFR), 
or other similar high-level institutions created for the purpose. A social 
security mechanism will be created to protect the interests of workers 
likely to be affected by such rehabilitation packages. 
(iii) In order to raise resources and encourage wider public participation, a 
part of the government's shareholding in the public sector would be 
offered to mutual funds, financial institutions, general public and 
workers. 
(iv) Boards of public sector companies would be made more professional 
and given greater powers. 
(v) There will be greater thrust on performance improvement through the 
Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) system through which 
managements would be granted greater autonomy and will be held 
accountable. Technical expertise on the part of the government would 
be upgraded to make the MOU negotiations and implementation more 
effective. 
(vi) To facilitate a fuller discussion on performance, the MOU signed 
between government and the PEs would be placed in parliament. While 
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focusing on major management issues, this would also help place 
matters on day-to-day operation of PEs in their correct perspective7" 
The industrial policy of July 1991 significantly departed from the earlier 
thinking on the role of CPSUs. The government decided to focus the public sector 
on strategic, high-tech and essential mfrastructure. The areas reserved for the 
public sector were first reduced to eight, and subsequently to six: defence related, 
atomic energy, coal and lignite, mineral oils, minerals related to atomic energy 
generation and rail transport. The CPSUs were permitted to make forays into non-
reserved areas and no ban was imposed on private sector entry into the reserved 
areas. 
Under Industrial Policy Resolution of 1991 it was also stated that the 
government would strengthen those public sector undertakings that fall in the 
reserved areas of operation or are in high priority areas or are generating good or 
reasonable profits. Such enterprises would be provided a much greater degree of 
management autonomy through the system of memoranda of understanding. 
Competition would also be induced in these areas by inviting private sector 
participation. In the case of selected enterprises, part of government holdings in 
the equity share capital of these enterprises would be disinvested m order to 
provide further market discipline to the performance of public enterprises. There 
are large number of chronically sick public enterprises mcurring heavy losses, 
operatmg in a competitive market and serve little or no public purpose. These need 
to be attended to. The country must be proud of the public sector that it owns and 
it must operate m the public interest. 
The policy objective announced in budget speech of 1999-2000 to improve 
the performance of PSUs were as follows; 
• To strengthen strategic PSUs 
• To privatize non-strategic PSUs through gradual dismvestment or strategic 
sale. 
• To devise viable rehabilitation strategies for weak units. 
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Approval of clear guidelines for strategic/non-strategic classification by the 
Cabinet on the 16'^  March 1999/' 
Strategic and Non-Strategic Classification; -
Cabinet classified the PSUs into strategic and non-strategic areas 
1. Strategic PSUs include (i) Defence related, (ii) Atomic Energy related with 
some exceptions; and (iii) Railway transport. 
2. Non-strategic PSUs include all others non-strategic public sector 
enterprises, reduction of government stake to 26% to be worked out on a 
case to case basis, on the following considerations: 
(c) Whether the industrial sector requires the presence of the public sector as a 
countervailing force to prevent concentration of power in private hands, 
and 
(d) Whether industrial sector requires a proper regulatory mechanism to protect 
the consumer interests before public sector enterprises are privatized. ^' 
The industrial policy statement of 1999 also provides guidelines for the 
foreign collaboration approval m Indian companies/joint ventures. 
Under Industnal Policy Statement of 2000, all proposals for investment m 
public sector units as also for EOU/EPZ/EHTP/STP units would qualify for 
automatic route subject to the above parameters. The modalities and procedures 
for automatic route would remain the same and RBI would continue to be the 
concerned agency for monitoring/reporting as per existing procedure. ^^  
The main elements of the policy laid down in budget speech of 2000-2001 
were as follows: 
1. To restructure and revive potentially viable PSUs. 
2. To close down PSUs which cannot be revived. 
3. To bring dovm government equity m all non-strategic PSUs to 26% or 
lower, if necessary. 
4. To fiilly protect the interest of workers. 
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5. To put in place mechanism to raise resources from the market against the 
security of PSUs assets for providing an adequate safety net to workers and 
employees. 
6. To establish a systematic policy approach to disinvestment and 
privatisation and to give a fresh impetus to this programme, by setting up a 
new Department of Disinvestment. 
7. To emphasize increasingly on strategic sales of identified PSUs. 
8. To use the entire receipt from disinvestment and privatisation for meeting 
expenditure m social sectors, restructuring of PSUs and retiring public 
debt.'" 
The main objectives of the budget speech 2001-2002 were to use the 
proceeds for providing restructuring assistance to PSUs, safety net to workers, 
reduction of debt burden, and additional budgetary support for the plan, primarily 
m the social and infrastructure sectors (contingent upon realization of the 
anticipated receipt). 
Thus, through the aforementioned Industrial Policy Resolutions we came to 
know the attitude of the government towards the public sector undertakings m a 
changing world scenario in the context of liberalisation, privatisation and 
globalisation to improve their performance and make them competent to compete 
against the MNCs and to bring about a sound growth in Indian economy. 
(F) Multinationals and Administration 
Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) are a product of industrial revolution 
which solely was responsible for the birth and development of technology. The 
fifteenth century witnessed the transformation of guild-based industry mto 
machme-based commodity production-oriented manufacturing mdustry.^'' The 
ongm of private international business enterprise, in an organized form, dates back 
to the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries when European business 
companies started movmg out to various parts of the globe. For example, the 
British East India Company (1599-1858), an organization of London merchants. 
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was created with a view to ti-ading with the East Indies and was granted monopoly 
rights of this trade by a Charter from the Queen in the year 1600 The Hudson's 
Bay Co. and the Royal African Co. were also created in the same way for the 
British merchants with the objective of trading with America and Africa, 
respectively. These were the predecessors of the modem Multinational 
Corporations. 
For the purpose of a UN Survey, the term 'MNC is used in a broad sense 
to cover all enterprises, which control assets, factories, mines, sales offices, and 
the like-in two or more countries. The fact remains that MNCs are large 
companies with enormous resources (financial, technical & managerial), which 
have diversified their activities across the national boundaries but are centrally 
controlled. Smce no private or public sector enterprises can invest in different 
countries at once, companies become MNCs either through merger of a number of 
companies or through establishing subsidiaries m other countries. They ovvoi 
intangible assets such as established brand names, proprietary technology, a 
reservoir of skills, and an 'organization capable of mastering complex tasks' 
which gives them an edge over their rivals. 
The roads of foreign capital in India can be traced back to 1500 A.D. when 
the Portuguese established a factory at Calicut. It was followed by East India 
Company in 1600, Dutch East India Company in 1602, and French companies in 
1614. all of them came in as merchants. While during the period of merchant 
capital (1500-1800) these companies competed with each other. East India 
Company was successilil in colonizing India. 
After India's liberation, and at the time of her launching upon the 
programme of planned economic development, foreign help was sought and 
received. Soon after the passage of the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948 by the 
Indian Parliament, MNCs were permitted to come to India. Certain rules and 
regulation were framed to treat both the indigenous and the foreign busmess at par. 
MNCs were allowed to operate within defined premises. However, through their 
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various methods of operations, they posed a formidable challenge to India's basic 
problems.*° After independence m 1947, the country suddenly faced the problem 
of economic backwardness. The lack of an industrial base and poor agricultural 
conditions made it difficult to meet the needs of the population. The country also 
lacked the capital and technology needed to meet the demand of rapid 
industrialization. By an Industrial Policy Resolution in 1948 the government of 
India acknowledged the need for foreign capital for industrialisation. 
The Government of India agree with the view of the Industries Conference 
that, while it should be recognised that participation of foreign capital and 
enterprise, particularly as regards industrial techniques and knowledge, will be of 
value to the rapid industrialisation of the country, it is necessary that the 
conditions under which they may participate in Indian industry should be carefully 
regulated m the national interest. Suitable legislation will be mtroduced for this 
purpose. Such legislation will provide for the scrutiny and approval by the Central 
Government of every individual case of participation of foreign capital and 
management m industry. It will provide, that as a rule, the major mterest in 
ownership, and effective control, should always be in Indian hands, but power will 
be taken to deal with exceptional cases m a manner calculated to serve national 
mterests. In all cases, however, the training of suitable Indian personnel for 
purposes of eventually replacing foreign exports will be msisted upon.*' 
Amplifying the policy in Parliament, Nehru observed: 
The policy as regards participation of foreign capital has already been 
announced in broad terms in government's Resolution of the 6* April 1948. The 
stress on the need to regulate m the national interest, the scope and manner of 
foreign capital arose from past association of foreign capital and control with 
foreign domination of the economy of the country. But circumstances today are 
quite different. The object of our regulation should therefore be the utilization of 
foreign capital m a manner most advantageous to the country. Indian capital needs 
to be supplemented by foreign capital not only because our national savings will 
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not be enough for the rapid development of the country on the scale we wish, but 
also because in many cases scientific, technical and industrial knowledge and 
capital equipment can best be secured along with foreign capital.**' 
The broad premises outlmed by the Prime Minister for participation of 
foreign capital in Indian economy were: 
1. All companies, Indian or foreign, had to conform to the general 
requirements of the government's industrial policy. 
2. Foreign companies will be treated on a par with Indian companies. 
3. Foreign companies will be free for remittance of profits and repatriation of 
capital subject to foreign exchange considerations. 
4. In case foreign companies are compulsorily acquired or nationalized 
compensation would be paid on a fair and equitable basis; and 
5. As a rule the major mterest ownership and effective control of a company 
should be m Indian hands. 
However, as a rule major ownership and effective control of enterprises 
was to remain in Indian hands, there were no hard and fast rules in the matter. The 
'government will not object to foreign capital having control of a concern for a 
limited period, if it is found to be in the national interest and each mdividual case 
will be dealt with on its merits'. 
In the light of the recommendations and government's acceptance, with 
certain reservations, of the Mudaliar Committee, a Foreign Investment Board was 
established in December 1968. The Board deals with all foreign collaborations 
cases except those in which the total investment exceeds Rs.2 crores of equity 
capital and where foreign investment exceeds 40 per cent of the issued equity 
capital. On 25 January 1969, the government issued an illustrative list of 
mdustries where: 
(a) Foreign mvestment might be permitted; 
(b) Only foreign technical collaboration (but not foreign investment) might be 
permitted. 
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(c) No foreign collaboration (financial or technical) was considered 
necessary. 
The government further liberalized its policy through a modified Industrial 
Licensing Policy (1970). The idea was to bridge the technological gaps in the 
Engineenng and Chemical industries. Majority foreign participation in new 
enterprises was to be considered if the development of a particular industry was 
vital and essential in the national interest and in other cases where huge amount of 
foreign exchange was involved.^ ^ The policy of Congress Government towards the 
MNCs was to permit them as foreign collaborators in areas where the import of 
foreign technology was imperative. If the requisite technology was indigenously 
available, no collaboration with MNCs was permitted except in those cases where 
such collaboration was aimed at export promotion.**** Although all proposals to 
collaborate with MNCs required the aforementioned approval of the government, 
each offer was decided on merit. 
The new Industrial Policy enunciated by the Janta Government (headed by 
Moraraji Desai) m December 1977 for permittmg MNCs to operate m Indian 
economy was not substantially different from their predecessors. The new policy 
categorically recognized the need of foreign capital and foreign technology in 
India's industrial development. George Femandes, the Mmister of hidustry, statmg 
Industrial Policy in the Lok Sabha described the following features. 
(a) Mutinational companies can participate in India's economic development 
on the condition of direct, non-residential, mvestment of only forty per 
cent. All foreign companies operating m India must reduce their foreign 
equity holdings to 40 per cent m accordance with the Foreign Exchange 
Regulation Act 1973. 
(b) All foreign companies (m compliance with the above conditions) will be 
treated at par with Indian companies. 
(c) The principles applicable to Indian companies will also be applied on them 
m proposals regarding their future expansion. 
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(d) For all approved foreign investment, "there will be complete freedom for 
remittance of profits, royalties, dividends as well as repatriation of capital, 
subject, of course to rules and regulation common to all". 
(e) "As a rule, majority' interest ownership and effective control should be in 
Indian hands though government may make exceptions in highly export 
oriented and/or sophisticated technology areas. However, an exception can 
be made in case of totally export-oriented industry. In such cases fully 
foreign owned company may be permitted. Whenever such a relaxation 
from industrial policy is allowed compulsory export obligation for a 
sufficiently long periods would contmue." 
(f) Import of technology will be allowed only in sophisticated and high 
priority areas where Indian skills and technology are not adequately 
developed. In fields where indigenous technology has fully developed no 
collaboration, technical or financial, will be permitted. 
The Government of India, under the policy of liberalisation in 1991, 
declared that existing companies m India with foreign shareholding were allowed 
to increase their stake to 51 per cent as long as the enhanced equity was for 
manufacturer in high priority industries. This may be regarded as the starting point 
for global private companies to take over the commandmg heights in Indian 
mdustry. Due to the amendment in Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, these 
companies were fi-ee to opt for 51 per cent and more holdmg to take over full 
control of joint ventures in India.^ " By May 1994, the Government of India 
allowed the foreign companies to acquire or hold immovable property in India for 
carrymg on their activities subject to the permission from Reserve Bank of India." 
It is argued that foreign investment mflows are essential for globalisation of the 
economy and we must learn to deal with it on equal terms rather than fear it.'^ ' 
Smce the process of liberalisation/globalisation has already started taking place, it 
becomes mterestmg to probe its implications for Indian industry. 
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One of the important features of the take-over bid by global private 
companies has been the removal of Indian touch m the brand name of the products 
and joint ventures, to begin with m the foreign markets are better in the domestic 
market.^ ^ There are few examples of mergers or takeovers; Brook Bond and 
Lipton, Hindustan Lever and Tata Oil Mills (TOMCO), Gillete, the Malhotra 
Brothers and Indian Shaving Products Ltd., Bajaj Auto and LML, Parle-Coca Cola 
and TTK Pharma and Kiwi.'^ ^ In the case of Parle-Coca Cola combme, they will 
control 60 per cent of the market for soft drinks. After the merger of HLL and 
TOMCO they are likely to control about 70 per cent of the market in the branded 
tea. Moreover, 87.5 per cent of the market for razor blades would be controlled by 
Gillette in case of its control over the Malhotra Brothers, together with ISPL.'^ " 
These are some of the examples of the impact of new liberalized policy of the 
Government in case of MNCs increased entry into Indian industry. 
With liberalisation, one would have thought that the official machinery 
would be more flexible then under a regime of regulation. Under a regime of 
growing liberalisation, the official machinery has a role in terms of mtervention, 
but to be effective this has to be quick. While the political leadership can find fault 
with the administrative mechanism, the response is very clumsy. The 
administrative machinery always takes decisions ultimately, but fault-finding is 
not going to improve, the integrity of the bureaucracy already under pressure for 
not takmg to heart the liberalisation process. It is very easy to assault the 
administrative mechanism for not responding to the market movements but m an 
economy so long accustomed to political decision-making, unless a firm signal is 
sent out that the officials are free to act without bemg questioned at the latter date, 
it would not be easy to foster desired flexibility. 
There are some myths about MNCs ushering in general economic welfare 
such as: 
1. The MNCs have tended to dommate the national economy with direct 
adverse effects on domestic industry. Comparatively speaking, Indian 
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industries are handicapped by a liquidity crunch, high interest rates, 
differential capital gains tax, restrictions on inter-corporate loans and 
investments, exacting labour laws etc. 
2 The MNCs are not content with the mere majority stake of 51 percent 
concession in joint ventures: they are phasing out the Indian partners. 
Sony, for example, has set up a 100 percent Japanese giant of S78 billion to 
produce telecom goods by the fully owned Japanese industry. Thus, the 
premise that collaboration with the MNCs would benefit the Indian 
industries is instead driving the latter out of business. 
3. The MNCs are driven by one overridmg motives, the motive of profitable 
sales. Instead of employing the latest technology, the obsolescent 
technology is finding its way into India. 
4. The headlong pursuit of profits by the MNCs to produce more and sell 
more is causing the depletion of India's natural resources. 
5. These corporations are merely consolidating their hold on the global 
economy and are not concerned with the national goals of countries. 
6. MNCs are not keen to share technology either. As a matter of fact, they do 
not want to share their technology. This one of the most important lessons 
of the policy of liberalisation and globalisation that we learnt. The Ministry 
of Science & Technology appears to have woken up to the fact that 
multinational corporations may be keen on direct investments but are 
extremely unwilling to share technology.^ 
All available international organizations and fora, includmg the UN 
Security Council, NATO, the Group of Seven, the World Bank and the IMF, 
UNCTAD and the newly formed World Trade Organization, which replaces 
GATT, are generally used for the establishment of a globalised economic system 
dominated by the western world, by the decision-makers m a systematic and 
coordmated manner. 
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Industry may have been delicenced in 1991 but is still highly regulated. 
Each industrial unit is visited by between 40 and 60 inspectors in the course of 
month. The World Bank's World Business Environment Survey, finds that in 
India, management spends as much as 16% of their time dealing with government 
officials. There is too much of a bureaucratic, rule-based environment rather than a 
market based environment in this country.'^ '' It is very important for the economy 
to become globally competitive if it is to organize itself strongly agamst the 
MNCs.'^ ** 
Politics of the country is likely to undergo a sea change under the new 
dispensation. MNCs are known to bribe politicians and bureaucrats for getting 
things done their way. There are umpteen numbers of instances from Latm 
America, Africa and Asia where powerful MNCs have held real political power in 
their hands and the dire consequences thereof for the polity and economy. Only 
the form has changed; East India Company Syndrome has not ceased to be 
relevant in the present day Indian economic colonization is not less outrageous 
than political colonization. In the world of today, flow of commercial credit and 
FDI does not depend on the credit worthmess of the recipient country but upon the 
capacity and willingness of their own government to compromise their national 
mterests and avowed policies on matters of vital concern to the MNCs and their 
countries. This explains MNCs preference for Deng's China and Yeltsin's Russia, 
Smgapore, Thailand, Philippmes and Korea-the success stories of market 
economy-have got pseudo-growth. India must, therefore, desist from jeopardizing 
Its long-term interests and economic sovereignty for euphemeral gains. 
The world is becoming uni-polar and the MNCs, the carriers of the 
industrialized culture of the west, will show the nature of future work 
organizations. 
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CHMT^^I"^ 
IMPACT OF LIBERALISATION AND ECONOMIC 
REFORMS ON ADMINISTRATION 
(A)ECONOMIC REFORMS DURING CONGRESS RULE 
According to Prof. Deepak Lai, the post independence period can be 
divided into a number of sub periods. The first was heyday of planning (1950-64), 
when industrial output, employment and capital stock, all rose markedly as 
compared with the precedmg pre-independence period. The second period from 
1965 to 79 saw a slowing down in all these variables, as the heavy mdustr>' biased 
imports substituting strategy began to run into the sands. The third period 1980 to 
1989 was a period when there was partial liberalisation of foreign trade controls 
and dash for growth, based on mcreased foreign borrowmg and rising fiscal 
deficits. Industrial output and capital stock rose but employment was virtually 
stagnant. In the post-reform period of the 1990s, industrial output and capital stock 
grew at the same rates as m the 1980s but in a more sustainable manner. But, 
mdustrial employment continued to stagnate. The result has been massive rise in 
the capital/labour ratio in Indian industry over these fifty years and that too in a 
labour abundant country. 
The key strategy espoused for growth and progress in most developing 
countries for the duration of 1950's and 60's was a deep dependence on planned 
economy with a stress on public sector participation in economic development. 
Many developing countries m Africa, Asia and Latin America pursued this model 
of development energetically, but, within a period of two-three decades, became 
disenchanted with the results. Against the background of a series of global 
recessions in 70s and 80s, the economies of most developing countries began to 
collapse, above all under the strains of severe external debt, which began 
accumulating m the late 70s. Public sector investments produced less output, 
lower yield and consequently very little surplus, if any, for growth. Consequently 
pressure began to mount globally for a change in the strategies of growth 
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The public sector is often called the creation of India's first Prime Minister, 
Jawaharlal Nehru (1947-64). To what extent Nehru's thinking on the public sector 
was governed by ideology and how far it was dictated by practical considerations 
has been greatly debated. The point has been made that at the time of 
mdependence, India had one of the most-developed private sectors m 
manufacturing in the third World. However, it is also true that the private sector at 
the time lacked the ability to mobilize resources for the heavy industries that 
Nehru regarded as the top priority. 
While initiating the debate on Second Five Year Plan on May, 1956, 
Jawahar Lai Nehru said: " I have no doubt that the normal government procedures 
applied to a public enterprise of this kind will lead to the failure of that public 
enterprise. Therefore, we have to evolve a system for workmg public enterprises 
where, on the one hand, there are adequate checks and protections and, on the 
other, enough freedom for them to work quickly and without delay".' In his 
statement, he documented that the government does not fianction the way a 
business house normally does. These views of Jawahar Lai Nehru were also 
replicated in the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956, which highlighted the need 
to provide sufficient autonomy to managements of public enterprises, so as to 
facilitate their functioning on commercial lines. Consequently, while policy 
makers in the 1950's acknowledged the need of autonomy as indispensable for 
efficient functioning of public enterprises, in later years, provisions of checks and 
safe-guards as applicable in governmental functioning, gained dominance over 
giving freedom for quick decision-making, essential for their efficiency 
There was a subtle attempt to underplay the importance of the public sector 
and indeed centralized plannmg during the brief tenure as prime minister of Lai 
Bahadur Shastri (1964-6) who succeeded Nehru. The initial years of Indira Gandhi 
(1966-77, 1079-84), who came next, saw a sharp cut in public investment arising 
from a budgetary crisis, which set the clock back somewhat so far as the public 
sector was concerned. 
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The stagnation in industry in the first half of the 1970s and widespread 
economic discontent forced a rethinking of pohcy and ushered m a phase of 
cautious HberaHsation from 1975 onwards. This point is worth noting as there is a 
tendency to believe that India embraced economic liberalisation only with the 
onset of a balance of payments crisis in 1991; others would more charitable date 
Hberalisation back to the Rajib Gandhi era, i.e., 1985 onwards. As Baldev Raj 
Nayar rightly observes, '...the origin of liberalisation m India lay in its own 
specific experience m the early 1970s, even though later it may have felt 
encouraged m that path by the worldwide trend'." 
A complex number of factors were responsible for India's slow movement 
towards economic liberalisation, first became perceptible durmg Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi's final term m office, 1980-84. 
At the time when Rajiv Gandhi succeeded to the office of prime mmister in 
1984, both internal and external financial shortages showed signs of worsening 
The combined budget deficits of the states and the central government had reached 
7.5 per cent of GDP, while the growth rate over the preceding decade was a scant 
3.2 per cent. By 1985/86 non-plan revenue expenditure of the central and state 
governments constituted 24.2 per cent of GDP at market prices. 
Rajiv Gandhi created the impression that he was prepared to go well 
beyond the limited liberalisation initiated by his mother. Such an image was 
strengthened by the 1985/86 budget, put forward by his finance mmister, V P 
Singh, which did not mention socialism. Instead, the number of industries 
exempted from licensing was substantially mcreased; large business houses 
regulated by the (Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) and Foreign 
Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) legislations were encouraged to participate in a 
number high-technology industries; limits on foreign exchange for import of raw 
materials were raised, and tax concessions for the corporate and urban upper-
middle classes were introduced.^ 
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According to prime minister Rajiv Gandhi's expert advisers, economic 
liberalisation could be successful only within the context of a whole new industrial 
policy that could not be presented merely as a modification of the controls regime 
established after 1956. In May 1987, the Planning Commission circulated the final 
text of a "new mdustrial policy" (approved, in prmciple, in September 1986), 
which it considered essential to meet Seventh Plan targets. The package of 
incentives to the private sector for modernizing engineermg and other basic 
mdustries constituted a clear break with past state policies favouring the public 
sector. 
Rajiv Gandhi's Congress (I) lost the watershed election of November 1989, 
on issues of corruption and communal conflict that had little direct connection 
with the economic reforms agenda. 
Disinmvestment evolved in the 1990s in a climate m which PSUs were, for 
the first time, subjected to a significant measure of competition, domestic as well 
as foreign. The disinvestments programme became part of an ambitious process of 
economic reforms covering industry, the external sector, the financial sector and 
agriculture, and also involving a programme of macro-economic stabilization that 
commenced in 1991 under the government of prime minister Narasimha Rao. 
The industrial policy resolution armounced in 1991 by the Congress 
government outlined the following major planks of public enterprise reforms: 
(i) Portfolio of public sector investments will be reviewed with a view to focus 
the public sector on strategic, high-tech and essential infrastructure. 
Whereas some reservation for the public sector is bemg retained, there 
would be no bar for area of exclusivity to be opened up to the private sector 
selectively. Similarly, the public sector will also be allowed entry in areas 
not reserved for it. 
(j) PEs which were chronically sick and which are unlikely to be turned 
around will, for the formulation of revival/ rehabilitation schemes, be 
referred to the Board for industrial & Financial Reconstruction (BIFR), or 
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other similar high-level institutions created for the purpose. A social 
security mechanism will be created to protect the interests of workers likely 
to be affected by such rehabilitation packages, 
(k) In order to raise resources and encourage wider public participation, a part 
of the government's shareholdmg in the public sector would be offered to 
mutual funds, financial institutions, general public and workers. 
(1) Boards of public sector companies would be made more professional and 
given greater powers, 
(m) There will be greater thrust on performance improvement through 
the Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) system through which 
managements would be granted greater autonomy and will be held 
accountable. Technical expertise on the part of the government would be 
upgraded to make the MOU negotiations and implementation more 
effective, 
(n) To facilitate a fuller discussion on performance, the MOU signed between 
government and the PEs would be placed in parliament. While focusing on 
major management issues, this would also help place matters on day-to-day 
operation of PEs in their correct perspective.^ 
The list of industries reserved for public sector was reduced from 17 
mcluded in Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 to only 8 by July 1991. Policy 
statement subsequently, in March 1993, two more items were dereserved. The six 
mdustnes for exclusively operation in public sector were (i) arms and ammunition 
and the allied items of defence equipment, defence aircrafts and warships, (j) 
atomic energy, (k) coal and lignite, (1) mineral oils, (m) minerals specified m the 
schedule to atomic energy (control of production and use) order 1953, and (n) 
railway transport.* 
Another important measure was to refer 'sick' PSUs to the Board for 
Industrial Finance and Reconstruction that had earlier been responsible for takmg 
decision on bankrupt firms in the private sector only. This meant that the 
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government would be bound by decisions issued by the BIFR where 'sick' PSUs 
were concerned and might be obHged to close down unviable firms and 
rehabilitate others as ordered by the BIFR. The state of drift at PSUs with huge 
losses could continue no longer. 
The government issued guidelines on composition of Board of Directors to 
make them more professional. The guidelines provide, that outside professionals 
should be inducted in the boards of PSU in the form of non-official directors 
whose number should be least one third of the actual strength of the board. The 
wave of liberalisation m countries across the world has not only swept away the 
age of monopoly for state enterprises but also led to conversion of public sector 
units into private enterprises.'"^ 
The beginning of the 1990s was characterised by financial stresses, 
compounded by the fact that the foreign exchange situation was also becoming 
very critical. In 1991, the Congress government of India ushered in an era of 
economic reforms, largely due to the compulsion of facing a deteriorating foreign 
exchange position in the context of mounting debt service obligations. The 
economic reform process was characterised by conscious policies of liberalisation, 
privatization and globalisation. Durmg 1991-1995 m the Congress Government 
the Finance Ministry was headed by Manmohan Singh, an economist of 
international repute, who was formerly the Governor of the Reserve bank of India, 
lent credibility and the legitimacy to the new direction of the economic reform 
process. The lessons from other developing countries in Latin America and Africa, 
which had to compulsively take the economic reform route due to the World Bank 
and IMF conditionalities, provided the perspective to the policies introduced 
during the reformist phase in India. These reform packages were a response to the 
foreign exchange and fiscal crisis of 1991 and they led to greater emphasis on the 
economic logic of the market forces, a more open economy welcoming the smooth 
flow of foreign direct mvestment into India and moving towards an increase share 
m international trade. This shift m the role of the government from an 
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entrepreneur, investor and owner of industrial enterprises to that of a regular and 
umpire found its ardent followers among the senior policy-makers of that time. It 
was felt the government must concentrate on the development of infrastmcture, 
stability in fiscal and monetary policies, and m the safeguarding of law and order, 
while simultaneously ensuring the growth of human resources by greater emphasis 
on social sectors like health care, education and social welfare. 
Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, facing opposition from the left parties as 
well as the BJP, also felt constrained to wait until after the 1996 elections to bring 
forward the msurance sector reforms, ending the monopoly of government 
companies recommended by the Malhotra Committee in 1994 and endorsed by the 
Cabinet in 1995, to attract domestic and foreign private investors to augment 
capital resources for the starved infrastructure sectors. Finally, the government 
failed to muster majority support for legislation to amend the 1970 Patent Act 
which allowed only "process patents" in food, medicmes and drugs. This kept 
India out of compliance with the World Trade Organisation agreement ratified by 
the Narasimha Rao government m 1994, mcludmg a commitment to provide 
exclusive marketing rights (EMRs) for pharmaceuticals and agro-chemicals as 
mterim production for intellectual property prior to phasing in full-fledged product 
patents by 2005. An ordinance, promulgated m 1994-95, amending the Patent Act 
and presented as a Bill in 1995, was blocked m the Rajya Sabha, or upper house of 
the states, where it was referred to a select committee and expired after the tenth 
Lok Sabha was dissolved. ^ '^ 
When the Congress government headed by Narasimha Rao moved into the 
fourth year of its tenure, the focus necessarily had to shift from implementation of 
the reform measures to consolidation of the overall gains of the reform process 
The World Development Report 1994 has sent some warning signals about the 
approach to foreign mvestment and the reformists in the government can hardly 
ignore these. As of now, worries over the growth of foreign institutional 
investment and the activities of MNCs may not be causing considerable worry. 
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This is suggested by what several corporate leaders have said, on how they react to 
a surge in foreign institutional investment and the prospect of this investment 
being used to change the management m Indian companies. But sooner or later, 
with foreign investors entering the power sector on the basis of a regime that 
seems much too generous, the attitude is certainly going to change. The 
government must be complimented for completmg three years without too many 
hiccups, but as for the future particularly in respect of economic policy, one has to 
keep his fmgers crossed. While on the price front, m recent weeks, there has been 
some indication of the government back in control, still with coal price being 
hiked by five per cent; the situation is gomg to tougher. While under a liberal 
environment administered pricing must give way to market pricing and wherever 
It is possible and just justified m economic terms imports must be freely available 
m lieu of domestic supplies, still with a massive public sector and a farm sector 
accustomed to the government hiking the crop prices every season, pricing will 
continue to be a key activity of the government, m fact, the real challenge before 
the government is going to be the consolidation of the process of liberalisation 
while simultaneously reconcilmg the conflictmg interests-accommodating the 
needs of consumers in different sectors of the economy without damagmg 
domestic productive activity m the country." 
Shortly before the 1996 elections, the Confederation of Indian Industries 
(CII), considered to be the strongest opponents of seeking foreign investment in 
India, fired the most controversial, and unexpected, broadside against the 
multinationals since 1991. The CII described a lopsided relationship m which 
benefits favoured foreign mvestors m jomt ventures rather than Indian partners. 
The list of criticisms included complamts that the multinationals brought in 
obsolescent technology and products; that they initially accepted 40 to 50 per cent 
equity agreements but quickly moved to acquire majority control, and that a 
number set up wholly owned subsidiaries for the manufacture and distribution of 
high quality products to avoid technology transfer and profit sharing. Without 
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mentioning the BJP, the statement endorsed the party's attack on "fast track power 
projects" for pitching costs and the price of power to the people at higher than 
necessary levels.'"^ 
The improved performance of the industrial sector was attributed to the 
reforms undertaken during the past five years from 1991-95. These included: 
1. The sweeping away of mdustrial licensmg controls. The few remaming 
industries still subject to licensing accounted for only about 15 per cent of 
value added in the manufacturing sector. 
2. The number of industries reserved for the public sector was reduced to six. 
These included defence products, atomic energy, coal and lignite, mineral 
oils, railway transport and minerals specified in the schedule to the Atomic 
Energy Order, 1953. Private participation in these sectors was also 
permitted on a case by case basis. 
3. The elimination of the separate permission required by 'large house' for 
investment and expansion under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices (MRTP) Act. 
4. Automatic approval of foreign investment up to 51 per cent (and foreign 
technology agreements permitted) for 35 priority industries, which 
accounted for about 50 per cent value addition in the manufacturmg sector 
5. Policy for the drugs and pharmaceuticals industry aligned with the 
liberalised industrial policy and the span of price control reduced and 
rationalised. 
6. Revision of National Mineral Policy and amendment of the Mines and 
Mineral Development Act, to open this sector to private and foreign 
investment. Thirteen minerals de-reserved for exploitation by the private 
sector. 
7. RBI based automatic approval policy for foreign investment made 
applicable to mining (except for atomic minerals and mineral fuels) subject 
to a limit of 50 per cent on foreign equity. 
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A number of measures were announced to facilitate private entry mto areas 
of infrastructure which were formerly the preserve of the public sector, with a 
view to freeing scarce public resources for social sectors and anti-poverty 
programmes. Some of the significant developments in this area included: 
1. Out of 52 proposals received from foreign investors including NRIs and 
joint ventures for setting up power projects, 16 proposals had already been 
cleared by the government. 
2. Several States initiated restructurmg of their power sectors in order to build 
long-term fmancial, institutional and operational viability. The process of 
restructuring of State Electricity Boards was initiated in Orissa, Haryana, 
Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh. 
3. The National Telecom Policy, 1994 allowed private provision of basic 
telecom services. For value added services, government permitted 
maximum foreign equity of 51 per cent and for basic services, cellular 
mobile and radio paging; this limit was fixed at 49 per cent. 
4. The government decided to set up a statutory Telecom Regulatory 
Authority of India to separate the regulatory functions from policy 
formulations and operational functions, 
5. The Air Corporation Act, 1994 enabled private air taxi companies to 
operate as regular domestic airlines. Six air taxi operators complying with 
the Air Craft Rules were granted scheduled airline status. In addition, 19 air 
taxi operators were given permission for charter/non-schedules air transport 
services. 
6. Areas like development and maintenance of airport infrastructure and 
material handling at major airports were opened up for private participation. 
7. The National Highway Act was amended to enable levy of tolls on national 
highways users.''' 
Between 1991 and 1998, no serious effort has been made to improve the 
working of PEs, though each government has sworn itself to introduce the above-
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referred reforms in these enterprises. In fact, the conditions under which PEs have 
worked during these years have severely worsened, affecting their physical and 
financial performance. Instead of creating a level widened the gulf between the 
conditions governing the public and private sector, as a result of which PEs have 
been put to a great disadvantage.'^ 
The UPA government has decided to establish a Board for Reconstruction 
of Pubhc Sector Enterprises (BRPSE) to advice the government on ways and 
means for strengthening public sector enterprises (PSEs) m general and to make 
them more autonomous and professional. The Board would consider 
reconstructing-fmancial organizational and busmess-of central PSEs and suggests 
ways and means for fundmg such schemes. The Board would also advice the 
government on dismvestments/closure/sale m respect of chronically sick/ loss 
making companies, which cannot be revived. The government has approved the 
constitution of National Investment Fund comprismg of proceeds from 
disinvestments of public sector units. The broad objectives of the fund will be to 
make investments m social sector projects and capital investment m selected 
profitable or revivable PSEs that yield adequate returns in order to enlarge their 
capital base to finance expansion/diversification. The Government has also given 
'in principle' approval for listing of currently unlisted profitable PSEs each with a 
net worth in excess of Rs.200 crore, through an initial public offer (IPO), either m 
conjunction with a fresh equity issue by the PSE concerned or independently by 
the Government on a case by case basis, subject to the residual equity of the 
Government remammg at least 51 per cent and the government retammg 
management control of the PSE."" 
(B)POST CONGRESS REFORMS 
In the 1977 policy statement it was noted that though some elements of the 
Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 still remained valid, certain structural 
distortions had crept in the system. The new policies were hence directed towards 
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removing these distortions The areas delineated for the large-scale industiy were 
as follows. 
(e) Basic industries that are essential for providing infrastructure and for the 
development for small and village industries, such as steel, non-ferous 
metals, cement, oil refineries, 
(f) Capital goods industries, 
(g) High technology industries that require large scale production and that are 
related to agricultural and small scale industrial development such as 
fertilizers, pesticides and petro-chemicals, and 
(h) Other mdustnes that are outside the list of reserved items for the small-
scale sector, such as machme tools, and organic and inorganic chemicals."^ 
In 1989 National Front, a coalition of political fragments and regional 
parties anchored by V.P. Smgh as Prime Minister formed the government in the 
centre. The effort in July 1990 by Prime Minister V.P. Singh to adopt an economic 
reforms package similar to that favoured by Rajiv Gandhi found no support before 
the collapse of his government in January 1991. Instead, the short-lived successor 
coalition led by the socialist prime minister Chandra Shekhar sent Finance 
Minister Yashwant Sinha on a fruitless quest for loans to Japan and the United 
States, and then reluctantly turned to the International Monetary Fund's 
Compensatory and Contmgency Financmg Facility for a $1.8 billion balance of 
payments credit to pay for oil imports as prices spiked m the wake of the 1991 
Gulf War. Sinha, m presentmg an interim Budget for 1991-92 stated that the 
accumulated internal and external debt had totally exhausted the central 
government's room for maneuver, that soft options had disappeared, and that by 
the time of the next regular budget, then planned for May 1991, a comprehensive 
package of macro-economic adjustment would be the only sustainable solution to 
the fiscal crisis.'' It was the government of Prime Minister Chandrashekhar that 
first announced a policy of dismvestmg government equity m PSUs m the interim 
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budget of 1991-2. It spoke of selling up to 20 per cent in such firms, that too to 
public sector institutional investors. 
It was this atmosphere of crisis that a newly elected government launched a 
programme of economic reforms in mid-1991. The government considered the 
possibility of raismg resources through divestment. The Department of Economic 
Affairs submitted a paper to this effect in February 1991 to the Cabinet Committee 
on Political Affairs (CCPA). The CCPA gave general approval to pursue the 
approach of divestment. Thereafter, the first public announcement of the 
government decision to dismvest upto 20 per cent of its equity in selected public 
sector undertakings in favour of public sector institutional investors was made on 
4 March 1991 at the time of presenting the Union government's interim budget for 
1991-92 by the Chandrashekhar government. The objective of disinvestments was 
to broad-base equity, improve management, enhance availability of resources for 
these PSEs and yield resources for the exchequer." 
The Congress (I) loss of the 1996 elections m a humulitatmg defeat, to be 
followed by two minority United Front (UF) coalitions in eighteen months, a 
number of changes were made m 1996-97 in the area of foreign mvestment. The 
Foreign Investment Promotion Council was set up, the Foreign Investment 
Promotion Board (FIPB) was streamlmed and made more transparent, and the first 
ever guidelines were announced by the UF government for consideration of 
foreign direct investment proposals by the FIPB, which were not covered under 
the automatic route. The list of industries eligible for automatic approval of up to 
51 per cent foreign equity was expanded. Foreign Institutional Investors (FIls) 
were allowed to invest m unlisted companies and in corporate and government 
securities, and external commercial borrowings (ECB) guidelmes were liberalized 
and made more transparent. 
The policy decisions made by the UF government durmg 1996-97 are as 
follows. 
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1. To provide long-term finance for infrastructure, the Budget announced the 
establishment of an Infrastructure Development Finance Company (IDFC) 
The IDFC was incorporated under the Companies Act on 30.1.1997 with an 
authorized share capital of Rs.5,000 crore 
2. A 5 year tax holiday for companies developing, maintaming and operating 
mfrastructure facilities such as roads, bridges, new airports, ports and 
railway projects, was extended to cover water supply, sanitation and 
sewerage projects. 
3. After the National Highway Act was amended to enable private 
participation, projects involving Rs.42 crore were awarded on a Build-
Operate and Transfer (HOT) basis. The capital base of the National 
Highways Authority of India was increased by a provision of Rs.200 crore, 
thereby providing greater leverage to borrowing from external funding 
agencies and other lenders. 
4. Through an Ordinance, the government established a statutory Telecom 
Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), which separated the regulatory 
functions from policy formulation and operational functions. The 
Department of Telecommunications and financial institutions had also 
finalized an assignability agreement, which facilitated flindmg of cellular 
and basic telecom projects. 
5. An independent Authority for regulating tariffs m major ports was created 
through an Ordinance. 
6. A Common Minimum National Action Plan for Power was approved by the 
Centre and the States in December 1996. As a part of this Plan, State 
Electricity boards were to be urgently reformed and restructured to give 
them more autonomy. Private participation m distribution was to be 
encouraged. The Central Government issued an Ordmance allowmg private 
entry into power transmission as an independent service; States were given 
greater authority; they were now fre to clear projects up to 250 MW. 
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Renovation and modernization schemes no longer needed approval of the 
Central Electricity Authority. 
7. In principle, approval was given by the Government for a rail-based Mass 
Rapid Transit System (MRTS) in Delhi. The cities of Banglore, Hyderabad, 
Mumbai and Calcutta had proposed major improvements in their public 
transport systems through the introduction/augmentation of rail-based 
transit system. 
8. A new policy for private investment m civil aviation was announced and 
this included allowmg 40 percent foreign equity in domestic airlines.'"^ 
The Vittal Committee Report sought to remove guidelines that were used 
by some PSEs as an excuse for non-performance. If the government implements 
Vittal Report in letter and spirit, it will be even more significant than its decision 
to grant autonomy to Navaratanas and Miniralanas smce it covers all the 243 
PSEs, and envisages greater autonomy for all. When guidelines are issued in 
future by the government, they should be applicable to PSEs only after their 
Boards of directors adopt them. 
The national election in 1998 produced an even more fragile coalition led 
by the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), which itself lost a vote of confidence after 13 
months and remamed in power as a caretaker government until the general 
elections announced for September-October 1999. The 1999 election saw the 
return to power of the BJP led-National Democratic Alliance (NDA) of 24 parties, 
under Prime Mmister Atal Behari Vajpayee, endorsing a common programme 
which set aside the party's Hindutva agenda. 
Addressing the opening plenary session of the World Economic Forum m 
1999, the Pnme Mmister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced that after the 
successful passage of the Insurance Ragulatory Bill and the Foreign Exchange 
Management Bill in the parliament, the government would now embark upon 
other economic reforms, including those in the financial, power and telecom 
sectors, and those concerning ports, airports and highways.'^ 
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During 1998-99 BJP led-NDA government announced following economic 
reforms in the industrial sector: 
• Delicensing of coal and lignite, petroleum (other than crude) and its 
distillation products and bulk drugs. 
• Delicensing of sugar. 
• Dereservation of coal and lignite and mineral oils. 
• Companies were permitted to buy-back their own shares subject to 
restriction of buy-back to twenty five per cent of paid-up capital and 
free reserves. 
• A National Task Force on Information Technology and Software 
Development submitted a 108 point Action Plan in July 1998 The 
recommendations were accepted by the government and directions 
for their implementation were given to all concerned departments. 
• Patent Bill approved by Rajya Sabha and subsequently promulgated 
through an Ordinance. 
• A number of items, including some from implements and tools, were 
removed from products reserved for exclusive manufacture by SSI 
sector. ^ ^ 
Economic Reforms during 2001 -2002 announced by the NDA government 
are as follows: 
1. Interest rates on small savmgs reduced. 
2. Full decontrol of sugar announced during 2002-2003 (conditional on 
commencement of futures trading). 
3. Items covered under the Essential Commodities Act reduced from 29 to 17. 
4. Licensing requirements and restrictions on storage and movement of wheat, 
rice, sugar, edible oilseeds and edible oils removed. 
5. New pharmaceuticals Policy announced, reducing the span of price control 
rigours on several bulk drugs and formulations. 
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6. Fourteen items dereserved from the list of items reserved for exclusive 
manufacture by the small scale sector. 
7 Bill for abolition of the Sick Industrial companies (Special Provision) Act 
introduced in Parliament. 
8. The Union Budget (2001-02) proposed amendments in the Industrial 
Disputes Act and Contract Labour Act for removing the existing structural 
rmidities in the labour market.'^ '' 
(C)THE MINISTRY OF DISINVESTMENT 
Disininvestment evolved in the 1990s in a climate in which PSUs were, for 
the first time, subjected to a significant measure of competition, domestic as well 
as foreign. The disinvestments programme became part of an ambitious process of 
economic reforms covering industry, the external sector, the financial sector and 
agriculture, and also involving a programme of macro-economic stabilization that 
commenced in 1991 under the government of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao. 
The Industnal Policy Statement 1991 neither placed an upper limit on 
disinvestments nor did it talk of selling government equity to any particular class 
of investors. It cited injection of greater market discipline into PSUs as the 
objective of disinvestments, which is quite different matter from raismg resources 
for government or the government getting out of business.In the budget of 1991-
92, however, the government reinstated the upper limit of 20 per cent mentioned 
by Chandrasekhar government, and also a preference for disinvestmg to public 
sector financial institutions and to the workers of the firms mvolved. There was a 
shift in the avowed objectives as well. Disinvestment, the budget said, was meant 
to 'raise resources, encourage wider public participation and promote greater 
accountability'. 
In 1993, a committee headed by C. Rangarajan, an economist that had been 
asked to outline a framework for disinvetsment recommended a more radical 
course. The committee recommended that the govemment could dismvest up to 49 
per cent in mdustries reserved for the public sector. In cases where the enterprise 
201 
had a dominant market share or where there were strategic considerations, the 
government could dismvest up to 74 per cent. In all other cases, the government 
could disinvest up to 100 per cent." In 1996 the United Front government decided 
to set up a Disinvestment Commission to advise on disinvestments. The 
Disinvestment Commission was to draw up a comprehensive programme of 
disinvestments over a five to ten years period for public sector undertakmgs 
(PSUs) referred to the Commission by a Core Group of government secretaries. 
The Commission was also asked to advise on such matters as the extent of 
disinvestments, the mode of disinvestments, selection of financial advisors to 
facilitate the process, etc." 
Disinvestment Commission: - The Disinvestment Commission was set up by 
Government Resolution dated 23 August, 1996 m pursuance of the Common 
Minimum Programme (CMP) of the then United Front government. The 
govemment gave advisory as well as supervisory and monitoring role to the 
Commission. The Para 4 of the terms and reference states as follows: "the 
Disinvestment Commission will be an advisory body and the govemment will 
take final decision on the basis of advice given by the Dismvestment Commission. 
The PSUs, would implement the decision of the govemment under over all 
supervision of the Dismvestment Commission." Furthermore, "to monitor the 
progress of disinvestments process and take necessary measures and report 
periodically to the govemment on such progress." '^^  
In its First Report submitted m Febmary 1997, the commission gave its 
views on the long-term strategy that should be followed on dismvestments. In line 
with the CMP classification, the Commission laid down the critena for classifying 
PSUs mto strategic, core and non-core units for purposes of decidmg on the extent 
of disinvestments of govemment shares in these units. The Commission also 
enunciated broad guidelmes and modalities of dismvestments for consistent 
application across all PSUs and for enhancing the transparency of the 
disinvestments process. Besides these, the Commission made general 
202 
recommendations m significant matters such as creation of a Disinvestment Fund 
for bemg utilized to restructure PSUs, wherever necessary, prior to disinvetmnet 
to find a Voluntary Rettrement Scheme for employees found surplus, to find 
social mfrastruture projects and to retire public debt. Recommendation were also 
made in the First Report of the Commission for improving the Corporate 
Governance and accountability along with grant of graded autonomy to all the 
PSUs;^ " 
In his Speech of February 27, 1997, presentmg the budget for 1997-98, the 
then fmance Minister stated, "We intend to proceed with disinvestments in 
Modem Food Industnes (India) Ltd. (MFIL), Gas Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL) 
and India Tourism Development Corporation (ITDC) along the lines suggested by 
the Dismvestment Commission".^' 
Ministry of Disinvestment: -The department of Disinvestment was set up by 
vide Notification No. CD/551/99 dated 10-12-1999. Vide Notification No. CD/-
442/2001 dated 6* September 2001, the Department of Dismvestment was 
renamed as Mmistry of Dismvestment. The Ministry has been assigned the 
foUowmg work: 
1. AH matters relatmg to disinvestment of central government equity from 
central public sector undertakmgs. 
2. Decisions on the recommendations of Disinvestment, including 
restructuring. 
3. Implementation of disinvestment decisions, includmg appointment of 
Advisors, pncmg of shares, and other terms and conditions of 
disinvestments. 
4. Disinvestment Commission 
5. Central Public Sector Undertakmgs for purposes of dismvestment of 
government equity.^ "^  
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The oovemment of India vide its order no. 1/11/2/2000 on dated 11"' 
October 2000 has constituted the Cabinet Committee on Dismvestment with 
composition and llmctions as mentioned below: 
Composition: - Cabinet Committee on Disinvestment include Prime Minister, 
Minister of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises, Minister of Petroleum and 
Natural Gas, Minister of External Affairs, Minister of Finance, Minister of Civil 
Aviation, Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission, Minister of Law and Justice 
and Company Affairs, Minister of Disinvestment, The Minister of the 
administrative ministry concerned with the public sector enterprises, whose 
proposals come up for consideration will be invited to the meetings of the 
committee. " 
The Cabinet Committee on Disinvestment performs following functions: -
(i) To consider the advice of the core group of secretaries regarding policy 
issues relatmg to the dismvestment programme, 
(ii) To decide the price band for the sale of government shares through 
GDR/domestic capital market route prior to the book buildmg exercise, 
and to decide the final price sale m all cases, 
(iii) To decide the final pricmg of the transaction and the strategic partner m 
case of the strategic sales; 
(iv) To decide on cases where there is disagreement between the 
recommendations of the Disinvestment Commission and the views of 
the Ministry of Disinvestment; and 
(v) To approve the three year rolling plan and the annual programme of 
disinvestment every year. '^' 
This IS important to note here that decision in respect of (li) above may be 
taken by the Minister of Fmance, Minister of Heavy Industry and Public 
Enterprises, Mmister of Dismvestment and the Minister of the Administrative 
Ministry concerned with the public sector enterprises whose proposals come up 
for consideration 
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The apex decision-making body on disinvestments matters is the Cabinet 
Committee on Disinvestment headed by the Prmie Minister. A core group of 
secretaries on disinvestment program in the following manner On the 
recommendations of the Dismvestment Commission or of the other expert bodies, 
or on the basis of decisions taken in consultation with the administrative 
ministry, the Ministry of Disinvestment initiates proposals and places then for the 
consideration of the core group of secretaries on disinvestment. The decision 
taken by the core groups m the form of recommendations are then submitted for 
the consideration of the Cabinet Committee on dismvestment and a final decision 
is obtained. " 
Government of India is carrying out dismvestment in accordance with the 
prescribed procedure that ensures complete transparency. The procedure is 
reviewed from time to time and modified with a view to acceleratmg the process 
further. At present it is as follows: 
(i) Proposals for dismvestments m any PSU, based on the 
recommendations of the Disinvestment Commission or in accordance 
with the declared dismvestment policy of the government, are placed 
for consideration of the Cabinet Committee on Disinvestment (CCD) 
(li) After CCD clears the dismvestments proposals, selection of the Advisor 
is done through a competitive bidding process, 
(iii) After receipt of the expression of mterest, in pursuance of 
advertisement m news papers/ website, prospective bidders are short 
listed based on objective screening in the light of armounced 
cnteria/f equirements. 
(iv) The advisors, after due diligence of the PSU, prepare the information 
memorandum in consultation with the concerned PSU. This is given to 
the short listed prospective bidders who have entered into a 
confidentially agreement. 
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(v) The draft share purchase agreement and the shareholder are also 
prepared by the advisor with the help of the legal advisors. 
(vi) The prospective bidders undertake due diligence of the PSU and hold 
discussion with the advisor/the government/the representatives of the 
PSU for any clarifications. 
(vii) Concurrently, the task of valuation of the PSU in undertaken in 
accordance with the Stanford national practices. 
(viii) Based on the reactions received ft'om the prospective bidders, the Share 
Purchase Agreement (SPA) and Share Holders Agreement (SHA) are 
prepared. After getting them vetted by the Ministry of Law, they are 
approved by the government. Thereafter, they are sent to the 
prospective bidders for mviting the final binding bids. 
(ix) After examination, analysis and evaluation, the recommendations of the 
Inter Ministerial Group (IMG) are placed before the Core Group of 
Secretaries on Disinvestment (CGSD), whose recommendations are 
placed before the Cabinet Committee on Disinvestment (CCD) for a 
final decision regarding selection of the strategic partner, signing of the 
Share Purchase Agreement and Share Holders Agreement, and other 
related issues. 
(x) In the disinvestment process mentioned above, Mmistry of 
Dismvestment is assisted at each stage by an IMG, headed by secretary 
of disinvestment and comprising officers from the Ministry of finance. 
Department of Public Enterprises, the Administrative ministry/ 
Department controlling the PSU, Department of Company Affairs, 
CMD/ Director (Finance) of the company being disinvested, and the 
advisors. 
(xi) After the transaction is completed, all papers and documents relating to 
It are turned over the CAG of India, the CAG prepares an evaluation for 
sending to Parliament and releasing to the public '*' 
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The following table indicates the actual disinvetsment from 1991-92 to 
2002-2003, the methodologies adopted for such disinvestments and the extent of 
disinvetsment m different CPSUs 
Table 
Actual Disinvestment from 1991-92 to 2002-2003 and Methodologies Adopted 
(Rs. in Crore) 
Year 
1991-
92 
1992-
93 
1993-
94 
1994-
95 
1996-
97 
No. of 
Cos. 
In 
which 
equity 
sold 
47(31 m 
one 
tranche 
and 16 
m other) 
35 (m 3 
tranches) 
-
13 
1 
Target 
for the 
year 
Rs. 
2500 
2500 
3500 
4000 
"5000~ 
Actual 
receipt 
Rs. 
3038 
1913 
Nil 
4843 
380 
Methodology 
Minority shares sold by auction method 
Minority shares sold by auction method 
"average" companies. 
Bundlmg of shares abandoned. Shares 
sold separately for each company by 
auction method. 
Equity of 7 companies sold by open 
auction but proceeds received in 1994-95. 
Sale through auction method in which 
NRIs and other persons legally permitted 
to buy, holder sell equity allowed to 
participate. 
GDR (VSNL) m international market 
207 
1997-
98 
1998-
99 
1999-
00 
2000-
01 
2001-
02 
2002-
03 
Total 
1 
5 
2 
4 
10 
6 
48* 
' 4800 
1 
1 5000 
i 10000 
1 10000 
i 12000 
i 
i 
i 
12000 
1 
i 
1 
I 783000 
902 
5371 
1829 
1869 
5632' 
3336® 
29481" 
GDR (MTNL) in international market. 
GDR (VSNL) Domestic offerings with the 
participation of FIls (CONCOR, GAIL) 
Cross-purchase by 3 Oil sector companies 
l e GAIL ONGC & Indian Oil 
Corporation. 
GDR-GAIL VSNL-domestic issue. 
BALCO restructunno MFIL's stratemc 
sale and others. 
Strategic sale of BALCO, LJMC, KRL 
(CRL), CPCL (MRL) 
Strategic ale of CMC-51%, HTL-74%, 
VSNL-25%, IBP-33.58%, PPL-74%, and 
other modes, ITDC, HCI, STC, MMTC 
Strategic sale of HZL-26%, MFIL-26%, 
IPCL-25% and other modes: HCI, ITDC 
and Maruti. 
Notes: * Total number of companies in which disinvestment has taken place so far 
# Figures (inclusive of amount realized by way of control premium, 
dividend/dividend tax and transfer of surplus cash reserve prior to disinvestment etc ) 
@ Till'31.01.2003. 
Source: Department of Public Enterprises, Government of India, New Delhi, Public 
Enterprises Survey: Vol-1, 2001-2002 and Ministry of Finance, Govemment of India, 
Economic Survey, 2003, p. 149 
Through this table we come to know that the actual receipt from 
disinvestment turned out to be 37.6 per cent of the targeted receipts. The 
disinvestment could not succeed by way of becoming a dominant source of 
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bridging the fiscal deficit. A review of disinvestment policy raises questions 
relating to the method of sale, organization for sale, identification of public sector 
undertakings for sale, eligibility for biddmg and mvolvement of concerned PSUs 
in the process. The method of sale has also attracted severe criticism. The 
govemment has openly prefeired the strategic sale. However, the Initial Price 
Offer (IPO) of Maruti Udyog Ltd., hitting the Indian capital market in June 2003 
brmgs altogether a different experience. The retail mvestor has gamed much in 
teiTns of allotment of shares. The capital market has tremendously benefited from 
Maruti IPO in terms of increased capitalization and wider distribution of its 
shareholdings. The market capitalization of PEs has gone up by 25 per cent of 
PEs.^ ^ Such IPOs by PEs will not allow the formation of monopolies. This method 
IS bound to improve the corporate governance m India, as the vigilant shareholders 
would insist on wealth creation, which would benefit all the stakeholders. The 
strategic sale suffers from many demerits. Besides, proppmg up monopolies, it 
gives unfettered rights to the strategic buyer to brmg about far reachmg changes, 
which might go agamst the mterests of the workers and the govemment The 
govemment has defended strategic dismvestment m terms of a superior price to 
eamings ratio obtamed in the case of the disinvested units as compared to those 
obtained in the case of PEs where shareholdings were disinvested to mutual funds, 
financial institutions, etc. The govemment continues to fail to appreciate the 
superiority of the IPO to other routes of disinvestment by not distinguishing 
between sale of shares to the general investor and ofiF-loading shares to mutual 
funds, banks and financial mstitutions. Nonetheless, the strategic disinvestment 
could possibly be appropriate for the sale of small units. The IPO method was 
frequently employed for dismvesting shares in PEs in the United Kingdom (UK) 
The demands to consider management-employee buy out as an alternative to 
strategic sale was conceded to a prolonged delay in April 2003. As per the 
decision of the Cabinet committee on Disinvestment (CCD) if the employees' bid 
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IS not the highest, it shall be considered only if the said bid is within 10 per cent of 
the highest bid.^ * 
The actual disinvestment from April 1991 to till November 2003 amounted 
to Rs.30823 crore. During the year 2003-2004, a sum of Rs.l335 crore has been 
realized through dismvestment till November 2003 as against a target of Rs. 13200 
crore. There was over whelming response from institutional and retail investors for 
the initial public offering of Maruti Udyog Ltd. m June 2003. The issue was over 
subscribed by about ten times. It has also created a conducive environment for 
offer of sale of PSUs equity.^ '^  In 44 PSUs the disinvestment is under process. 
However, disinvestment of HPCL and BPCL was stopped w.e.f 16 September 
2003 after receipt Supreme Court judgment in this regard and the dismvestment of 
NALCO is not being pursued presently. The dismvestment transaction in respect 
of ICVL Palakkad, is pending approval from BIFR. Out of the remaming 40 cases, 
15 PSUs are listed in domestic stock exchange, while the remainmg 25 PSUs are 
unlisted. Apart from the disinvestment of government's equity through strategic 
sale along with the transfer of management control, the government decided m 
July 2003 for the sale of its residual shareholdmg m five public sector 
undertakings namely, CMC Ltd., IBP Ltd., VSNL, hidian Petrochemical 
Corporation Limited (IPCL) and Bharat Alummium Corporation Limited 
(BALCO), which were earlier disinvested through strategic sale and also in 
Dredging Corporation of India Ltd., through offer for sale route. ' 
(D)LOK SABHA DEBATES 
Public Sector Undertakings are commercial or industrial enterprises which 
are fmanced out of the public funds. The tax payers are like the shareholders of 
these enterprises and as such, the Parliament is like the board of directors while 
the Chief Executive is like its managing director. The Parliament has, therefore, to 
lay down policies for the public sector undertakmgs and has to exercise 
supervision and control over it through its Managing Director. The methods 
available to the Parliament to exercise its powers of supervision and control are. 
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more or less, the same as it exercises to control the Mmistnes and Departments of 
the government. 
Speaking on the occasion of 50"' anniversary of hidia's independence, the 
speaker of Lok Sabha, P. A. Sangama said that planned growth of mdustnes, 
mixed economy, a dominant public sector, licensmg regulations and domestic 
mdustry protection have been the highlights of the last six mdustnal policy 
resolutions. He also highlighted the successes and shortcomings of the previous 
mdustnal policies of the government. 
On further discussion on the Resolution moved by Shrimati Geeta 
Mukherjee regarding sick public sector undertakmgs on the 3rd December, 1999. 
(Resolution withdrawn), Shri Momul Hassan M.P. from Murshidabad highlighted 
the object and aim to build up a public sector enterprise in the country to help m 
the rapid economic growth by way of industrialization of the country, to promote 
redistribution of income and wealth and to create employment opportunities.'*' On 
that occassion Shri Ramesh Chermithala MP from Mavellkara said, "Today, we 
are living in a changed situation. The effect of globalisation and liberalisation is 
seen the world over, and hidia is also a part of that. In the changed environment, it 
has become difficult for the public sector undertakings to survive. So, in the 
changed circumstances, we have to evaluate the performance of the public sector 
undertakings, and we have to induce more strength m these public sector 
undertakings in order to compete with the other private agencies or institutions or 
companies".''^ 
Talking on the discussion regarding Disinvestment Policy of Government 
raised by Indrajit Gupta on the 16"' of December 1999, Sudip Bandyopadhyay 
(Calcutta North West) proposed to consider the economic and humanitarian 
aspects of the problem, if dismvestments and closure of public sector units took 
place, it would be a real challenge and a difficulty for those employed m the 
various Central Public Sector Units and the problem of unemployment will not 
only be acute but would also cross all limits of tolerance. Besides, highlighting the 
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reasons for sickness e.g. low capacity utilization, frequent equipment breakdown, 
ageing of plants, power shortages, industrial problems and lack of 
competitiveness, he urged the government to consider on top most priority the 
disinvestments proposals and the proposals declared for closure and VRS and 
announce its ideas and attitude. 
The Minister of State of the Ministry of information and Broadcasting and 
Minister of State of the Department of Dismvestment, Arun Jaitly said, " The 
policy of Disinvestment is not a creation since 1998. The thmking process on 
disinvestment in PSUs started in 1991-92. In fact, in the Industrial Policy 
Statement and in the Budget speech of 1991 itself. Dr. Manmohan Singh 
categorically said: "In the case of selected enterprises, a part of Government's 
holding in equity share capital of these enterprises will be dismvested in order to 
provide further market discipline to the performance of the public sector 
enterprises," Further he asserted, "In 1996, when the United Front Government 
took over, the Common Minimum Programme was framed. Today, Shri Indrajit 
Gupta, one of our senior-most Members, said that he is, in principle, opposed to 
disinvestment. But the CMP did not say that it was opposed to disinvestment. In 
1996, the CMP mentioned - to which the Left Parties were also a party - that the 
question of withdrawing the public sector from the non-core, non-strategic areas 
would be carefully exammed subject, however, to assurmg the workers and the 
employees of job security or, m the alternative, opportunities for retaining and 
redeployment."'*' 
On the occasion of the discussion on the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and 
Development) Amendment Bill, 1999. Moved by Naveen Patnaik on 3rd 
December, 1999, K P. Singh Deo M. P. from Dhenkanal said, "Mr. Deputy-
Speaker, Sir, I was on my feet that day, I was just mentioning that the Industrial 
Policy and Development Chapter of the Economic Survey 1998-99 had mentioned 
that the current year's deceleration has been most pronounced in the minmg and 
manufacturing sector amongst the broad sectors and mdustrial production 
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registered a growth of 3.5 per cent during April to December 1998, lower than the 
6.7 per cent growth in April December 1997. I am sure, the hon. Minister would 
like to reverse this trend. But how is he doing this? Is he doing this by this 
amendment? He mentions m his opening remarks that he is keeping the mterest of 
the mming industry m particular and the national interest in general; it will 
encourage vast mvestment and it is a progressive legislation. If one goes by the 
hon. Prime Minister's remarks at the Conference held day before yesterday, one 
will find that he says that the Government is for more reforms to attract foreign 
mvestments. The highlight of his own Mmistry's Report of 1998-99 says one 
thing. The present year's Report has not come". Speaking on the discussion 
regarding disinvestments of public sector undertakings, Basu Deb Acharia MP 
from Bankura highlights the government policy of disinvestments from the 
government of Chandra Shekhar who had started the dismvestments of PSUs up to 
20 per cent of its equity in selected PSUs m favour of mutual hinds and financial 
mvestment institutions in the public sector. Consequently, the Congress 
government also announced policy of disinvetsment on the same line in 1991 .''^  
Thus, from the above excerpts of Lok Sabha Debates we come to know that 
from time to time the parliament plays an important role m the examination of 
govemment policies concerning public sector undertakings. The Lok Sabha 
debates regardmg PSUs highlight the consequences as well as mdispensability of 
economic reforms and policy of liberalisation mtroduced smce 1991 m the present 
economic system of globalisation to meet the challenges ahead. The Lok Sabha 
debates emphasized the need of reforms in public sector urgently to improve their 
performance and make them economically viable. 
(E) ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY IN PUBLIC SECTOR 
UNDERTAKINGS IN INDIA 
In India it is generally believed that bureaucracy is more important to do 
things right than doing the right things. A typical bureaucrat, conscious of being 
continuously watched by some agency or the other, is afraid to taking risks in 
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decision making. He likes to put on record opinions and views of others so that 
responsibility and accountability for decisions is divided. By the nature of his 
environment, he is conservative resulting in delays in decision- making. In the 
case of large projects, this means lost opportunities and cost and time overruns 
The lack of autonomy and the responsibility to become independent 
allowed the senior managers, who were largely government officers-retired or on 
deputation- to run these undertakings like government departments The 
bureaucratic approach that often constramed the public administration as well as 
the public sector organisations also discouraged the grovvth of private enterprises 
In fact, the bureaucratic style degenerated into the bureau-pathic way of 
management, partly as a result of the colonial worldview that Lord Kippling 
pronounced. "Indians are half-devil and half-child." The mode of managing 
subordinates, hence, was based on the mistrust of the subordinates who were 
believed to be inferior. Therefore, the colonial ruler mamtamed a great distance 
from the subordinates lest they sought undue advantages, kept tighter control over 
them so that they could not defy orders, and centralized decision-making because 
the natives were believed to be mcompetent to make important decisions As a 
large number of bureaucrats from the government, where they inherited tins mode 
of functioning, were placed in public sector undertakings, they continued to 
function in the same mode. 
Constraints facing public sectors by bureaucracy in the present set-up can 
be considered in three broad parameters: 
(1) Personal values and character of mvolved bureaucrats determine 
their influence and impact on PSE's, which they interact with, or 
control, dependmg on whether they are autocratic or democratic, 
pliant and self-seekmg or value oriented 
(2) Government Directors on PSE Boards, particularly if the PSE is 
headed by another civil servant, often suffer from inter cadre or intra 
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cadre jealousies, occasionally making their presence felt by 
backstabbing successful CEO's. 
(3) Management by objectives and MoU's use performance evaluation 
and reward systems, which though rational m concept, are often 
subjective distortions. Their impact on performance or otherwise of 
PSE's depends entirely on subjectivity of individuals concerned 
sometimes leading to mverted logic, partisan rationality, destructive 
collaboration and manipulative networking. MoU's have a potential 
but Its realization requires patient, honest efforts at the subjective 
level of all concerned includmg CEO's, bureaucracy and experts/'^ 
Interference by politicians and bureaucrats m day-to-day working including 
unnecessary, frequent reviews, adversely affects optimal use of time and energy of 
senior managers of PSEs. Reviews by Mmistries and parliamentary Committees 
requiring personal appearance of CEO's & Directors of PSEs can be replaced by a 
sound MIS, which clearly defines responsibility and authority of the Board of 
Directors/ CEO.^ ° 
Narasimha Rao's government has been extremely careful m not hurting the 
political and bureaucratic vested interests, which have grown over the years 
around the PSUs, while mtroducing the policy of liberalisation m Indian economy 
For example, everyone recognizes the importance of making public sector 
undertakings autonomous, which essentially means estrangement the management 
of these undertakmgs from political and bureaucratic meddling. However, 
politicians do not want to give up these extremely profitable areas of control The 
class of officers in the PSUs has evolved over time into a mirror image of the 
cadre-based services in the civil administration such as the IAS, IPS and IRS 
They have similar norms of institutional behaviour regarding hiring, promotions 
and remuneration. Civil servants from cadre-based services move back and forth 
between civil admmistration and public sector management. This makes it 
impossible to use the concept of a 'firm' or a 'company' in the public sector as one 
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does in the economic organization of a market economy The avenues of 
promotion for an officer require a large sphere for horizontal and vertical mobility 
Other forms of rewards (or punishment) essential for managers of a firm in a 
market economy go against the philosophy and the collective interests of the 
officer class in the system of state feudalism. 
If one is to take a lesson from the manner in which liberalisation uas 
introduced in 1991, one cannot help but come to the conclusion that it is only a 
crisis brought about by a system that heralded an awareness of urgency of reforms 
Their implementation, however, depends on paradigms, beliefs and perceptions of 
strengths and weaknesses of political parties and their ability or otherwise to bite 
the bullet. The general perception m the mmds of Indian public about the 
bureaucracy is that it is corrupt, slow, inefficient and insensitive. This certainly is 
not true of all bureaucrats but, at the same time, the fact that this perception is and 
continues to grow in the minds of people, is something that cannot be wished 
away or ignored. Corruption nexus between politicians and pliable bureaucrats has 
moved the conscience of many honest, upriglit and straightforward officers and 
workers. And the mitiative taken by UP IAS officers to name the most corrupt 
officers from amongst their tribe and to relentlessly follow up their punishment, is 
a happy augury for governance m general and Indian bureaucracy in particular " 
In the developing counfries, like India a politician, a minister or a senior 
civil servant often holds as a part-time or full-time position in the board of public 
sector undertakings. Such an arrangement results in the political or governmental 
interference in the smooth functioning of the enterprise. 
Committee on Public Sector Undertakmgs m India recommended in its 
twentieth report that "members of parliament be appomted chairman and directors 
of boards of public enterprises as they have greater involvement m enterprises". 
The committee also recommended that no person from the pnvate sector should be 
appointed on the boards of the public undertakmgs.^' In order to eliminate 
disadvantageous possibility of ministerial or otherwise political chairmanships, on 
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balance it is preferable to make the chairman a flill time executive.'^ The 
institution of part-time Chairman, some of whom are working secretaries, 
additional secretaries or joint secretaries to the government of India, creates 
unnecessary dichotomy regarding authority, responsibility and accountability 
between them and full time Managing Directors '^  
Any effort by the government to play a supportive role m improving 
functional and organizational productivity of PSEs will depend on the attitude and 
paradigms of its bureaucracy. Its past perceptions were analysed by the Vittal 
Committee on PSE guidelines. It came out with a shocking revelation that 85% of 
892 "guidelmes fro PSEs" could be scrapped, out of the remaining, 25 needed 
modifications while others could be retamed as they are. Implementation of its 
recommendations, however, will depend on the will power of ministries to 
gracefully give up their sense of power over PSEs, exercised in the past, through 
their guidelines. In the context of autonomy, detailed instructions by ministries on 
issues which deal with day-to-day operations, cannot play any constructive role, 
particularly when a market-driven economy needs innovative mitiatives m dealing 
with unforeseen problems and frequently sailing in uncharted waters. They inhibit 
speedy decision-making, which always involves an element of risk of a mistake. 
All that we have to ensure is that there is a system by which mala fide mistakes are 
caught and severely punished. Knowledge, experience and ability of persons to 
judge whether a mistake is mala fide or bona fide however, is of crucial 
importance. Those vested with this authority must not only be totally honest, 
intellectually and otherwise, but also have the necessary professional background, 
to be able to visualize the context and environment in which a particular decision 
was made. This alone will remove from the minds of real performers, the fear of 
penalties for subsequent review of their decisions, which could result in witch-
hunts with various individuals and committees wantmg to take credit for "brinmno 
to book" people who, m their " expert opmions" had made mistakes. There are 
many cases of public sector executives who had turned around PSEs or 
217 
considerably increased efficiency of their operations but were hounded for 
decisions which would be either termed as bona fide by informed persons or, at 
least, deserved the benefit of doubt. The culture of guidelines backed up by such 
witch-hunts in public sector operators against bold, honest and innovative 
decision-making. 
The most fundamental problem in public sector undertakings is political 
and bureaucratic interference with the day-to-day operations of PSUs, which 
renders difficult the pursuit of shareholder wealth maximisation. Such interference 
takes many forms in the Indian context. Decisions at PSUs, it is said, are often 
taken on non-commercial considerations, for instance excess employees are hired 
or project locations are not chosen strictly on commercial grounds. Decision-
making is slowed down because several decisions require the approval of parent 
ministries. 
A big problem is that many PSUs remam without a CEO for long periods of 
time, as the government process of selection is necessarily slow and cumbersome. 
Not least, oversight of PSUs by parliamentary committees, the Controller and 
Auditor General as well as the Central Vigilance Commission, not only slows 
down decision-making-as decision are referred to committees instead of 
individuals bemg able to decide-but also creates a culture of risk-aversion that 
does not conduce to performance. 
As R.H. Patil (2003) points out, one of the striking facts about PSUs in 
India is that the government chose the corporate form of organization for carrying 
out a variety of activities when it could easily have set up these organizations as 
departmental undertakings. The motivation for doing so was not ease in raismg 
capital but the 'administrative convenience and flexibility that a corporate entity 
confers'. It is not necessary for government to seek parliamentary approval for the 
budgets of PSUs; it needs approval only for fiinds provided to a PSU out of the 
Consolidated Fund of India. Having opted for the corporate form, however, the 
government failed to put in place mechanism of governance appropriate to the 
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corporate organization. For many years, PSUs functioned without a minimal 
complement of full-time directors. As Patil (2003) pomts out, it was only in 1984 
that the Bureau of Public Enterprises issued guidelines to PSUs asking for the 
creation of the post of Director (finance) and Director (personnel) While the 
guidelines also referred to the need to have broad representation for other 
disciplmes such as production, marketing, etc., these guidelines were largely 
Ignored.^  
R.H. Patil makes several suggestions for reform of governance in the public 
sector. He argues m favour of the strengthening of the Public Enterprise Selection 
Board (PESB). The PESB makes recommendations for the posts of chairman. 
Managing Director and functional directors in PSUs, as well as posts at other 
levels. It IS also supposed to advise the government on overall HRD policies at 
PSUs, mcluding performance appraisal, training and development, creation of data 
bank on managerial personnel, etc. A problem that Patil sees m the present PESB 
system is that its recommendations are not final: they are subject to further 
scrutiny. This, he suggests, should change, with the PESB bemg the sole decision-
maker. Further, the job of selectmg mdependent directors should also be 
transferred to the PESB. Not least, the boards of many PSUs need to be 
reconstituted with induction of mdependent directors as required and a panel of 
qualified, mdependent directors needs to be drawn up from which the 
Appomtment Boards of PSUs can select directors as required. Patil also suggests 
that the role of the admmistrative ministnes should be confined to two areas: the 
appointment of directors, based on the recommendafions of an expert body, and 
the issuing of transparent guidelines to PSUs under their jurisdiction. The latter is 
important because of the tendency on the bureaucrats to issue by telephone 
mstructions to top management of PSUs." 
Both these recommendation mvolve a substantial shift of authority from the 
admmistrative ministries to the respective boards of PSUs. This would not mean 
that the government, as owner, would not have a say in the running of PSUs. It is 
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just that government would have its nominees on boards and these nommees 
would work with fulltime and independent directors in formulating the PSUs 
policies 
The first Disinvestment commission, headed by G. V. Ramakrishna, made a 
number of recommendations for strengthening the governance structure at PSUs 
Again, a key recommendation was to professionalise the boards by inducting non-
executive directors chosen by the PESB. 
The government responded by announcing that m the case of 97 PSUs, the 
boards would have at least three non-official part-time directors, with such 
directors constituting at least one-third of the total strength of the board. The 
nomination of such directors would be decided, not just by the PESB as 
recommended by the Disinvestment Commission, but by a Search Committee that 
would comprise the Chairman, PESB, Secretary, Department of Public 
Enterprises, Secretary of the administrative ministry concerned, and some eminent 
persons. Clearly, the bureaucracy is reluctant to entirely cede over board 
appointments.^^ Other recommendations made by the Disinvestment Commission 
include conferment of greater autonomy, depending on whether the PSUs are 
strong performers or moderate performers, autonomy m fixing prices and superior 
compensation structure for top management, none of which has found acceptance 
with the government. 
There are many who believe that the political and bureaucratic class will 
never let go of their strong hold on PSUs, and that is why privatization remains the 
only means to improved governance at these enterprises. A more radical route to 
greater autonomy for PSUs proposed by the Disinvestment Commission was the 
creation of a National Shareholdmg Trust that would hold government shares in 
blue chip PSUs. First, there would be sale of shares to the general public Once the 
government's equity came dovm to 26 per cent, these shares would be transferred 
to the Trust, which would be managed by six or seven eminent professionals, 
including the Finance Secretary to the government of India.*"" 
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(F) ADMINISTARION AND GLOBALISATION 
Globalisation is a hideous word of obscure meaning, coined in the 1960s 
that came into ever-greater vogue in the 1990s. For many its proponents it is an 
irresistible and desirable force sweeping away frontiers, overturning despotic 
governments, undermining taxation, liberating individuals and enriching all it 
touches. For many of its opponents it is no less irresistible force, but undesirable. 
With the prefixes 'neo-liberal' or corporate', globalisation is condemned as a 
malign force that improvishes the masses, destroys cultures, undermines 
democracy, imposes Americanization, lays waste the welfare state, ruins the 
environment and enthrones greed. Many of these beliefs are wrong Globalisation 
is, no balance, resistible. But globalisation is also, on balance, highly desirable 
Precisely how desirable depends on the choices that are made.''' 
Anne Krueger, the first deputy managing director of the International 
Monetary Fund in the Bonython lecture, delivered m Australia m 2000, defined 
globalisation as: 'a phenomenon by which economic agents in any given part of 
the world are much more affected by events elsewhere m the world' than before.*^ " 
There is, however, another more technically precise version of this process: the 
integration of economic activities, across borders, through markets. David 
Henderson, former chief economists of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, defines globalisation as: free movement of goods, 
services, labour and capital, thereby creatmg a single market in inputs and outputs; 
and full national treatment for foreign investors (and nationals working abroad) so 
that, economically speakmg, there are no foreigners.'^ "^  
Brink Lindsey defmes the word globalisation: ''m three distinct but 
mterrelated senses: first, to describe the economic phenomenon of increasing 
mtegration of markets across political boundaries (whether due to political or 
technological causes); second, to describe the strictly political phenomenon of 
fallmg government-imposed barriers to international flows of goods, services, and 
capital; and finally, to describe the much broader political phenomenon of the 
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global spread of market-contend that globalisation in the first sense is due 
primarily to globalisation in the second sense, and that globalisation in tlie second 
sense is primarily due to globalisation in the third sense, I do not think it unduly 
confusing to use the same word to mean three different things." ' This is the useful 
definition of globalisation. A necessary consequence of such a process of 
integration is the increased impact of economic changes in one part of the world 
on what happens in others. 
A second and much more radical definition of a global economy would be 
one in which, in addition to the abolition of politically imposed barriers to 
economic integration, costs of transport and communications were zero. This form 
of a global economy is conceivable, but practically impossible. In this world 
distance would no longer matter. It would be the end of geography. There would 
no longer be services that are intrinsically non-tradable, such as haircuts hospital 
operations and looking after children or old people. The world would be like 
London or New York today, with almost every conceivable culture effectively 
cheek by jowl. Economically, the world would be reduced to a. pomt; something 
that cyberspace has close to achieving; but only for mformation.''^  
Thus, globalisation is defined in what follows as integration of economic 
activities, via markets. The driving forces are technological and policy changes 
falling costs of transport and communications and greater reliance on market 
forces. The economic globalisation discussed here has cultural, social and political 
consequences (and preconditions). 
Globalization means eclipse of state authority in regulation and control of 
the economy and leaving it completely at the mercy of the market forces. In such a 
situation the determination of employment, prices, interest rates, exchange rates, 
wages rates and all that are left at the hands off from all such responsibilities. It is 
argued in favour of globalization that it would and attracting foreign capital in our 
country that would accelerate our growth rate. Examples of South Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia etc., are cited in this connection. In my point of 
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view such almost city like states would not be path setters to such a vast countiy 
like India is still only a market for their,manufacturers. They feel introverted of 
investing their capital in high tech and manufacturers. Most of the foreign capital 
that has come in India after the declaration of this policy is m the shape of 
portfolio investment that is highly unstable and may fade away from this country 
at the slightest alleged reason. Thus, foreign capital investments, in fact, have less 
to do with our national priorities and they create volatility m the economy. 
Smce the Second World War, the advanced economies have all become 
liberal democracies. Today's globalisation is ultimately a consequence of that 
choice. Their governance has not been the same as nineteenth century laissez-
faire. States are far more interventionist. But acceptance of the basic logic values 
of liberal democracy-elections, property rights, liberal trade and, increasingly, 
liberal movement of capital-has been common to all the advanced market 
economies. They have differed, however, on the role of the state in income 
redistribution, regulation of private transactions and provision of public services 
All such differences within countries are negotiable, just as differences among 
them are manageable. Thus, it is evident that the move to economic liberalisation 
and democratization since the early 1980s has been a political economic 
catastrophe. 
Good markets need good governments. Unfortunately, good governments 
are not easy to fmd. Even m advanced liberal democracies, where governments 
work relatively well, political and bureaucratic processes are as flawed as markets, 
if not far more so. In general, it is a case of balancing defective markets against 
defective political processes. In developing countries, however, governments are 
generally still worse. Many governments are grossly incompetent, corrupt, or both. 
This is both a cause and a consequence of poor policy performance. Decentralized, 
competitive corruption, mcludmg state capture by corrupt private interests, is 
particularly damaging. Improvements will not occur unless and until these 
constraints are at least partially lifted. One important way of domg so, it happily 
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turns out, is to open up economies to global competitive forces. Reforms in the 
governance of the advanced liberal democracies have been designed to make them 
more effective. An important element in those reforms has been the mirror image 
of the observation above that good markets need good governments Good 
governments also need good markets. More precisely, the more the government 
focuses on its essential tasks and the less it is engaged in economic activity and 
regulation, the better it is likely to work and the better the economy itself is likely 
to run. This is an important argument for privatization. 
In the case of ordinary productive enterprises, nationalization tended to 
mean political interference and waste, but also a diversion of attention and effort 
by governments. In the case of utilities, privatization allowed the creation of a far 
more transparent and rule-governed regime than that m place beforehand. Again, 
this has important economic benefits. But it is also improves the quality of 
regulation. It is almost impossible to be both a producer and a regulator at the 
same time. The two activities are inherently different. 
The economies today are so interlinked and economic life now has become 
so competitive and mutually dependent that the national markets almost have 
turned into a world market and economies have partially or fully willy-nilly been 
globalised or are moving towards globalization. Globalisation is a term that has 
recently come into use, along with liberalisation and privatization covering all 
facts of life-political, economic, social and cultural. In economic context it may be 
defined as the global dimension of the evolving world economy. Globalisation is 
an unavoidable process, which is taking place independent of us. It forces us to 
cope with it. There is no room in a globalised world for an economy de-lmked 
from world trade and foreign investment. The truth is that if we do not reform 
rapidly, and position ourselves to compete, we will be marginalized. There is no 
divine dispensation that gives India alone the power to survive and prosper as an 
isolationist island m a globalised world. 
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A start has to be made by reducing the opportunities for corruption. Critics 
of the market and of global economic integration seem to be entirely unaware that 
a control, regulation or restriction creates an opportunity for corruption Wherever 
there is gap between the market value of something and an official price or the 
price government is prepared to allow, there is an incentive to cheat and to bribe 
If the black-market price of foreign cunency is twice the official rate, people will 
bribe officials to let them sell on the black market. Similarly, if imports of certain 
much desired commodities are restricted or under a very high tariff, business 
people will bribe officials to let them take the commodities in or evade the tariff 
Again, if one needs a large number of bureaucratic permissions to do something m 
business, the officials have an opportunity to demand bribes. But there is worse: 
once it is known that a government is prepared to create such exceptional 
opportunities, there will be lobbying to create them. Then there is not just the 
corruption of the government, but the waste of resources in such 'rent-seeking' or 
directly unproductive profit-seekmg activities'.^^ Broadly defined, globalisation is 
a long-run process with powerful forces behind it. Economics, traditionally 
defined, is a vital component of a wider range of positive-sum activities that 
compel ever-wider exchanges and, with those exchanges, construct bigger and 
more complex political institutions 
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INDIA AND THE WORLD ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
(A) GATT 
The international economic relations in the twentieth century witnessed 
developments which led to the evolution of concepts, percepts and doctrines 
completely unique in order not only to achieve order in international economic and 
trading relations but also in the establishment of international economic 
institutions. 
In 1916, the Allied Economic Conference, Paris, declared that with the 
cessation of war, all commercial treaties between the allied and enemy powers 
should be declared invalid and that, for an agreed period of time, the latter should 
receive no benefits from the 'most-favoured-nations' obligations. In this very 
period, the Wheat Executive of 1916 and the Allied Maritime Transport Council 
of 1917 were other efforts of multilateral action, which eventually became a model 
for future international cooperation. Before the First World War, there were some 
international multilateral efforts such as European Danube Commission (1857) to 
achieve order and uniformity in the respective economic activity of these unions at 
the international level. In 1920, the Economic Committee of League of Nations 
convened the Brussels Conference. It recommended, inter-alia, the abolition of 
artificial restrictions on international trade and restoration of pre-war trading. The 
League of Nations from 1920 to 1930, contributed immensely in developing new 
principles and doctrines for free trade at the international level. At the Genoa 
Conference (1922), a Convention on the Simplification of Customs Formalities 
was drawn up. Later on, the two Geneva Conferences of 1927 recommended 
'collective action' to encourage the expansion of international trade set up by 
excessive customs tariffs. Thus, in 1927, a Convention on the Abolition of Import 
and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions was adopted. It was the most 
comprehensive multilateral economic Agreement ever concluded till that time. 
Consequently, the World Economic Conference of 1927 refuted the traditional 
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international legal doctrine that taritTs were a matter of domestic concern and 
sovereign power, hence, the Conference recommended reduction of tariffs by the 
nation states individually and collectively.' 
With the 'general depression' of 1930s, the world's leading trading nations 
were deep in recession. At the same time, the United States raised tariffs on nine 
hindured items with the passing of Hawly Smoot Tariff Act of 1930. This was 
immediately answered by a world wide substantial mcrease m tariffs. The tariff 
increase echoed from one side of the world to the other, from Canada to Cuba, to 
France, to Australia, to China, to India, to Italy, to cite only a few, and above all, 
to Great Britain, which at the end of 1931, introduced its first major protective 
measures, and replaced them by the Imports Duties Act of March, 1932. All this 
led to the reversal of the trend towards multilatralism. Thus, the League of Nations 
witnessed from 1930 to 1939, an unprecedented world economic crisis. However, 
the United States in 1934 decided to liberalise trade by the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements programme borne of Cor die Hull's (the then Secretary of State of the 
U.S Administration) imagination by assistmg recovery of the American export 
sector through reciprocal tariff bargaming. The main aim of the 'New Deal' was to 
liberalise international trade from obstacles which had set in from 1929 to 1932.' 
Thus, the period of 1913-1950 which witnessed two world wars and trade 
wars, the severest economic depression in history, the collapse of liberalism and of 
the global market, very slow growth of output and international trade was one of 
the worst periods indeed. It has been very aptly observed that "economic 
liberalism, waxing from 1820 to around 1870, waning between 1870 and 1913, 
was practically moribund from 1913 to 1950".'' With the ravages of the Second 
World War, the economic problems became too dampening. So in 1944, even 
while the Second World War was going on, representatives of 44 nations met in 
Bretton Woods, USA, to discuss major international problems and to evolve 
practical solutions for them. The Bretton Woods Conference proposed the setting 
up of 
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(i) The International Monetary Fund (IMF) to alleviate the problems of 
international liquidity (i.e., to help the member countries to meet their 
balance of payments deficits) and international monetary instability, 
(ii) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to 
help the reconstruction and development of various national economies 
by providing long-term capital assistance; and 
(in) The International Trade Organisation to work towards the liberalisation 
of international trade.^ 
The IMF and IBRD (World Bank) were established in 1946. However, the 
proposal for the ITO did not materialise; instead the General Agreement of Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), a less ambitious organization, was formed in 1948. The 
Uruguay Round has agreed to transform the GATT mto a World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) from January 1, 1995. Thus, after about five decades the 
original proposal of an International Trade Organisation has taken shape in the 
form of WTO. India is one of the founder members of the IMF, World Bank and 
GATT.^  
Developed countries have been characterized for past some years by either 
stagnation or slow rates of growth, surplus in the capital market, and massive 
unemployment. Competition among the USA, the E.U. and Japan has made it 
practically impossible for them to perk up their respective economic conditions at 
one another's cost. The only feasible solution to their economic problems appears 
to lie in massive investment in the Third World and the draining of super profits 
Unrestricted penetiation of the poor economies by capital and manufactured 
goods, therefore, seems to be essential for the survival of the developed 
economies, and perhaps of western civilization itself. Since many TNCs have 
budgets larger than the Government budgets of many poor countries and 
technologies generations ahead, developed countries hope to convert the third 
world to vast captive markets for their capital and manufactured goods. The rich 
nations created organizations like GATT, and subsequently WTO, to promote 
132 
international trade and settle trade disputes among nations, but in reality these 
forums have been used by them only for protecting their own trade interest by 
using their clout and powerful lobbying which the poor developing countries find 
extremely difficult to match. 
Promoting trade among nations, providing technical assistance to address 
development-related issues, and financing development policies were meant to be 
the mtemational community's response to the ongomg quest of how best to 
address the causes of conflict. At the same time, a less ambitious project was bemg 
negotiated m Lake Success, New York. Between January and February 1947, state 
representatives concluded the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a 
legal instrument aimed at relaxing government-mandated trade protection 
Between April and October 1947, the members of the Preparatory Committee 
conducted a round of tariff negotiations in the course of the ITO negotiations at 
the European office of the United Nations, in Geneva. This was the first round of 
multilateral trade negotiations.'' 
The outcome of these negotiations, along with the negotiated document at 
Lake Success, together constituted the Geneva Final Act, which mcluded the 
Protocol of Provisional Application (PPA). Under the terms of the PPA, eight 
governments that participated in the negotiations undertook to fully apply Part I of 
the GATT (dealing with the most-favoured-nation, or MFN clause) and Part III of 
the GATT (containing articles dealing with administrative issues). They further 
undertook to apply Part II of the GATT (the heart of the GATT, covering national 
treatment, antidumping, subsidies, safeguards, balance of payments, prohibition of 
quantitative restrictions, exceptions to the obligations assumed, and dispute 
settlement) 'to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation'. The 
application of Part II only to the extent that its articles were consistent with 
existing legislation created what became known as the 'grandfather rights'. 
Consequently, parties with these grandfather rights were allowed to continue 
applying GATT-inconsistent measures notwithstanding their obligations under the 
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General Agreement Article XXIX; 2 GATT shows how temporary tins was 
mtended to be. It relevantly provides: Pari II of this Agreemeni shall be suspended 
on the day on which the Havana Charter comes into force. The reason why such 
commitments entered into force by virtue of the PPA has to do, essentially, with 
the unwillingness of the participating governments to await the final conclusion of 
the ITO negotiations The GATT entered into force on 1 January 1948, Its entry 
into force was provisional, pending the conclusion and the entry into force of the 
Havana Charter'' 
Following the explicit unwillingness of the US Congress to ratify the ITO 
Charter (6 December 1950), the GATT slowly developed mto an mstitution of its 
own, despite the fact that the GATT Articles do not refer to a specific mstitutional 
umbrella, and that this function was supposed to be played by the ITO. Therefore, 
the GATT, a de Jure mtemational agreement to liberalize trade m goods, de facto 
evolved into an international mstitution.* The integration process both benefited 
and suffered from this fact. On the negative side, the countries participatmg in the 
GATT could not plan ahead; any institutional innovation was more of response to 
an observed need, rather than a springboard, which would accommodate future 
challenges. On the positive side, however we can observe that this 'functional 
mstitutionalism' a la GATT, gained legitimacy precisely because of the edifice 
was built on observed and not imagmary needs. The fact that all decisions m the 
GATT years were taken by consensus added to the legitimacy of the whole 
endeavour. Decidmg by consensus m practice amounted to reachmg a decision, 
unless a contracting party explicitly opposed the decisions. Acquiescence, in other 
words, without explicit approval sufficed for decision to be adopted. As a result, 
the participants m the GATT process were formally contractmg parties (and this is 
their official title, as reflected in the Agreement), but behaved as members 
operatmg under a sketchy 'institutional' umbrella. A number of well-known 
GATT institutions came into bemg through a series of decisions reflecting the 
consensus of the GATT contractmg parties.'^  
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The basic purposes of the GATT can be scanned through its various 
Articles and the text, which is divided into four parts; Part I includes Articles I and 
II (i.e. the most favoured nations' clause and tariff schedules of the contracting 
parties). Part II comprises of commercial policy regulations (including, inler-alia, 
the provisions of freedom of transit, anti-dumping and countervailing duties, 
valuation, quantitative restrictions, non-discrimination, subsidies, governmental 
assistance to economic development, emergency action, security exceptions, 
consultation and nullification and impairment). Part III mcludes, inter-alia, the 
provisions on territorial application, customs unions and free trade areas, joint 
action by the Contracting Parties, modification of schedules, amendments and 
withdrawals. Part IV which was added in 1965, under the caption. Trade and 
Development, deals with principles and objectives for helping less-developing 
countries, delineates commitments and joint action to achieve the objectives of 
trade and development of the world at large m general and less-developmg 
countries in particular.'° The GATT provides for specific disciplines on trade and 
trade-affecting instruments. 
Tariffs and quantitative restrictions (QRs) are normally classified as pure 
trade instruments. Since the latter are, m principle, prohibited, the former 
constitute the only permissible from the trade protection in the GATT regime. The 
GATT aimed to discipline tariff protection by (1) reducing tariff-volatility and (2) 
reducing the level of tariffs altogether. The former was taken care of through the 
obligation not to impose duties above the negotiated levels. The latter happened 
through a series of multilateral rounds of negotiations at first focused on tariffs 
and later dealing with trade m general. During the GATT years, the contractmg 
parties conducted eight rounds of multilateral negotiations:" 
Na me of the Round Chronology Number of participants 
Geneva 1947 19 
Annecy 1949 27 
Torquay 1950 33 
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1956 
1960-61 
1962-67 
1973-79 
1986-94 
36 
43 
74 
85 
128 
Geneva 
Dillon 
Kennedy 
Tokyo 
Uaiguay 
Up to the Kennedy round, negotiators were essentially preoccupied with the 
reduction of tariff barriers. However, the Kennedy round shifted the focus of the 
negotiations to non-tariff barriers (NTBs), which had begun to be viewed as a 
formidable obstacle to trade liberalisation. Negotiators had originally understood 
the term NTBs to refer to non-tariff barriers imposed for economic reasons 
(antidumping, countervailing, safeguards), eventually however (first through the 
negotiations of the technical barriers to trade (TBT) in the Tokyo round and then 
through the re-negotiation of the TBT as well as the negotiations of the Agreement 
on sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) during the Uruguay round) they 
began to negotiate NTBs adopted ostensibly for public policy reasons (such as the 
protection of human health) unconnected, in principle at least, to the competitive 
position of domestic industries. In the case of intellectual property rights, trade in 
services, and domestic subsidies, WTO negotiations extended to domestic policy 
choices concerning industrial structure and regulatory frameworks that were 
argued by some WTO Members, most notably the United States, to impede US 
'market access' abroad, even if they cold not, across the board, plausibly be 
understood as discriminatory protection of domestic industries, i.e as having 
commercial effects analogous to those of a tariff or quota imposed at the border. 
Traditionally, the GATT was concerned with the trade in goods, which 
were mainly primary manufactured products. But the eighth round had a much 
wider scope, as new areas were included in the negotiations having implications 
for the production process of goods also. Agriculture, a controversial area was 
mcluded for the first time. Other new areas were: Trade Related Aspects of 
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Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Trade Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMS) and General Agreements m Trade m Services (GATS).' 
The Uruguay Round (UR) was the eight round of multilateral trade 
negotiations (MTN) concluded under the auspices of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The earlier rounds of multilateral trade negotiations 
had not received active participation from the developing countries The 
developed countries could manage to leave the sectors of greatest interest to the 
developing countries, such as agriculture, textiles and clothing, out of the 
negotiations. Both the developing and the developed countries shared active 
participation in the UR.''' 
The Uruguay Round Multilateral Trade Negotiation was concluded in 1993 
and the results of the negotiations were concluded m the Final Act or the 
international treaty that was signed by the ministers of the member countries m 
1994. Apart from TRIPS, the Uruguay round led to agreements m a wide area 
covering agriculture, textile, tariffs, trade rules, services and trade related 
investment measures. All of these agreements are such as to promote more 
competition, liberalisation and fair play while affording protection to the rights of 
'inventors'. It is the developed countries, which pushed for greater competition, 
liberalisation and protection. Hence, there is grave apprehension among several 
people in India, which defines itself as a developing country. ^ The original GATT 
contract underwent a substantial transformation during the Uruguay round; the 
negotiators agreed to add to the original text all adopted decisions by the GATT 
Contracting Parties since 1947. The new agreement has been termed GATT 
1994 16 -pi^ g GATT 1994 cannot be viewed in clinical isolation of legislative 
evolutions. The appellate body has time and again repeated that die Agreement 
establishing the WTO is one, and that the GATT is one of its annexes The legal 
implication is that the GATT disciplines have to be construed keeping in mind the 
rest of the Agreement establishing the WTO, which is part of the GATT context 
(in Article 31 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sense of the term). 
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There were three main characteristics of the GATT that rendered 
participation in the organization difficult. Although, formally a democratic one-
member-one-vote institution, most decisions in the GATT were taken by 
consensus. More of a de facto norm in the GATT, consensus-based decision-
making was institutionalised in the WTO through Article IX: 1, which states: "The 
WTO shall continue the practice of decision-makmg by consensus followed under 
GATT 1947.' Consensus is arrived at 'if no member, present at the meeting at 
which the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision'. There were 
four key problems with consensus decision-making, all of which persist even 
today. First, the key assumption in consensus decision-making procedures is 
presence, and many developing countries lacked permanent presence in Geneva 
and therefore have simply not been able to object to the 'consensus'. Second, 
consensus was arrived at through an open show of hands as opposed to a secret 
ballot. Many developing countries feared an open display of dissent and therefore 
resorted to the alternative of remaining silent. However, silence too was 
interpreted as a lack of objection and therefore equaling consensus. Third, the goal 
of consensus was used by the developed countnes as an excuse to hold small 
group exclusionary meetings. Fourth, any insistence on majority votmg would 
simply have resulted in the bypassing of the GATT by the developed countries, 
and recourse to bilateral and regional arrangements. Such threats were indeed put 
to use by developed countries m the Uruguay round. Given the norm of consensus 
decision-making, there was little question of makmg use of the power of the large 
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numbers that developing countries enjoyed as GATT members. 
The provisional nature of the GATT meant that it had a very small 
secretariat. In 1951, in recognition of the fact that the decision-making sessions of 
the Contracting Parties were not enough, an inter-sessional committee was formed 
This was replaced in 1960 by Council of Representatives-also a body of national 
delegates- with greater powers for the everyday management of the GATT. The 
secretariat that was eventually established was known as the Interim Commission 
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for the International Trade Organization (ICITO), with its name indicating its 
provisional nature As a result, the onus of negotiating and implementing the 
agreements fell on the members themselves. Not only did they have to be present 
to participate in the consensus-building process, but they were also required to 
have an informed presence to participate knowledgeably and actively m some of 
the technical issues that were negotiated. It was the members of the GATT 
themselves who took the decisions and enforced them, leaving the Secretariat to 
provide technical and administrative support. Contrasting power balances between 
the developed versus the developing worlds were hence translated into the GATT 
in contrasting resource availability and diplomatic expertise. It is not surprising 
that the GATT was seen as a 'rich man's club' where only the most powerful were 
able to represent their interests.' 
Consensus decision-making and member-driven character necessitated 
considerable reliance on network of informal processes to facilitate the working of 
the institution. This behind-the-scenes activity that is key to negotiatmg consensus 
took place in a variety of small group meetings and mformal meetings of Heads of 
Delegations (HODs). Its greatest drawback was that it dimmished the benefits of 
certainty that derived from belonging to an mstitution and were crucial for 
developing countries that have traditionally sought an 'authoritative allocation of 
values' as per Stephen Krasner. Particularly in the days of the GATT and even the 
pre-Seattle days of WTO, developing countries were often not even informed of 
key informal meetmgs that were called to beat the consensus into shape, and hence 
were left out of this crucial stage of consensus building. In the absence of strict 
rules about the agenda, membership, and frequency of the meetmgs, the mformal 
protocols of interaction and culture of the institution acquired overwhelming 
importance. The 'almost English club atmosphere...the codified language' made 
the Green Room consultative process even more in accessible for developing 
countries.'^ *' 
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The GATT, however, is not simply an agreement. Although it is an 
agreement now, it was once an institution as well. It is probably this function of 
the GATT, which has been the relatively more successful: in times where 
cooperation across nations was threatened, the GATT, with its pragmatic 
mfrastructure, managed to keep cooperation among nations alive, al least in its 
narrow field of trade. It is difficult to measure to what extent cooperation in the 
GATT affected cooperation across nations in other fields By the same token, it is 
difficult to establish a casual link between the GATT experience and the transition 
to the WTO. The fact, however, that many of the GATT features were kept intact 
m the WTO setting is an implicit approval of its record."' 
The unwillmgness of developing countries to participate m the GATT 
derived from the fi'ee trade ethos espoused by the GATT, which often contradicted 
the policies of greater protectionism and mterventionism in the developing world, 
especially in the late 1950s and 1960s. Additionally, the GATT was seen as a poor 
substitute for the stillborn ITO. Unlike the ITO, the origmal Articles of Agreement 
made no mention of economic development. The GATT also avoided distinctions 
between stronger and weaker parties, and was thereby seen to expose developmg 
countries to unfair compefition. But a good measure of unwillingness of 
developing countries to make use of the power of their large numbers in the GATT 
was a product of their belief that its institutional structures and procedures were 
unfavourable to their participation. ' 
There are uncertainties that our agriculture and food security will be 
severely exaggerated, that the agreements on trade related investment measures 
(TRIMS) will force us to accept foreign investment in all areas with majority 
participation and that our service industry will be totally flooded by large foreign 
service providers. Many of these apprehensions are not well founded. However, 
we definitely should be on our sentinel and in all future dialogue ensures that our 
gains will be at least as much as the gains of the developed countries. At the 
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instant, we must focus on strategies to be adopted to maximize to the gams from, 
and to minimize the unfavorable effects of, the agreements 
Here, the most important question arises, why do we need the GATT, in 
order to do what we would have been doing without it? The most persuasive 
response to this question is offered by the work of Bagwell and Staiger (2002) 
They explain that it is simply not the case that unilateral trade liberalisation is first 
best for all contries: countries that can influence terms of trade have a strong 
mcentive to set tanflfs and influence the terms under which particular goods are 
being transacted to their advantage. Unilateral setting of tariffs, though, can lead to 
terms of trade externalities: a country setting tariffs will choose their level by 
calculating the welfare implications of its tariff-setting to its domestic producers 
and consumers. It will, however, also be imposing an externality on foreign 
producers of the commodity hit by its tariffs, which, in all likelihood, will not be 
internalized.^ "^ 
India has a high tariff regime. Its aim has been raising of revenue, shieldmg 
domestic industry against economical imports and rationalizmg imports. It is also 
true that this shelter has given rise to high cost and high price producers, making 
them internationally uncompetitive. The tariff reduction is suitable and even we 
would advantage from the reciprocity. Standmg Committee of Parliament in its 
report on Dunkel Proposals stated: "There is no denying the fact that the final 
outcome is not in the best interest of India. But the multilateral agreements are 
based on the principle of give and take. The mterdependence of nations has been 
growing very fast, so the multilateral agreements with the most favoured nations 
treatment is certamly more advantageous than the bilateral ones. Every nation has 
a sovereign right to withdraw from the membership of GATT, but our mterest is 
not to be served better by givmg up the membership " 
The GATT was designed as a mechanism whereby, through liberalisation, 
trade across countnes would eventually occur based on comparative advantage. 
The subject matter of the GATT is charactenstically economic. Various factors, 
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however, influence the shaping of comparative advantage. The GATT, with the 
steady reduction of tariffs, has increasingly become the interface among partners 
with divergent regulations. 
(B) WTO 
The establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in January 
1995 was a culmination of international efforts over the past five decades to 
establish a truly international trade organization which should not only cater to the 
growing needs of international economic community which had witnessed 
substantial and enormous multifaceted phenomena especially of protectionism, 
regionalism and interdependence, as also to substitute the aborted ITO of Havana 
Charter with a new international organization plugging the weakness of the GATT 
which had served the cause of the international trade in a loose footed way. The 
WTO, therefore, can be characterised as completing the unfinished agenda of ITO 
and strengthening the GATT 1947, which was established by way of accident, by 
GATT 1994.^ ^ 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the product of successful 
negotiations during the Uruguay round. Article I of the Agreement establishing the 
WTO (WTO Agreement) states: The World Trade Organization is hereby 
established. Negotiators agreed to provide for an institutional umbrella that would 
administer all agreements concluded during the round. Article II of the WTO 
Agreement states about the scope of WTO.^ ^ 
The WTO may be a young institution, but it has a long history of evolution 
in the GATT and continues with many of the structures and decision-making 
procedures of its predecessor. Immediately after the second World War, policy 
makers recognized that there was a strong correlation between a stable and 
prosperous economic system and international peace. The memory of the adverse 
consequences of the beggar-thy-neighbour policies of the 1930s was still vivid and 
generated an unprecedented support for multilateralism by most countries, 
including the US. As part of the effort to build a stable economic system based on 
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multilateral institutions, tariff negotiations were opened up among twenty-three 
countries in 1946 that were aimed at building the International Trade Organization 
(ITO). The tariff concessions and rules that emerged from these negotiations 
became known as the GATT, which was accepted on a provisional basis and 
entered into force on January 1948. The Havana Charter establishing the ITO was 
agreed by 53 of the 56 countries that had attended the meeting m the same year. 
But ratification of the Charter proved difficult m many national legislatures. The 
US government's announcement m 1950 that it would not seek Congressional 
ratification of the Charter effectively rendered the ITO a non-starter. And the 
'provisional' GATT continued to provide the rules for the multilateral trading 
system for the next forty-seven years. The World Trade Organization has been 
created like its predecessor, GATT, at the initiative of the developed countries 
ostensibly for promoting free international trade, its true objective appears to be 
the creation of unrestricted investment and market opportunities for the 
transnational corporations of the North in the South.'^ 
The structure of WTO, which has been formally endowed with legal 
personality, and legal capacity as an international organization, is wide enough 
with a nucleus of ministerial conference, which is composed of representatives of 
all WTO Members and meets at least once every two years. The General Council, 
another governing body is the chief decision and policymakmg body, which meets 
as appropriate and is composed of all WTO members. The WTO under Article 
V.I has established arrangements with UN, WIPO, IBRD, IMF, Office 
international des Epizootics and International Telecommunications Union. The 
WTO has a secretariat located m Geneva and presided over by Director General, 
who is appointed by the Mmistenal Conference. The ministerial conference sets 
the powers and term of office of the Director General and the Director-General has 
the power to appomt the staff and direct the duties of the WTO Secretariat. Neither 
the Director-General nor the members of the secretariat may seek or accept 
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instructions from any national governments, and both must act as mtemational 
officials. 
International trade is one of the major engmes of economic growth. It not 
only enables us to obtain through imports things, which are difficult or expensive 
to produce at home by exporting those where we have comparative advantage. It 
also allows new products and technologies to make their appearance in our 
markets and thus encourages domestic producers to upgrade quality and 
technology. Fast growmg countries all over the world have opened up their 
economies and mtegrated with world trade. They have learnt to compete in world 
markets and to open up their markets to import competition. The WTO is an 
mtemational organization that supervises the rules by which sovereign 
mdependent nations trade with each other. These are rules that are established by 
negotiation. Membership of WTO imposes certain obligations on all of us but it 
also provides us protection agamst unfair practices, particularly from the richer 
countries. In the absence of some international rules of the game, we would be 
even more at the mercy of the rich. The value of being a member of the WTO is 
best seen in the far reaching concessions that China has recently made to the US 
and to Europe-gomg much beyond what is required by the WTO-in order to gain 
their approval for its membership.''^ 
The objectives of the WTO as reflected in its preamble 'in parenthesis' are: 
(a) That mtemational economic relations should be conducted with a view to 
raising standards of living, ensurmg full employment and a large and 
steadily growmg volume of real mcome and effective demand; 
(b) Expanding the production of trade m goods and services, 
(c) While allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources m accordance 
with the objectives of sustainable development, seekmg both to preserve 
the environment and to enhance the means of domg so in a manner 
consistent with their respective needs and concems at different levels of 
economic development. 
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The preamble identifies the less beneficial position of less developing and 
least developed countries in international trade and economic welfare, so that there 
IS a need for positive efforts on the part of international community of securing a 
share for them in the growtli of international trade proportionate with their 
developmental requirements. The above mentioned objectives are to be realised by 
entering into reciprocal and mutually beneficial arrangements that are directed to 
the substantial reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers and the removal of unfair 
treatment m international trade relations. 
Thus, the WTO accordingly, is set to develop an integrated, more viable, 
and durable tradmg system encompassing the GATT, the results of the past 
liberalisation efforts, and of the results of the Uruguay Round Multilateral Tariff 
Negotiations preservmg the basic principles of the earlier negotiations and the 
objectives underlymg multilateral tradmg system. The members of the Uruguay 
round have therefore agreed to the establishment of WTO (Article I of the WTO) 
and its mstitutional structure along with the commitments as agreed m various 
WTO Annexes.^' 
There have been some significant multilateral initiatives following the 
conclusions of the UR and creation of the WTO. The first WTO ministerial 
conference was held m Singapore in December 1996. The second ministerial 
conference held m Geneva in may 1998 carried forward the results of SMC (1996) 
and established a work program to examine trade-related issues mvolving global 
electronic commerce. Attention was paid towards preparations for the negotiations 
mandated under the UR-built in agenda. There was an ongomg interaction among 
the WTO members as a follow-up of the two ministerial conference to be held in 
Seattle from November 30 to December 3,1999. This conference was expected to 
launch a new round of multilateral trade negotiations to begin in 2000 (millennium 
round). This new round was to be devoted to items on the UR built-in agenda 
together with new issues to be decided upon. The third ministerial conference 
ended in a failure with the members of the WTO not being able to agree on an 
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agenda for the millennium round. Domestic US politics played a key role. There 
were strong differences between the European Union and the United States on the 
issues relatmg to agricultural liberalisation. Developing countries were unwilling 
to accept inclusion of labour standards and environmental issues within the 
purview of the new round. Small countries were left completely in the cold. The 
strategy and tactics adopted by the developed countries at the inaugural ministerial 
conference (1996) of the WTO at Singapore in a fact a contextual exercise m the 
promotion of their national interests. This, indeed, is the true face of globalisation 
Article III of the WTO delineates five ftinctions for it. These essential 
ftinctions are: 
1. Administermg and implementing the multilateral and plurilateral trade 
agreements which together make up the WTO; 
2. Acting as a forum for multilateral trade negotiations; 
3. Seeking to resolve trade disputes; 
4. Overseeing national trade policies; and 
5. Cooperating with other international institutions involved in global 
economic policymaking.^'' 
There is difference of opinion among political parties on the degree of 
opening up of our economy to foreign trade and foreign investment. As regards 
foreign trade, we are members of WTO and as such we are bound to fulfill all the 
obligations entailed by that membership. Membership of WTO also requires that 
we should abide by the agreement on TRIPS. Out of the eight categories of 
intellectual property for which standards of protection are incorporated in the 
TRIPS agreement, our existmg and proposed laws and regulations in respect of six 
categories of intellectual property are largely in consonance with the required 
standards. Our concerns with respect to TRIPS agreement are limited to granting 
product patent to pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals, patenting of microorganism 
or life forms and establishing an effective sui generis system for the protection of 
new plant varieties, i.e., plant breeders' rights." 
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We must remember that many developmg countries have already enacted 
legislation granting products patents. Apart from that, since we have the capacity 
to conduct research and produce new pharmaceutical products. In course of time 
we would greatly benefit by product patents in this area. We should encourage R 
& D in the pharmaceutical field and at the same time the government should effect 
improvements in the working of the patent office and m procedures relating to the 
grant of patents. 
The strategy and tactics espoused by the developed countries at the hot 
(1996) inaugural ministerial conference of the WTO at Singapore was in fact a 
contextual exercise m the promotion of their global national interests This, 
undeniably, is the exact face of globalisation. But a greater mtegration of the 
Indian economy with the rest of the world is inevitable. We must recognize that 
there are many countries which are knocking on the doors of the WTO to enter. It 
is significant that the Indian industry be forward looking and get organized to 
compete with the rest of the world at levels of tariff comparable to those of other 
developing countries. Obviously, the Indian government should be alert to ensure 
that Indian industries are not victims of unfair trade practices. The safeguards 
available in the WTO agreement must be fully utilized to protect the mterests of 
Indian industries. Indian must take a proactive stand m the next round of trade 
negotiations and articulate its own demands, focusing on what it wants from the 
global trading system, such as a prohibition of unilateral trade action, establishing 
symmetry between the movement of capital and natural persons and zero tariffs m 
mdustrialized countries on labour intensive exports of developing countries. 
(C) IMF AND WORLD BANK 
It was the devastation of the great depression and the disastrous breakdown 
of the mtemational monetary and tradmg system in the 1930s that led world 
leaders to create the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) m the belief that stable 
economic growth requires active economic management by government in both 
the domestic and international spheres. The BWIs were established in 1944 at the 
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New Hampshire Conference where major governments negotiated the institutional 
set-up for the postwar world economic order. 
BWls, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were 
created to bring about orderly development of the world economy in the post-
second World War era. The IMF was to oversee the new international monetary 
system of an adjustable peg linked to gold, and the World Bank to provide 
financing for reconstruction and development projects. Over the course of half a 
century, their roles have undergone drastic changes in response to changes in the 
economic realities and the dommant economic thinking. They have, at the same 
time, been key players in shaping the world of today. Reforming the BWIs will be 
a critical part of any effort to reform global economic governance in the new 
millennium.^^ 
The Washington Consensus refers to the development approach, which 
arose from the integration of traditional IMF concerns for macroeconomic stability 
(anti-inflation, ant-deficit policies) and the Bank's agenda of efficiency-enhancing 
reforms (openness, competition, deregulation, privatisation). A typical package of 
IMF stabilization and World Bank adjustment mcludes fiscal and monetary 
austerity, devaluation, trade liberalisation, financial liberalisation and bankmg 
system restructuring, price liberalisation, privatisation, labour market deregulation, 
tax reform, and subsidy cuts."''' The birth of the Washmgton Consensus reflected a 
shift in ideology toward neoliberalism that emerged after the erosion of the golden 
age. 
The structural reforms and liberalisation measures of the Washington 
Consensus that were introduced m the 1980s and the 1990s could not prevent the 
general decline of growth m most parts of world, with Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
former Soviet Union experiencing disastrous falls in standards of living. Until 
1997, East Asia was the notable exception, but has since then gone through a 
serious financial cnsis and setback. The neoliberal world economy has exhibited 
two kinds of crisis: the acute financial crisis, which has hit many emerging-market 
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economies and the chronic development crisis that has gripped much of the poor 
developing world. The incredible rise in the mobility of capital-with about two 
trillion dollars currently crossing borders everyday, and 80 % of which is purely 
speculative-has become a major threat to economic stability." 
Privatisation is widespread and accelerating. More than eighty countries 
have launched ambitious efforts to privatize their state-owned enterprises. Since 
1980, more than 2,000 SOEs have been privatized in developmg countries and 
6,800 worldwide. Up to 1990, many of the SOEs sold in Bank borrower countries 
were small or medium in size. The past two years, however, have witnessed an 
mcrease not only in the number of large SOEs being sold or readied for sale but 
also m number of the countries adopting privatisation and in the pace of sales. The 
World Bank Group has actively supported privatisation in more than 180 Bank 
operations, 50 advisory support and investment operations by the International 
Finance Corporation (IPC), and three projects by the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Because of three institutions have complementary 
roles. Bank Group support adds up to more than the sum of its parts. 
The World Bank and IDA have, till 1990, been lendmg for the Plan 
programmes. However the loans from the international institutions-World Bank, 
IMF, ADB-referred to here are in relation to the economic and fiscal crisis that the 
country has faced since 1990, for correcting some of our macro-economic 
imbalances and for effecting structural adjustments.''" As moneylenders, IMF and 
the World Bank would like the borrowing countries not to borrow from any other 
source, raise more revenues from tax and non-tax sources and control expenditure 
so that they have the capacity for timely repayment of their loans. 
Privatisation is a compliment to, not a replacement for, the other aspects of 
the development of the private sector in the World Bank's member countries. In 
many mstances privatisation will be less important for the growth of the private 
sector than the emergence of new private business. Measures that support free 
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entry by private operators will be crucial in shifting the balance of economic 
activities from the public to the private domain. 
The theoretical underpinning of the Indian reform process is predominantly 
based on the World Bank-IMF approach, which has come to be known as the 
"Washington Consensus'. This is essentially a reform strategy that gives primacy 
to the role of competitive markets in allocating and utilizing resources efficiently. 
The basic pomt being made here is that while it is convenient to use the 
Washington Consensus as the underlying model for the Indian reform process, it is 
a model that is clearly dependent on the existing conditions in which it is 
implemented. Also, the most successful countries in terms of growth performance 
deviated in significant ways from the prescriptions of this model."*' 
The International Monetary Fund, World Bank directed structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) laid emphasis on the package of liberalisation and 
globalisation of the economy through a process of abolition of import control over 
all items, including consumer goods, reduction in the rate of import duty, 
privatisation of the public sector and adoption of a better market economy to 
determine the pattern of investment and output. In addition, deregulation in terms 
of public controls, quantitative restrictions and procedural obstacles is 
accompanying feature of the reform package.'*' One of the major concerns of 
World Bank's World Development Report 1996, is how public agencies, legal 
systems, fmancial institutions, and educational and health system can all enhance 
the success of market economies.''^ 
Implementation of World-Bank-IMF remedy of devaluation does not seem 
to have delivered the expected goods to the Indian economy during the late sixties. 
Then, the pursuance of international Agencies advice to India during the seventies 
to go for international commercial borrowings, when the financial institutions of 
West, specially those of US, have been flooded with petro-dollars of the oil-
exporting countries, has resulted in the debt trap and the crisis proportions of 
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balance of payments problems in a period of only less than a decade when India 
has to negotiate an unprecedented loan of 5.75 billions from IMF-World Bank/^ 
The conditions are getting more onerous and their implementation is 
turning into a form of sanctions-as in the case of the loans for what the World 
Bank calls structural adjustment and the rate of the reforms process demanded by 
the IMF. As for alternatives to the loans from the World Bank and IMF, there are 
two altematives-the first is for us to save a little more to meet our capital needs 
and to change our life styles so that the import intensity of our consumption goods 
and the capital goods used for their production is decreased. Further even as the 
efficiency of production and distribution system is improved and the small starts 
towards globalisation suggested earlier to put into effect which will improve 
productivity, the flow of Direct Foreign Investment will begm to reach levels 
envisaged in the VIII Plan, creating in the process the competitive environment 
which is also a hallmark of the global system.''^  
The commitment by the World Bank of an IDA assistance of $3.5 billion 
over a three-year period for social welfare programmes underscores the 
multilateral mstitution's keenness to take care of areas likely to be neglected 
because of the stress on fiscal adjustment and liberalisation. It is possible that this 
initiative was prompted by New Delhi's general resolve to stick to reform path and 
reflected the Bank's appreciation of the various measures of liberalisation. The 
Union Budget for 1994-95 has sought to address itself to areas of social welfare 
and the assurance of IDA funding is a signal that the Government is free to pursue 
this course side by side with opening up and liberalisation and that the World 
Bank will not let a situation emerge where the stress of structural adjustment will 
go unattended. With the Union Finance Ministry, sometime ago, having decided to 
relax substantially the release of external funds to the state governments, the decks 
were cleared for the latter mvolvmg themselves actively in the liberalisation 
process. So far, the complaint has been that while North Block was pursuing 
earnestly the reform agenda, little support was forthcoming from the other wings 
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of the central government and, even more so, the various state governments. Yet, 
for getting the Bank's contmued support for social sector programmes, it would be 
necessary for Delhi to stick closely to the reform agenda. 
The World Bank and the IMF officials are persuaded that the changes that 
the Government of India have mitiated m economic and trade policies were 
mdispensable for the development of the economy. They feel particularly happy 
over the concession given to foreign investors and traders. But for us it is far more 
essential to understand that India cannot forever depend on foreign loans nor on 
foreign capital investment. Therefore, attention has to be laid on the building up of 
the capital flow within the country and on making Indian industry adoptable in the 
international market otherwise it will not be possible to get away from the clutches 
of foreign debt. Nor will it be possible to avert the country's trade and mdustry 
from going into the jaws of MNCs. 
For the time being there may be pressure to borrow from the international 
financial institutions. But this compulsion must not be developed into a habit. 
There is no easy way to get free from debts. For this we have to develop and 
utilize our own internal resources in the best possible manner, use the floatmg 
black money in the country for productive purposes and quickly develop our 
alternative technology suited to our temperament and needs so that we do not 
depend on ready made imported technology. This may take some time and calls 
for hard efforts and sacrifice. But if the will is there and the direction is correct 
and firm our country can, within the next years, be free from domestic and foreign 
debts and come to compete in the world market on equal footing. 
Indian policy makers should know that they need much more than the 
IMFAVorld Bank's occasional praise and the nation must have their sustained 
financial backing for programmes in areas that will suffer neglect with the 
government havmg to tighten its belt. This support itself is dependent critically on 
the progress of reform. The government will have to go beyond sustaining the 
liberalisation initiated earlier and must show that it is willing to proceed further In 
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this respect, what is being sent out is the message of retraction. On the Exit poHcy, 
while the government secured World Bank assistance for a social security net, 
there is little evidence of workers being pulled out from PSUs that badly needed 
rationalization of the labour force. The government has only managed to get an 
economic resolution passed at the New Delhi session of the AICC demanding 
strong action m regard to the restructuring of PSUs and on industrial sickness, but 
the policy and administrative measures taken only suggest a reluctance to exercise 
the hard option of reform. Presently, the tone on international fora is one of 
euphoria, but what about the future. It is inconsistent that more borrowmgs are 
offered for the detachment of the economy out of the debt-trap. The studies 
conducted by the World Bank and the IMF have clearly indicated that the 
structural adjustment program has not yielded the desired results. 
(D) SAARC AND REGIONAL COOPERATION 
The urge for cooperative relations between states is as old as the beginning 
of civilized life, but the experimentation of this concept gained momentum after 
the second World War. The emergence of bipolarity after the second World War 
led to the formation of a number of treaties, pacts and regional integration schemes 
m both the developed and the developing world. 
In present world scenario, regional arrangements have become genuine 
devices for the socio-economic endurance of their respective peoples. 
Globalisation is technology based phenomenon that brings enormous opportunities 
for growth, despite it there are also serious pitfalls. As a technology and market 
driven process, globalisation is unresponsive to human, cultural and environmental 
values. Equity and fairness are also beyond the caring of markets and 
technologies. Regional arrangements are thus significant to cooperatively resist 
negative manifestations of globalisation and averting threats to the cultural and 
environmental values of regions concerned In a world seemg an increasing 
liberalisation of trade, booming investment, rapid movement of capital, 
consolidation of the role of the private sector, regional cooperation and integration 
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IS becoming a vital necessity. The increased pace of economic globalisation has 
presented to the South Asian countries new opportunities and exposed them to 
new challenges. The weak economic structure of these countries has left them ill-
equipped to cope with the complex nature of these challenges. As countries across 
the Third World are trying to safeguard their interest by impartmg new vigour and 
depth to their existing framework of regional cooperation by instituting and 
joinmg new regional formations and adoptmg schemes for the deeper integration. 
South Asia is seriously being jeopardized. 
There is a compelling logic underlymg the process of constructive 
regionalism that enhances the member countries capacity to cope with the 
common challenges of globalisation. In the context of the segmentation of the 
world tradmg system, regionalism has emerged as the last resort to escape 
marginalisation and develop collective leverages in global negotiations. 
The first ever attempt at regionalism m Asia was made at the 'Asian 
Relations Conference' in March 1947, but it largely focused on the de-colonisation 
movements taking place in Asia. The region witnessed a few efforts by mid 1950s. 
However, these efforts were either promoted by anti-colonial ethos or by the 
prodding of ex-colonial masters. Dunng the cold war period, regional politics in 
South Asia emerged primarily to support and sustain military alliances and to re-
build, coordmate and integrate markets and economies of allies. The South Asian 
nations could not do more than preoccupy themselves with quarrels and conflict. 
In fact, the divisions and conflicts in South Asia were seen to serve the greater and 
better purpose in Cold War politics. The first regional grouping in Asia emerged in 
East Asian region. It was the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), a 
military alliance supported by the United States. From South Asia, Pakistan 
became a member of SEATO, as well as of the Central Treaty Organisation 
(CENTO), a military and economic alliance of Britain, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. 
After the Bandug Conference of 1955, Non-Alignment as an mtemational group 
emerged at the Belgrade Conference of 1961. Except Pakistan, all other South 
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Asian countries became its member. India due to its dominant position in the 
region was a leading player. 
The idea of a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
was mooted by President Zia-Ur- Rahman of Bangladesh/*'^  The SAARC was 
established when its Charter was formally adopted on December 8, 1985 by the 
Heads of state of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldieves, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka. It is an association based on the consciousness that is an increasingly 
interdependent world, the objectives of peace, freedom, social justice and 
economic prosperity best achieved in the South Asian region by fostering mutual 
understanding, good neighbourly relations and meanmgflil cooperation among the 
Member States which are bound by ties of history and culture."" 
The objectives, prmciples and general provisions as mentioned in the 
SAARC Charter are as follows: 
Objectives: -
1. To improve the welfare of the people of South Asia and to improve their 
quality of life 
2. To accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development 
in the region and to provide all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity 
and to realise their full potentials. 
3. To promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of 
South Asia. 
4. To contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one 
another's problems. 
5. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, 
social, cultural, technical and scientific fields. 
6. To strengthen cooperation with other developing countries. 
7. To strengthen cooperation among themselves in international forums on 
matters of common interests. 
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8. To cooperate with international and regional organizations with similar 
aims and purposes.' 
Principles: -
1. Cooperation within the framework of the Association is based on respect 
for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political 
mdependence, non-interference in the mtemal affairs of other states and 
mutual benefits. 
2. Such cooperation is to complement and not to substitute bilateral or 
multilateral cooperation 
3. Such cooperation should be consistent with bilateral and multilateral 
obligations of member states."' 
General Provisions: -
1. Decisions at all levels m SAARC are taken on the basis of unanimity. 
2. Bilateral and contentious issues are excluded from the deliberations of the 
Association 
The emergence of SARRC in 1985 coincided with the winds of economic 
liberalisation blowing over the Indian sub-continent. Sri Lanka liberalized its 
economy in 1977, partial liberalisation of the Indian economy began in 1985, and 
the late 1980s saw the mitiation of economic liberalisation both m Bangladesh 
(1987) and Pakistan (1988). With open economies in the four major SAARC 
countries, there was a need to explore the benefits of economic cooperation. The 
early 1990s also witnessed the end of the Cold War, and globalisation of trade and 
investment began taking place. This was further strengthened by the information 
revolution when Netscape was introduced to the Internet m 1994."'' 
The SAARC sought to achieve integrated package of greater cooperation in 
the following phases: 
1. The establishment of SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA). 
The agreement to this effect was signed in April 1993 and entered into 
force in December 1995, 
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2. The establishment of a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) by the year 
2010 by the least developed member states by 2008 and by other member 
states. 
3. The establishment of a South Asian Customs Union (SACU) by the year 
2015;and 
4. The commencement of the process of implementmg the remaining 
measures for moving towards a South Asian Economic Union by the year 
2020." 
After mitially focusmg on the non-economic issues, SAARC embraced 
economic cooperation m the mid 1990s. However, SAARCs economic 
cooperation have not yielded any impressive results in the global context. It is true 
that at present South Asian regional cooperation is far from the stage where EU 
and ASEAN have reached, yet it can not be denied that a small beginnmg has been 
made in this direction, which would produce far reachmg results m the future The 
inception of the SAARC represents unity m diversity. The Seven Member States 
are of different sizes, having diverse political system and varied security 
perception yet, despite the disparities, these neighbouring countries have made 
significant progress towards finding common grounds for economic, social and 
cultural cooperation. The SAARC members have fiilly realized that a solution to 
every nation's problems is possible by a collective approach. Thus, SAARC has 
become a living reality today, because the inspiration for regional cooperation 
emanated from common aspiration." 
The world-wide wave of regional cooperatives arrangements like EU, 
NAFTA, MERCOSUR, declaration on ASEAN Free Trade Area, APEC etc., 
provided a compelling force to the Indian initiative for greater economic 
cooperation in the region. With her new economic policy in favour of market-
friendly reforms India argued for adjusting to the emergmg political and economic 
landscape of the post cold war world. Sensing an ideal opportunity, India also 
pushed for building regional consensus on mtemational forums including on vital 
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economic issues affecting North-South relations. One such shift in India's policy 
stance was much talked about "Look-East Policy". It was keeping with this policy 
that Indian started to look towards ASEAN and APEC for a closer association and 
participation. 
The Indian emphasis on taking hill advantage of the process of 
globalisation and liberalisation was sharply underlined by the call made by the 
Indian Prime Mmister Atal Bihari Vajpayee at the Tenth SAARC Summit in 1998 
for sheddmg sterile ideology, hostile nationalism and conflicts of the past to fight 
poverty and backwardness m the region,^ ^ 
According to S. D. Mum: "India's regional trade in South Asia is 1 percent 
of its total foreign trade. Even in a strengthened SAARC when this trade increases 
substantially, it cannot fulfill the needs of the growing Indian economy. India also 
feels frustrated in its failure to induce Bangladesh for forging comprehensive 
economic cooperation ties and to mduce Pakistan in establishing normal trade and 
economic relations at the bilateral level, not to mention the irritation arismg out of 
the communal question in these relations. Therefore India has to look towards 
other economically dynamic regions for its investments, technology and trade. 
Hence its moves towards ASEAN, APEC and the Indian Ocean Rim".'*^ India 
became a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN in the areas of trade, investment, 
tourism, science and technology m 1993, after the end of the cold war. Later, in 
1995, India's status m ASEAN was upgraded to full dialogue partner.^ ^^  
India has also become a member of Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sn 
Lanka, Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), which was formed in late 
1997. BIMSTEC came up pnmanly as a result of 'Look-West Pohcy' of Thailand 
Some observes see BIMSTEC as a link between SAARC and ASEAN which 
might be extended to include Japan in fiiture.^' In pursuit of its 'look-east policy' 
India lanched a new cooperative forum-the Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) 
forum-with five of its eastern neighbours, namely Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam m November 2000 m Laotian capital Vietnam. The 
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Vietnam declaration issued on this occasion spelt out the parameters of this foaim 
to include tourism, culture and education as the initial areas of cooperation *'^  
India unsuccessfully tried to become a member of Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC). APEC economies m 1995 accounted for 55 per cent of total 
global income 40 per cent of global trade and a combmed income of over 13 
trillion US dollars. This rich club aims to strengthen an open multilateral trading 
system without attemptmg to form a regional trade bloc and to focus on economic 
rather than political and security issues. India's failure to join APEC is considered 
to be a failure of its 'look-east policy' itself" 
Regional cooperation m South Asia is nothing more than intergovernmental 
cooperation for the benefits of member states from within and without. It cannot 
expect to go beyond existing power relations within states even though they might 
be under authontanan and undemocratic regimes. In this, sense, it is cooperation 
to minimise divergence regionally, and an effort to create an island of peace. It 
may only be hypocrisy to constructive magnitudes of peace. 
Among successful regional organizations, such as European Union and 
ASEAN, economic cooperation played a pivotal role. European Union is 
culmmation of the process with the setting up of the European Coal and Steel 
community (ECSE) in 1951 by six original members-France, Italy, Germany, 
Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg to create one common set of policies, tariffs, 
taxes and to plan the production and use of coal and steel in whole Europe. The 
leaders mainly from France, Italy and Germany conceived it as the beginning of a 
movement to unify all aspects of economic and possibly political mstitutions in 
Europe, for the avoidance of further wars just as much a factor in their plans as 
technical economic aspects. Likewise, the ASEAN leaders emphasised national 
and regional economic development to face the challenge of communism. They 
worked on the principle of eradicating poverty to block communism. Thanat 
Khoman described this approach as "collective political defence" because 
"security no longer meant military security". This vision of security was 
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propounded by Indonesian military as the concept of national resilience to be 
amplified at the regional level. The idea of national resilience emphasised the 
"ability of a nation to cope with, endure and survive any kind of challenge or 
threat she meets m the course of her struggle to achieve her national goals" ''^  
Thus, the regionalist approach to economic cooperation helps to enhance 
prosperity and increase areas of interdependence breeds a sense of oneness in loss 
and gams; and reduces possibilities of political conflict. This very idea led to 
emphasise economic cooperation amongst the SAARC countries-one of the 
poorest countries of the world. 
(E) LIBERALISATION AND SOCIALISM: OPPOSITION COMPAIGN 
AGAINST DISINVESTMENT POLICIES 
There is no doubt that more than half of the public enterprises of the center 
and the states taken together cast a grave burden on the Indian economy. There are 
a very large number of loss-making unviable public enterprises. Even among 
public enterprises that are making profits, many are incompetently run, are 
overstaffed and are subject to political interference and patronage. One view is 
that there should be complete privatisation and the government should get out of 
the production of all private goods except for atomic energy and military related 
mdustries. Socialists and trade unions and also those who do not wish to rely 
wholly on pnvate enterprises obviously oppose this view. The view that the 
government sector should concern itself only with the production of public goods 
and some part of ment goods (except for some highly sophisticated weaponry and 
military goods) is generally held among western economists and policy-makers In 
their economies government do not play a direct developmental role through 
investment. Their private enterpnses are large, efficient and multinationals m 
scope. This is not the case in India. I could be legitimately argued that here in 
some important areas public enterprises should continue to exist at least till the 
pnvate enterprises come of age. 
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In 1985-86 when Rajiv Gandhi initiated liberalisation in the Indian 
economy, unresolved ideological conflicts resurfaced, especially as doubts arose at 
the same time (after the setbacks suffered by the Congress party in the March 1985 
elections in eleven states) about Rajiv's potential as a vote-getter. The left inside 
the Congress party, as well as old-style Congressmen attached to the socialistic 
pattern of society, resisted the departure from Nehru's policy of self-reliance and 
Indira Gandhi's pro-poor programmes. They echoed the criticism of the 
communist parties that Rajiv was "pro-rich". In May 1985, the economic 
resolution presented to the Congress Party Working Committee by Finance 
Minister V.P. Singh was shot down. The revised resolution passed by the All-India 
Congress Committee (AICC) deleted a critical sentence: "In the process of 
contmued development, the policy instruments relevant to one stage cannot be 
treated as permanently sacrosancf. In its place, there was a new passage that 
restated the Congress's commitment to the goal of achieving socialism. Rajiv was 
placed on the defensive. Subsequently, he reverted to Mrs. Gandhi's cautious 
approach of making piecemeal policy changes while insisting that his government 
was continumg the traditional Congress programme of the mixed economy, m 
which the public sector would control the "commanding heights".^' 
The liberalisation process has come in for criticism from two opposite ends 
There are those who feel that the process has been slow and not suflFiciently 
comprehensive. At the other end, there are critics who view the reform process as 
misconceived, ignoring the basic requirements of the people. While it is accepted 
that the growth rate m the post reform period has generally been higher, some 
concerns have been expressed about the slower growth rate in agriculture, lesser 
impact on poverty, reduction in capital expenditures of government, lack of 
adequate investment in social mfi'astructure and growing disparities in growth 
rates among states Some of these criticisms have validity and some others do not 
Some are related to the liberalisation process while others are not. Obviously the 
reform process must take mto account these criticisms. Reforms have not reduced 
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the role of the state. In some areas, the role has expended and some others, it has 
contracted. As has been, somewhat paradoxically, remarked "More market does 
not mean less government but only different government." ' The need for 
expanded state intervention in areas of education, health and sanitation cannot be 
underestimated. But it is only an efficient economy which will generate the 
necessary surplus which will enable the state to flilfil its socio-economic 
obligations. Efficiency and equity should not be posed as opposing considerations. 
In 1991 the opposition groupings, that of the National Front left parties, and 
the BJP, were in no position to attack the shift to economic liberalisation 
mtroduced by the central government led by the Congress. But within months, 
critics m the Janata Dal and left parties denounced the Congress (I) government 
for takmg an IMF loan that imposed conditions as robbmg India of its economic 
mdependence and condemning its people to mcreasmg unemployment and 
escalating prices. The senior Communist Party of India (Marxist), or CPM leader 
E.M.S. Namboodinpad, characterized the government's argument that there is no 
alternative to an IMF loan as "like a thirsty man takmg a cup of poison on the plea 
there is no alternative with which he can quench his thirsf. Foreshadowing the 
BJP's commitment to "swadeshi" (self-reliance), E.M.S. asked Indians to 
remember the Swadeshi movement that was part of the freedom struggle when a 
small elite had also become habituated to luxury goods produced with foreign 
capital and technology "while the large mass of people could not satisfy their 
essential needs''.''^ In the year preceding the May 1996 elections, the Congress (I) 
government's economic liberalisation policies were subjected to strong attacks 
from both the left opposition parties and the BJP. 
Privatisation of public sector in India is bemg opposed m some quarters 
both at the economic and pohtical levels. The trade union organizations excepting 
those affiliated to the Congress and BJP , are opposmg these economic reforms 
mamly on the grounds that it will lead to large-scale retrenchment of workers. It is 
also argued that pnvatisation of the sick mills will not help in improving their 
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efficiency and productivity as the private entrepreneurs are not interested in 
running these units but in taking advantages of the assets of these PSUs at low 
prices. Because of the stiff opposition by the trade union organizations the 
government may not be able to make any headway in this direction and pohtically 
It may not be feasible for the government to go in for privatisation of the existing 
PSUs m a big way. Opponents of the privatisation argue that low profitability of 
the PSUs is not a sufficient ground for their privatisation. They resist the method 
of measuring the private rate of profit, as it is insufficient to reflect the costs and 
benefits of PSUs. They argue for a social rate of profitability based on social costs 
and benefits, which is hard to measure. Leaving aside this controversial criterion, 
there are many other grounds on which we can examine the case for privatisation 
The feared large-scale retrenchment of workers can be avoided if the policy 
of privatisation is pursued at a low pace and with strmgent conditions attached 
with the transfer of ownership and/or control. In the initial stages, the direction, 
control and management of the selected PSUs can be transferred to the private 
sector. There are two strategies to adopt this policy. These are: 
(a) Privatisation of the existing PSUs at one go or in a phased manner, and 
(b) Privatisation of future industrialization through reallocation of investible 
resources in favour of the private sector along with creating a congenial 
environment for the growth of the private sector.^ ** 
The trade unions and political parties of the left resist the various issues and 
policies involving the privatisation of the existmg PSUs. Their firm resistance to 
the privatisation is based on the probable retrenchments because of overstaffmg m 
the PSUs and secondly, because of the qualms of the shutting of such units by the 
owners once these are transferred to them. The problem of retrenchment resulting 
from closure of sick PSUs after privatisation can be successfully dealt with if the 
transfer of such units is done m a phased manner and is conditional to their being 
in operation for some years. Despite these safeguards there may be some 
retrenchments where the units are not economically viable. 
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Swadeshi Jagran Manch (SJM) accused the NDA government of being 
"non-transparent and insecure" on its disinvestments poHcy and warned of 
launching a 'mass pohtical movement' to further the cause of swadeshi and self-
rehant economic model. "We are completely disappointed with the performance 
of NDA government on the economic front. This political regime will not be able 
to satisfy the aspirations of nationalist forces unless it makes employment and 
self-reliance as central issues of reforms", SJM convenor P Murlidhar Rao said 
on the sidelmes of the organization fifth national convention held m Hyderabad 
Making scathing attack on NDA government's disinvestments policy, the SJM 
leader alleged that the present economic policy domam had been "taken over by 
former World Bank executives who have no stake m nationalistic vision. 
The Supreme Court, m its judgement dated September 16, 2003 in the case 
of disinvestments in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd (HPCL) and Bharat 
Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (BPCL) restrained the Central Government from 
proceeding with disinvestments that would have resulted in HPCL and BPCL 
ceasing to be government companies without appropriately amending the statutes 
concerned. Several cases were subsequently filed challenging strategic sale in 
other PSUs in vanous high courts. Government has petitioned the Supreme Court 
to transfer all these cases to itself for a definitive verdict of the common issues 
Charging the NDA government with trying to "destroy national assets" in the 
name of disinvestmg the petroleum companies, the SJM leader said, "gross under 
valuation of assets and creation of private monopoly where the hall marks of the 
present disinvestments policy."^' The big story in the petroleum sector last year 
was the dismantling of the admmistered pricing mechanism (APM) ant its effect 
on the margins of the domestic oil marketing companies. The bigger non-story has 
been the aborted disinvestments of oil PSUs. Privatisation even one oil marketing 
company would apart from giving credence to the economic reforms, create 
competition and put an end to the de-facto government control of the oil sector 
even after supposed control.^ ^ 
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Drawing on his wide experience as a former top-level bureaucrat, Dr Nitish 
Sengupta of the Congress party spoke of the controversies surrounding the issue 
of divestment, a major sticking point between the UPA government and the Left 
Parties— t^hat provide support from the 'outside', without claiming ministries, but 
their numbers are crucial for UPA to maintain majority in Parliament "The CMP 
says that there will be no privatisation of Navratna companies (nme major profit-
making public sector companies that enjoy quasi-autonomy of management)," 
said Dr Sengupta. "But they can go to the market wherever it is necessary. This 
has become a major issue now because when the government decided to sell i 0 
per cent shares of BHEL (Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited), reducing 
government shareholding from 67 to 57 per cent, the Left raised an objection that 
this was a violation of CMP. That is not correct. Privatisation happens only when 
the government's share goes below 50 per cent. However, nobody m the UPA had 
the courage to explain this position, (and that divestment would) make better use 
of the resources of the government. Given the stock market situation, the sale of 
even 10 per cent of BHEL shares would have given the Government several 
thousand crores of rupees (One crore equals ten million). I have a feeling that if 
the government had stuck to its position, the sale of 10 per cent through a 
compromise could have been possible. This was one case where because of the 
Left's opposition, the government agreed to retain the shares."'"^ On the issue of 
divestment, Mr Mukhopadhyay said, "With regard to divestment, the Left has 
been saying right ft-om the beginning that, we are not interested m acquisitions 
and mergers. We want investments. We want public investments m agriculture 
and industry, private investments in industry. We have been talking about creation 
of jobs and not reduction in jobs." He questioned the government's policy of 
creating new industrial units rather than reviving existing non-performing units 
According to him, the cost of setting up a new fertiliser plant could be avoided if 
the government spends the same money on reviving sick units.^ ^ 
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CO!N'CLUSIO!N' 
India has a nearly four thousand years long administrative histor\' Imperial 
and unitary form of administrative systems; i.e. the Mauryan, the Mughal and the 
British systems have significantly contributed to the evolution of political 
mstitutions and subsequent administrative systems based on parliamentary 
democracy m India However, many other regimes such as Guptas, Cholas and the 
Sultanate of Delhi have also mfluenced Indian administrative system through the 
ages, which should not be undermmed. The administrative systems-Mauryan, 
Mughal and British are said to be the 'land marks' m the evolution of India's 
administrative system. This is mainly because they were being designed for 
common application over a major part of India. This commonality also infiised a 
unitary character in all these three administrative systems. Another similarity 
among these systems was in terms of their objectives that were, to preserve and 
promote the imperial interest of the respective regimes. Notwithstandmg its 
colonial character, the British admihistrative system marked the beginnmg of a 
scientific and universal pattern of administration. As a whole, all these three 
administrative systems along with many other regimes and empires have left their 
lasting impression on the present day administrative system in India, based on 
parliamentary democracy. 
Through the present study we come to know that public sector undertakmg 
is a modem innovation inducted into the economic activities of a state by which a 
government ensures equitable distribution of goods and services under its own 
care and control. The entrepreneur of a public enterprise is the government and its 
shareholders are the public that comprise, tax payers and citizens of the country 
Public sector undertakings are mainly created when public initiative is mcapable 
of ensuring the development of the main branches that accelerate the growth of the 
whole economy; when the government endeavours to build autonomous 
commercial enterprises free from bureaucratic procedures, when the public 
mterests in a number of areas are considered to be more important than private 
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interests which are aimed solely at profit-making and when the private sector 
consists of foreign investors who should not be allowed to penetrate the vital 
branches of the economy. The important drive of the government in building 
public sector is to avoid a concentration of economic power in the hands of a few 
private individuals who might use them to increase their political influence 
Maximum socio-economic benefits to the maximum number of consumers at 
minimum cost of production form the cardmal objectives of the government to 
enter into commercial, industrial or economic life. General objectives of a modem 
state m establishmg or managing a public undertakmg are viz., dispensmg of 
socio-economic justice, optimum exploitation of resources m men and materials of 
a country, attamment of self-dependence of the citizens as well as of the state, and 
freedom from exploitation of consumers by private entrepreneurs. The Acts that 
brmg forth public enterprises clearly lay down the purposes and aims which each 
of these enterprise have to pursue and strive to achieve. But the enterprises under 
the national government's control bemg managed by political bureaucracy have 
rarely achieved success in realizing their objectives. Politicians with no idea or 
practical experience, and the administrative bureaucrats without any faith or active 
mvolvement in the working of this socialistic innovation have created an ominous 
situation in which the public sector lingers without delivering the anticipated 
goods to the nation. Personnel of any public enterprise generally do not form part 
of the civil services of a country. Thus, the executive, legislature and the civil 
services do not have enough control over public enterprise personnel. Each 
enterprise frames its own rules and regulations for its employees. This is a 
statutory necessity. The Nehru government in India preferred appomtmg members 
of the Indian Civil Service even if they were not qualified for such posts or lacked 
the requisite commercial or busmess experience, to run enterprises in the public 
sector. In India, the model of establishing and managmg public sector enterprises 
has differed vastly from that of similar ventures in socialistic governments in other 
parts of the world. There are, however, different forms of exercismg governmental 
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control over public sector enterprises. In socialistic or communist states like the 
erstwhile USSR and other countries where the innovation of public enterprise had 
firstly been inducted in the economic field, it is the political party in power which 
directs the government as to how it should plan and promote public enterprises 
and manage them to realize given socio-economic targets. Public sector 
undertakings were being promoted for establishing social justice and economic 
equality in the nation, to raise the standards of living of the poor, and to add to the 
gross national product. But m practice, political bureaucrats and administrative 
bureaucrats occupying the top managerial positions of the public sector succeeded 
only in raising the standard of living of their own selves and that of their dear and 
near ones. To conclude, it can be safely said that the public sector has been 
summarily mismanaged by unprincipled politicians and opportunistic civil 
servants in India since the very beginning. Although, the public sector 
undertakings constitute one of the most important forms of development efforts 
made by governments. 
In India, public sector undertakings were formed in accordance with the 
decision to use industrialisation as a means of affectmg economic growth. In order 
to accelerate the rate of economic development and m order to free the economy 
from colonial dependence, it was necessary to build up heavy industries. Hence, 
the formation of a public sector in the economy of a developing country like India 
is had to be an inevitable process. India followed the British pattern to establish 
public sector undertakings in the economy. Public sector had been playing a vital 
role in building up the basic infrastructure for growth and settmg up core and basic 
heavy mdustries m the initial stages of the country's development by making large 
investments with long gestation periods, which the private sector would not have 
been able to do at that stage. Such investments created the infrastructure and the 
investment climate required for the growth of private investments. Public sector 
was protected from competition by state benefaction m various forms like 
budgetary support, price preference and capital restructuring. This, coupled with 
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bureaucratic control, political greed, lack of autonomy in taking commercial 
decisions and the consequent lack of accountability adversely affected the 
efficiency and profitability of the public sector, and made many public enterprises 
sick, their net worth being totally eroded by their accumulated losses They 
continued to survive due to government meeting their working capital 
requirements and reimbursing their losses from the budgetary resources, thereby 
mcreasmg their revenue deficits. 
The economic reforms mtroduced by the then prime minister, P.V 
Narasimha Rao, m the shape of New Economic Policy gave us some hope. But we 
should not have imitated the wholesale western model, as it could be dangerous to 
our own existence. We should privatise, liberalise and globalise our economy but 
at the same time should come up with a clear-cut economic alternative to the pro-
western pronouncements of Rao and later Devegowda, Gujral and Vajpayee 
governments. Attempts should be made to Indianize the system of our economy. A 
healthy mteraction with the western economic forces is welcome but the Indian 
identity should not be lost sight of Unnecessary bureaucratic control should be 
done away with, but the supremacy of the people and the sovereignty of the nation 
should be emphasized in unambiguous terms. The wholesale transplantation of 
western technology and consumeristic culture based on the principle of 
profiteermg is certainly not the solution to our problem. The impact of uncritical 
acceptance of the western model of modernisation and liberalisation of the 
economy has been much more varied and far-reachmg than is visualized. 
Because of the wholesale commitment to the neo-liberal market-friendly 
ideology and policies, the role, relevance and even the very existence of public 
sector undertakings (PSUs) are under constant questioning and threat. The 
government is committed to dismvest of its shareholdmgs m PSUs in order to 
privatize them. The advocates of the school of impairing greater autonomy to 
PSUs, on the other hand, have been strongly advocating the withholding of these 
enterprises. In their view, a few strategic measures such as strengthening the 
274 
Navaratana/Miniratana institutions, operating PSUs through board-managed 
organizations, and investing more monies into them, would faciHtate them to 
function better and augment their competitiveness, and contribute to consistent 
and sustainable development. A board-led enterprise is an essential prerequisite 
for the successful working of an enterprise. The institution of Board of Directors 
m PSUs frequently reveals the need for making PSUs as board led organizations. 
The compositions and strength of such boards should be such that \t may turnout 
to be virtues of PSUs and contribute to their improved performance. The 
government should restrict the number of government directors on the enterprises 
and appoint independent directors and also enhance the number of independent 
directors. In the changed economic environment of liberalisation, it is desirable to 
reduce the nommees from government and induct more mtemal and external 
professionals and expert members in the board to make it fijnction in a business-
like manner, of course without compromising the public purpose. 
Under liberalisation, we should have a policy that would work for PSUs. 
While the MoU and Exit Policy, no doubt, have a role in preparing the public 
sector for the challenges of tomorrow, these by themselves will not do. The PSUs 
should be competent to fight things out and this would demand a tough format. 
The PSUs fundamentally should be corporatized, not only in structure but also in 
its approach. The policy makers should first stop thinking about all the 
commanding heights of the past and settle down to the busmess of putting various 
PSUs m a position where they can perform competently. However, with the 
liberalisation of economy, restructuring of PSUs has to take a different dimension, 
simply cleanmg the slate will not do. The public sector should be given an agenda 
that will help them function at a competitive level of feasibility. 
Under pressure of liberalisation, the third world countries are often 
obsessed by ill conceived deregulation exercises as well as misperceived 
promotional exercises towards wasteful and environmentally hazardous processes. 
The liberalisation process is directed at speeding up economic investments and 
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removal of several existing rules on grounds, like environmental safety or other 
such reasons, has practically made hazardous impact on the economy The 
liberalisation programme to be successful should ensure that the benefits accrue to 
all sections of society and that it commands the acceptance of a wide constituency. 
Developments m the Indian economy cannot be de-linked from the international 
context. The process of integration of economies into a global economy is 
proceeding apace, and we need to be part of the process. Liberalisation at home 
must be a necessary precondition for expanding our involvement in the 
mtemational economy to obtain competitive benefits through reforms in areas 
such as agriculture and labour intensive industries. 
In our point of view, numerous problems inherited in liberalisation, as 
apparent today and as evident through history are posed by a close scrutiny of 
market operations. Such as: 
1. The fabulous claim that extension of private sector implies maximization of 
mdividual liberty has to be studied empirically. It will be deceptive to 
Ignore the coercive abilities of the market-operation. 
2. Markets fail to narrate to the requirements of people if not mterceded by 
individual purchasing power or public intervention. 
3. There are several areas where market mechanism is simply unable to 
operate. Public goods that are characterized by indivisibilities in production 
or by jointness of supply pretense a difficulty for market. 
4. Market mechanism in a lot of cases, is mcompetent of toning up to 
efficiency. Lacks of any regulation will only make thmgs unmanageable 
and thereby increase the risks, often unalterable of these processes. 
Thus, government mtervention in relation to, formulation and 
implementation of monopoly legislation, investment in human resource 
development, elimmation of barriers to the equalization of opportunities for higher 
earnings, information and marketing, physical and social infrastructure, research 
and development, and other measures conducive to the efficient flinctioning of the 
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market will not only be justifiable but it will also promote efficiency and enhance 
productivity of the market-oriented economy. Market liberalisation refers to 
change in policy framework within which the public enterprises operate, which 
will create a more competitive, market-oriented environment whereas, enterprise 
reform refers to internal change in the management, organization and operational 
practices of public enterprises. Privatisation refers to the transfer of ownership 
and/or control of productive assets from public to private sector. Market 
liberalisation can be implemented without changing the ownership or control of 
public enterprises. And ownership or control can be shifted to the private sector 
while leavmg the overall policy framework unaltered. Here, a question that needs 
to be answered is whether ownership an important determinant of economic 
performance? Economic theory suggests that improvements in efficiency 
performance depend not only on ownership, but also on market competition 
Sound, economic reasonmg also suggests that performance may be better under 
private ownership and control than under public ownership, and will be better in 
competitive rather than monopoly market conditions. 
Two key concepts used in this context of World Bank's notion of reforms 
are: capability and effectiveness. Capability is the ability to undertake and promote 
collective action efficiently (for example, law and order, basic infrastructure 
provisions, public health, etc.). Effectiveness stands for results that flow from use 
of capability to meet society's demands for public goods. The first step towards 
reforms is to develop a strategy in terms of assessment of where the state's 
capability is weak and how and where the state should mtervene Reinvigoratmg 
public institutions is the necessary next step to actualise strategy. This involves: 
1. Designmg effective rules and regulations, 
2. Checkmg arbitrary state action and combating entrenched corruption, 
3. Subjecting public institutions to greater competition to increase their 
efficiency, 
4. Improvmg performance, pay and incentives; 
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5. Making the state more responsive to public needs; and to this end; 
6. Bringing government closer to people through broader participation and 
decentralization. 
The trouble with our economic planners and politicians is that they base 
their conclusions and actions on economic parameters alone, leaving out such 
issues as population growth, ecological degradation, and unsustainable 
development all of which interact with each other and affect the economy We 
should, therefore, try to find an Indian solution to the Indian problem. The Indian 
economy is dangerously taking an elitist pro-western trend. It shall not serve the 
mterests of the nation m the long run. It may be a relief for the time being but not 
the remedy we are searching for. Therefore, we should globalise with caution with 
effective benign role of the state ensured. In our opmion the root cause of present 
day economic ills of our nation is corruption-corruption of all kinds, which is 
mainly due to the blind race for modernisation on the western model. Hence, we 
should devote our energies to the elimination of wholesale and retail corruption at 
all levels. Various scandals involving people from bottom to top and from top to 
bottom compel us to think agam. 
India's economic reform programme since 1990s has involved two basic 
sets of policy measures. The first set aims to accomplish macroeconomic 
stabilisation by reducing both fiscal and balance of payment deficits. Reducing 
fiscal deficits involves a cut in public expenditure, and also an attempt to raise 
public revenue to bring about a balanced budget over time. To reduce the BOP 
deficits, the economic reform program in India has heavily relied on currency 
devaluation to boost up exports and lessen imports. So far, measures taken to 
attain macroeconomic stabilization in India have been generally half-hearted and 
stumbling in nature. Overall budgetary deficits at the centre mcreased from 
Rs. 18562 crores in 1990-1991 to Rs.30265 crores in 1997-98. \t is also to be noted 
that the total outstanding debt of the central and the state governments m India 
mcreased from Rs 350959 crores in 1991 to Rs. 854029 crores in 1998. 
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The second basic set of economic policy in India since July 1991 has been 
to modify the production structure by mcreasing the role of the markets in the 
economy, directly through privatisation, or by way of reduction in state 
investments and interventions, and indirectly through domestic deregulation and 
by trade liberalisation. The overall effect of these measures has been to bring to an 
end India's relative economic isolation from the rest of the world economy. There 
is no misgiving that there has been an increased degree of mtegration of the Indian 
economy with the global economy in the 1990s. This has led to a fundamental 
shift in Indian developmental policy, away from Nehruvian socialism based on 
import-substitution industrialisation to an export-oriented industrialisation 
strategy. The industrial policy announced m July 1991 intended to free the 
mdustrial sector from barriers to entry, and from other limitations to expansion, 
diversification and modernization. Much of the industrial licensmg system was 
dismantled, and areas once closed to the private sector were opened up: electricity 
generation, some of the oil industry, heavy mdustry, air transport, road and some 
telecommunications. 
The implications of public accountability arise from the fact that the central 
govemment's financial stake in the company will come down as a consequence of 
disinvestments. The calculations show that the stake would fall from a high of 
89.5% to 58% per cent. One must acknowledge that even with this holding the 
centre would be able to exercise considerable control over the company's 
management. One obvious solution to ensure autonomy and relevant 
accountability for PSUs is to disinvest their equity to 49% or less to remove their 
handicap of being considered as a part of the state. The government could still 
retam a majority stake, say, through equity owned by a publicly held trust so that 
It is not perceived as holding a majority of the shares. 
K.S Ramachandaran in his book-77ie Reform Process: An Evaluation says 
that the public sector's continued decline over the past several years is no 
justification for its neglect in the present context of liberalisation It needs to stand 
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up to overseas challenges. It, no doubt, has its infirmities, but these have to be 
removed through an approach that shall sharpen its competitive edge Merely 
condemnmg it shall not do. 
Some broad conclusions relating to privatisation or dismvestment policy, 
which emerge from the present study may be stated as follows: 
1. Privatisation, which is being pursued since July 1991, has not been 
precisely defined anywhere. It has so far consisted of-
(a) Broad-basing the ownership and management of PSUs by selling 
government equity to the general public or the workers, or making 
"strategic sales" of PSUs on a selective basis and thereby mobilizing 
resources that could be used to reduce budgetary deficit of the government, 
(b) Revival of sick PSUs by referring them to the BIFR and closure of such 
sick PSUs that caimot be revived; 
(c) Taking measures to improve the performance of PSUs by giving them 
greater autonomy and making them accountable; and 
(d) Permitting private mvestments (including the inflow of foreign capital) in 
several areas hitherto reserved for the public sector, and facilitating and 
encouraging private investment and competition in such areas, particularly 
in infrastructure like power, telecommunications, air transport, road 
construction and information technology. 
2. Privatisation efforts so far have not resulted in any significant reduction in 
the number of PSUs or mobilization of sizeable resources by 
disinvestments. 
3. Privatisation would be meanmgful if besides (a), (b), (c) and (d) of (1) 
above, the PSUs are fully exposed to competition by withdrawal of all 
government protection and patronage and making them sink or swim on 
their own strength and simultaneously freeing them from all forms of State 
control (bureaucratic and political) and insulating them from political 
greed, or disbursing of patronage by politicians 
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4 Besides the implementation of the Competition Act, it is also necessary to 
have independent regulators to ensure a level playing field for all, and 
preventing and punishing unfair practices. 
International financial mstitutions like IMF, World Bank consider 
'Privatisation' to be an instrument of economic policy which when combined with 
other measures improves economy. In the global context, it is seen as an 
instrument to create market economy, generate local and international competition 
and improve national productivity so that a country gets a competitive advantage 
over other nations 
Mere privatisation of PSUs is not sufficient. PSUs are only one of the 
several ingredients of the public sector. It is essential to make thorough analytical 
studies of each ingredient, particularly government admmistration, to make a 
decision what package of measures need to be adopted to set the entire public 
sector on the right track. 
International experience leads one to conclude that divestiture of PSUs by 
itself is no panacea for ensuring their global competitiveness, which depends on 
management styles, policies and ethics irrespective of whether entrepreneurs are in 
the public or private sector. Objectives, country characteristics, compulsions and 
ideologies determine the best course that needs to be adopted. To make PSUs 
globally competitive, however, most PSUs need to be reengineered. One aspect 
that finds universal acceptance is that disinvestments proceeds should not be used 
to finance welfare schemes. 
With growing liberalisation of the economy, policy makers should 
concentrate sincerely to protect the PSUs and the domestic private sector even 
while encouraging the flow of foreign investment because neither can be 
sacrificed. This is the most important aspect since we need both foreign 
investment and the domestic enterprise. Reform should not be directed towards 
displacement of Indian skills and capital, and at the same time, the firm signal 
should be sent to the international community that the Indian economy was 
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opening up and should cease to be viewed as a closed shop. This is a difficult 
preposition, but the reformists m the government should be flexible enough to 
assure both sides that neither is neglected. In regard to foreign investment, western 
governments and industrialists need convincing that the doors are being opened to 
multilateral business 
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